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This thesis deals with the two most striking aspects 
of New Zealand's wartime politics ; the effect of the war, 
and particularly the public pressure for political unity 
that it generated , on party politics and the growth 
be tween 1940 and 19L!.3 of various new political movements. 
The election is obviously the focal point in developments 
on these subjects. By renewing the Labour Government 's 
mandate it enabled the already dead question of political 
unity to be decently buried, and by eliminating the small 
parties it ensured an immediate return to the two-party 
syst~m. Therefore the main interest in the 1943 election 
is not in its place in the development of electoral trends 
in the nineteen-thirties and forties , but in the culmination 
of political developments that were ~ direct result of the 
war . 
It is for this reason that I have given so much attention 
to the evolution of the Labour and National parties between 
·1940 and 191+3, for this explains many of the otherwise 
puzzling features of the election. The Labour Party had 
largely fought and won its battle against John A. I:ee and 
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the Democratic Labour Party be~ore 1943 ana National averted 
the threat from splinter groups on its r ight wing in 1940. 
In both these c.aees the election only dealt the coup de 
grace. Eowever, it i s easy to overlook the part played 
by the new parties, and particularly the Democratic Labour 
Party, in the politics of the ear ly nineteen-forties, and 
easy, too, t o f ·orget how powerful they appeared to be at 
times. Internal developments in the two main parties 
during the war years provide some fascina ting insights into 
the disposition of pQwer in modern parties. The displace-
ment of an old group of leaders in the National Party is 
particularly interesting in this regard. Such significant 
episodes may be lost sight of if the scope of a study such 
as this is too broad, or, as John A. Lee put it when 
discussing the period with me, if one sees the milestones 
but not the miles in between. 
Very little work has been done on t he growth of small 
parties in New Zealand, and the period of the nineteen-forties 
has scarcely been examined at all from thi s point of view. 
There has also been little written on Labour during its years 
of power, apart from Thorn's "Peter Fraser" and Paul's 
"Humanism in Politics", the latter a work of very little 
value. Robinson's thesis on "The Rise of the New Zealand 
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National Party, 1936-1949" covers the s tructural growth 
of the party during these years, but does not attempt 
to interpret shifts in the balance of power within it. 
Some overlapping will be noticed between the ground covere~ 
in Wood's'~he New Zealand People at War" and in this thesis. 
However, Wood has very little to say about the evolution of 
the new parties, or about the election itself. /here we 
have covered similar goound it is usually for different 
purposes. Nevertheless, this work has been an indispensable 
guide on political questions directly related to the conduct 
of the war, and my debt to it is very great indeed. 
Since this thesis is mainly concerned with the publicly 
stated policies of the parties, practically all the sources 
used are published ones. References to a number of letters 
and interviews are, however, recorded in footnotes to the 
text. 
An electric calculating machine was used for the ~igures 
included in Chapter VII. 
I would like to acknowledge, however inadequately, the 
help that so many people have given to me. I owe a special 
debt to the late Professor K.J. Scott, who died shortly 
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before I completed my work on this thesis. His help 
and friendly encouragement were invaluable on many 
occasions, and I know I am only one of many who feel his 
. loss as a friend as well as a professor. 
' I am also very grateful to Mr J. o. Wilson, the Chief 
Librarian of the General Assembly Library, and other members 
of the Library staff whose help and advice have made this 
.such a re~arding task, and to Messrs. J.G. Barclay, H. E. 
Herring ana J. A. Lee for their reminiscences and letters. 
Special thanks to· all .those who helped with typing, and 
particularly to Eileen Bollana for her excellent work on 
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INTRODUCTION 
THE WAR AND POLITICS 
Probably the most remarkable fact about the 1943 election 
was that it was held at all, for the preceding four years of 
New Zealand politics had been dominated by efforts to damp 
down political rancour to the stage where a national govern-
ment could be formed and an election avoided. The failure 
of these efforts, culminating in the break-up of the War 
Administration in October 1942, left a permanent mark on both 
major parties and was responsible for a substantial number 
of electors defecting from both parties in 1943 to vote for 
candidates who thought that neither party had tried as hard 
as it could to achieve political unity. 
The charges of these people, and of other groups in the 
community who condemned "party politics 11 , were in themselves 
well founded. Forces within the parties proved to be over-
whelmingly against a coalition government and any attempts 
at one had to be made in the face of bitter opposition from 
powerful supporters of both parties. An equally important 
factor, particularly from Labour's point of view was the 
readiness of embryonic political groups to take up criticism 
of the Government's policy should the National Party join it 
in a coalition. This was at times, as this study will show, 
the main •reason for the reluctance of the main parties to 
work for political unity. 
2 
For a short period- from September 1939 to May 1940 -
there was something approaching Parliamentary unanimity on 
the need to subordinate domestic political disputes tQ the 
war effort. Even before the outbreak of war, on August 3 
1939, Hamilton, the Leader of the Opposition , said in 
Parliament, 
"The Opposition wishes to assure the House of its 
wholehearted support in all and every action 
deemed necessary to meet the crisis that has arisen. 
The Opposition recognises that national unity is 
essential in such a crisis, and ~s~ures the Govern-
ment of its unanimous backing . " ~1J 
The National Party, however , obviously hoped that some 
move could be made toward a coalition government , and 
Hamilton's statement in September 1939 that "we are quite 
ready to co-operate with the Government in any way it may 
call upon us to do", was followed up a week later by the 
Nat ional Party Dominion Council's decision, at its quarterly 
meeting, to cut its Dominion Headquarters staff to a skeleton, 
discontinue publication of the party newspaper "National News", 
and reduce the supplies of party circulars and propaganda.< 2) 
Admittedly some such measures would have been necessary anyway, 
as wartime economies, but the fact that they were criticised 
in the party (3) shows that they ~eed not have been so drastic. 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
(3) 
N~PD, Vol . 255, p.492. 




The immediate Government response to these conciliatory 
gestures was disappointing to the Opposition. 
on September 5, that 
Fraser said, 
"we want as far as possible to agree on those 
matters where agreement can be reached, and if 
it can be done, to postpone matters on which 
there are obvious political disagreementy 1 also postpone matters which are not urgent" ~ J 
Hamilton , and two of his colleagues, J.G. Goates and 
G.W. Forbes, were shown confidential despatches on the 
crisis in early September. 
However , when Parliament reassembled on September 12 it 
became obvious that the Government could not guarantee that 
all its legislation would be acceptable to the Opposition. 
The main objects of contention were the Reserve Bank Amend-
ment Bill, which extended government control over the Bank , 
and the Marketing Amendment Bill , giving the State power to 
acquire and resell any commodities at fixed prices. Hamilton 
called these "revolutionary and objectionable" and went on to 
complain that the Opposition had received no co-operation from 
the Government and that he had not been given any more inform-
ation than the general public about the war situation.(2) 
(This apparently means that the Government had ceased showing 
confidential despatches to prominent Opposition members). 
(1) N~PD, Vol. 256, p.47. 
(2) Dominion, 15 November, 1939. 
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Thus the 1939 session of Parliament ended with the 
parties in complete agreement on the war effort, but in 
complete disagreement on domestic politics. This fell 
short of what Fraser had hoped for when war broke out, but 
the Government was certainly not going fast enough for some 
of its supporters. "Standard", on December 15, 1939 sounded 
a warning note against Fraser's policy of avoiding contentious 
domestic issues. 
The Government will fall only if it fails to carry 
out its policy - the policy which a great majority 
of the people voted for. The Gov~rnment has a long 
way to go. It must not hesitate .\1J 
Pressure of a similar kind was coming from the National 
Party too. Early in 1940, for instance, the Wakanui (Mid-
Canterbury) branch of the party resolved 
that this branch desires to draw the attention of 
the Mid-Canterbury executive •••• to the continual 
spread of Labour propaganda, especially over the 
radio of this country, while we are at war. We 
are of the opinion that the National Party •••• 
should consider renewing our effort$ ~n the 
interests of the Party immediately.\2) 
That the branch should have taken the unusual step of 
forwarding such a resolution to the newspapers is a sign 
that dissatisfaction with the party leadership's conciliatory 
attitude was widespread. 
Early in 1940 forces outside both major parties added to 
the pressure toward a resumption of party controversy. 
Standard, 15 December, 1939. 
Dominion, 24 January, 1940. 
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In March 1940 John A. Lee was expelled from the Labour 
Party and almost immediately began attacking the Government, 
among other issues on its adoption of conscription for 
overseas service.<1) At the other end of the political 
spectrum was the People's Movement, an avowedly non-party 
organisation which emerged to lusty life at a meeting in 
the Wellington Town Hall on April 30 , 1940.(2) The 
Movement concentrated its attack on socialism, but made 
no secret of its contempt for the National Party as an 
Opposition, pointing out that "there are thousands of 
dissatisfied National supporters todayn. The Movement's 
founder, E. R. Toop, went on to threaten the National Party 
with political action unless it changed its ways. 
"A third party at the next election will have a 
greater chance of success than either of the 
present parties •••• We must have a buffer party 
between the two extremes . It is within your 
province to say whether that buffer party is to 
be Mr. Lee's pa~ty or a safe, sane and commonsense 
middle party" ~3) 
Actually the Movement's announced policy was far to the 
right of that of the National Party (and included a virtual 
dismantling of the Social Security scheme) but its appeal 
to disgruntled National supporters was clear. 
(1) See Chapter 2 . 
(2) See Chapter 3. 
(3) Evening Post, 1 May, 1940. 
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Toop 1 s statement put the Nat ional Party 1 s dilemma in 
clear relief. Hamilton 1 s policy of co-operation with the 
Labour Government, partial and half -hearted though it was , 
had earned no response from the Government, and in his own 
party it had merely annoyed many of his supporters. Now 
his position was complicated by the emergence of a noisy 
right-wing group ready and willing to fill any opposition 
vacuum left by a conciliatory National Party. 
Hamilton 1s reaction was to give notice that the 
Opposition would begin to criticise Government policy in 
relation to the war effort. His statement( 1)ranged over 
much wider issues than previous Opposition criticisms had . 
At the same time he issued the first public call by the 
National Party for a coalition government . It was at last 
clear that unless the Government ·was prepared to show some 
appreciation of the Opposition 1 s forbearance, it would have 
to face increased criticism on a wider scale than previously. 
Public opinion in favour of a national government was 
greatly strengthened at this time by the extraordinary growth 
of the National Service Movement and the Returned Services 1 
Association 1 s agitation for conscription. As Wood (2)shows, it 
was this pressure from essentially non-political, or at least 
bi-partisan bodies, which forced the two parties into some 
co-operation. 
(1) Evening Post, 19 May 1940. 
(2) F. L.W. Wood, The New Zealand People at War, pp.131-139. 
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On July 16 , 1940 Fraser was able to announce the formation 
of a War Cabinet, consisting of Nash, Jones, Hamilton, 
Coates and himself . It was to make decisions concerning 
"production for war purposes, war finance require-
ments, emergency regulations so far as they apply 
to the war effort and generally to implement the 
policy of Parliament in relation to New Zealand ' s 
participation in the war 11 • ( 1) 
The arrangement was less than the full National Government 
which the Opposition wanted, but even so it was primarily 
the result of public pressure. Fraser had used this as a 
lever to shift the opposition in his own party, just as he 
had done on conscription earlier in the year . 
The disadvantages of a coalition, or any move toward 
one, were summed up by John A. Lee at the time • 
• • •• the gain will be largely psychological. For 
miracles will be expected and miracles will not be 
forthcoming • •• • Nationalist voters will expect 
Nationalist policies and Labour voters Labour 
poli?ie92)and everyone will be disgusted at the hybrl.d. ~ 
Lee embarrassed the Labour Party considerably by his attacks 
on the doubling of sales tax and the imposition of a wages 
tax, both of which were voted through with Nationalist support 
when Lee forced a division in the House . 
Reaction to the War Cabinet in the National Party was 
i mmediate. On 19 July the Christchurch "Press" reported 
that the appointment of Hamilton and Coates to the Cabinet 
(1) N~PD, Vol . 257, p. 512 . 
(2) John A. Lee•s Weekly, 24 July, 1940. 
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was followed by a move to replace the former as Leader. 
According to this report the move was blocked by "some of 
the older members", who persuaded the caucus to give the 
War Cabinet a trial of a few months , even though a majority 
were said to be against the whole idea of a national 
government.< 1) However, the damage was done, for the entry· 
· of Hamilton and Coates into the War Cabinet sparked off 
discussion in the party throughout the country on the leader-
ship question . The September meeting of the Party's Dominion 
Council received reports from many areas on the need for a new 
Leader, and when the Dominion Executive met on 1 November 
every Division of the party was said to be in favour of a 
change. After some hesitation , Hamilton called a caucus, 
which elected Sidney Holland , one of the younger members of 
the party, as Leader.< 2 ) The Dominion Executive also resolved, 
significantly, that Coates and Hamilton should remain in the 
War Cabinet but that the new Leader should not join. 
What "political truce" may have existed in 1940 had in 
fact ceased well before Hamilton 's defeat. In the 1940 
session of Parliament there had been some bitter clashes, 
for instance when F .W. Doidge, the most vocal of the ational 
Party "tough-liners" had said in the course of an attack on 
the government's war effort, "their hearts are not in the 
cause we are fighting for". (3 ) 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
(3) 
Press, 19 July, 1940. 
For a fuller account of these events, and a discussion 
of the reasons for them, see Chapter 3, pp66-71 
NZPD , Vol. 257, p.230. 
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The Opposition had been unanimous in opposing the SmallFarms 
Amendment Bill , which gave the Government power to acquire 
farms for soldier settlement at a fixed price. This was one 
measure which the older, more moderate Nat ionalists, mostly 
from rural electorates, could oppose wholeheartedly. Much 
publicity was also given to a speech made by P.C. Webb , a 
Cabinet Minister , at Denniston, during which he said that 
"when we win this war the capitalist will be as dead as 
Julius Caesar and the wealthy people will have played their 
last card". (1) Although obviously intended for West Coast 
consumption, this faux pas was widely quoted by the National 
Party throughout the war as an illustration of the Qovernment's 
aim to speed the introduction of socialism in wartime. 
Encouragement was given to the National Party by the result 
of the Waipawa by-election, held on 11 November, 1940, which 
resulted in a swing of 8.33 per cent to the party since 1938. 
Such a handsome increase in t he party's vote confirmed those 
who favoured a stronger Opposition and stressed the danger of 
allowing party electoral machinery to run down . Holland 's 
work in directing the National campaign in Waipawa tended to 
confirm him in favour with the extra-parliamentary party, and 
was later quoted as a factor in his election as Leader. (2) 
Soon after his election Holland issued a statement calling 
for a national government and emphasising, more significantly, 
that the National Party was ready for an election at any time.<3) 
(1) Star Sun, 21 October, 1940. 
(2) Evening Post, 28 December, 1940. 
(3) Auckland Star, 18 December, 1940. 
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Such political musc le-flexing was obviously no way to reopen 
the delicate question of nat ional unity, and it is doubtful 
whether it was intended as such. Fraser's only reply was 
to invite Holland to join t he War Cabinet, but Holland made 
it quite clear that the National Party would accept nothing 
short of a full coalition, (1) although this was obviously 
further away than ever in the sharpened political atmosphere 
that Holland was doing his best to create. 
That he had no intention of seeking a "political truce" 
was clear when he made a speaking tour of the country early 
in 1941. In Palmerston North, for instance, he attacked 
the Government in scathing terms: 
11 New .Gealand today is fighting two wars -one as part 
of the British Empire against an enemy seeking to 
destroy the rights and independence of the people of 
the Dominion, and another on the home front against 
a Government that is taking advantage of the war 
overseas to implement its full programme for the 
socialization of New Zealand 's indP,stries. 11 
These were far stronger words than Hamilton, or other older 
Nationalists, used during the war . In the same speech 
Holland said, referring to the War Cabinet, "the Government 
has failed to honour its promise that all matters connected 
with the Dominion's war effort would be referred to it." 
He also made it clear that National was not interested in the 
formation of a national .government until after an election had 
been held, although Fraser had always seen the avoidance of an 
(1) Press, 31 December, 1940. 
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election as one of the desirable results of a coalition. 
Holland's attitude was clear: 
"Having repeatedly refused a coalition war 
ment, the Government cannot ask and expect 
to join in one at this late hour.( 1)For us would be unfair to the electors." 
govern-
us now 
to do so 
Thus the National Party showed that it was primarily intent 
on fighting an election, in which, on the strength of the 
Waipawa result, it could make considerable gains, before it 
would consider a national government. During the next 
eighteen months the party see-sawed between stressing the 
need for a coalition, and the need for an election, until 
~ 1 after the failure of the War Administration in October 1942 
•there was simply no alternative but to hold an election. 
Labour feeling toward the National Party, of course, 
hardened under Holland's attacks, and suggestions of co-op-
eration were angrily rejected. 
6 March 1941 is typical: 
"Standard's" editorial of 
Babour has never sought power by making a compact 
with its political enemies. It will not now yield 
its power to them. Labour was elected Government 
of this country by the largest vote ever accorded 
one party in the history of the country. It has 
a tremendous majority in the House of Parliament. 
It can make its decisions and car~~)them out with-
out reference to any other group.~ 
This certainly seems to have been the majority view in the 
Labour Party, for "Standard" throughout 1941 was full of 
(1) Manawatu Times, 6 February, 1941. 
(2) Standard, 6 March, 1941. 
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reports of resoluti-ons carried at party branch meetings 
urging resistance to demands for a coalition. 
It is important to realise how far these views on unity 
differed from Fraser's. At the party conference in April 
he had said, referring to a further approach to form a 
national government from Holland , 
"I •••• stated (to Holland) that in the light of 
circumstances prevailing the question of postponing 
the General Election , which might be advisable and 
even inevitable owing to war developments, would 
involve the question of a National Government and 
that the Government would not postpone the election 
if the only result would enable the Labour Govern-
ment to remain in office." 
Fraser promised that "we will summon the conference together 
and tell you what the situation is" before any move toward a 
national government was made, and end~d by appealing to 
delegates to "keep a free and open mind" on the matter. (1) 
Both parties, however, prepared as usual for an election 
in October or November . By the end of August 64 Labour 
candidates had been selected and "Standard" urged party 
workers "to prepare for the struggle that is ahead".(2) 
By September 1941, however, it was clear that, although 
preparations continued feverishly, an election could not be 
held. The war in the Middle East and Russia was at a critical 
stage, and conflict in the Pacific seemed imminent. Few people 
in New Zealand would have welcomed an election; Fraser was 
(1) Standard, 24 April 1941. 
(2) Standard, 28 Augusi, 1941. 
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probably right when he said that "at least eighty per cent of 
the people do not desire a general election at the moment ."(1) 
What could Fraser do? Feeling in the Labour Party was strongly 
against a national government, and the Prime Minister knew that 
any attempt to form one would probably split the party. This 
was obviously in his mind when he told Parliament later, 
"It is no secret - among my friends at any rate -
that I explored every possibility , and I found that 
no considerable section of the people wanted a 
national government. I am not talking of the merits 
of that course, but I was forced - and I use the word 
"forced" - to the conclusion that any steps taken in 
the direction of forming a complete national govern-
ment would)cause more disunity at this moment than 
unity." ~ 2 
The National Party, seeing that there was no chance of 
political unity, was determined not to make the first move in 
avoiding an election. The Government, however, was given a 
convenient excuse to broach the question when a delegation 
representing many sections of the public waited on Fraser and 
Holland ~o request a postponement of the election and the 
formation of a coalition.(3) The Government caucus met next 
day, but according to the "Evening Post" opinion at the meeting 
was about equally divided on the question of an election, and 
there was no support for a coalition. 
without making any decision. (4) 
(1) N6PD , Vol. 260, p.1144. 
(2) N~PD, Vol. 260, p.1152. 
(3) Evening Post, 19 September , 1941. 
(4) Evening Post, 23 September, 1941. 
The meeting broke up 
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The only course open to Fraser was to approach the 
Opposition for support for a postponement of the elect ion , 
and this he did in a letter to Holland on October ?.(1) 
The Prime Minister asked what the Opposition attitude to a 
postponement would be , and again invited Holland to join the 
War Cabinet . Holland 's reply was far from accommodating . 
The attitude of the Opposition remai ns what it has 
consistently been since the outbreak of war, viz., 
we consider that a postponement of the elections 
should be accompanied by the formation of a non-
party government, so that the responsibility for 
this and other difficult questions caused by the 
war may be shared by a united Government and not 
by one party. So long as your party remains unable 
or unwilling to f orm a non-party Government, it must, 
of course in this as in all other questions, carry 
the responsibility for whatever legislation is 
introduced. 
Holland went on to say that if the Bill were introduced to 
prolong Parliament 11 then the Opposition, as a minority party, 
would have to accept the position and submit to the passage of 
the necessary legislation, 11 a remark vrhich made it appear 
that the National Party would prefer not to be implicated in 
the decision at all. 
Fraser pointed out in a sharply worded reply that 
11 
'acceptance' or 'submission' does not indicate support or 
preclude opposition11 • The next part of the letter shows that 
(1) This and the subsequent letters were read to the House by 
Fraser when the Prolongation of Parliament Bill was given 
its second reading. See NZ PD, Vol. 260, pp.1153-1155. 
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Fraser needed National support to persuade the Labour caucus 
to accept the Bill . 
I will be assisted personally very much if you would 
inform me definitely whether the Opposition will 
support or oppose such a measure as I have indicated, 
so that I can explain the exact position to the 
Labour Party caucus. 
Four days later (13 October) Holland replied that the Opposi-
tion would all support an extension of Parliament for one year, 
and the way was clear for the introduction of the Bill . 
The letters show clearly the difference between National 
and Labour on the question of unity . The Labour Party had 
obviously agreed to the postponement on condition that (1) 
It be for one year only and (2) no coalition be formed, while 
National were unwilling to accept the postponement without a 
coalition. Speaking in the House during the second reading 
of the Bill, Holland went out of his way to imply that an 
election would have been inevitable, and desirable , had it 
not been for the desperate war situation. "I think," he 
said, "the Prime Minister will share my opinion when I say 
that this decision is caused solely by the present war 
situation. 11 ( 1) and a later remark that "many people will be 
disappointed at the postponement of the electiod' 2) was a 
direct contradiction of Fraser ' s opinion that eighty per cent 
of the electorate were not in favour of one. 
(1) N~PD, Vol . 260, p.1155. 
(2) Ibid., p.1157. 
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Party warfare intensified rather than abated after the 
postponement of the election. On 19 January, 1942 Holland 
announced that he had prepared a detailed memorandum setting 
out his opinions on the shortcomings in the government's war 
effort. (1) After consultations with the War Cabinet he 
decided not to publish the document, but it was discussed in 
secret session on 10 February, and there was some acrimony 
when the House resumed open session. 
There was also a bitter dispute between Holland and Fraser 
over by-elections. In late 1941 and early 1942 four seats 
in the House became vacant through the deaths of Members, three 
of them on active service. Fraser 's opinion was that a candi-
date belonging to the party which previously held the seat 
should be returned unopposed. 
This argument, understandably, failed to impress the 
National Party in relation to the Bay of Plenty seat, for 
Labour's hold on it had been very tenuous in 1938 and Nat ional 
felt confident of victory. Holland angrily rejected Fraser's 
opinion that the 1941 postponement covered by-elections, and 
accused Labour of forcing the by-election by nominating its 
own candidate. Fraser had no difficulty in pointing out the 
flaw in this strange argument, commenting acidly that 
there is something more serious than the losing of a 
Parliamentary seat; that is losing one's head, or 
losing one's temper, or losing one's sense of propor-
tion in the assessing of relative values at the present 
(1) Dominion, 20 January, 1942. 
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grave stage of the war. The former Labour MP for 
the Bay of Plenty, Lieut. A. Gordon Hultquist, lost 
his life in our common cause. 
Holland replied that he had hoped that "a suitable non-party 
candidate acceptable to both sides" could have been nominated 
jointly by National and Labour, but this had never been 
suggested by Fraser and Holland had obviously made no move 
to do it. At the same time Fraser announced that Labour 
would not contest the Temuka seat, and the "Evening Post", 
which devoted nearly a full page to the exchanges between 
the leaders, called on National to withdraw its candidate 
from the Bay of Plenty contest.< 1) The vigorous campaign 
was interrupted by Japan's entry into the war , but the 
National candidate, W. Sullivan, won the seat and the party's 
vote increased 9.85 per cent over the 1938 figure. National's 
anxiety to contest the seat can thus be understood, if not 
excused. 
Labour did not contest any of the three by-elections 
held in early 1942. All were in strong National seats, and 
in Mid-Canterbury (21 January 1942) Mrs . Grigg, wife of the 
late member, was returned unopposed. However , the others, 
in Hauraki and Temuka (7 February 1942) were contested by 
Independent candidates, neither of them with Labour support. 
The absence of Labour candidates did not deter Holland from 
campaigning hard in both electorates, directing his strongest 
fire at the Government's handling of a rash of industrial 
strikes, particularly the one at Westfield freezing works. 
(1) Evening Post, 5 December, 1941. 
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A typical report of his campaign stated, 
The government should take the matter of defiance 
more seriously and he asked the Temuka electors to 
record their opinion that the Governme~t)was not 
strong enough to handle the situation.~ 
The Prime Minister described this as "trying to hit hard when 
there is no one to hit back", and condemned electioneering in 
seats which the Government was not contesting. (2) 
Scarcely was this interlude finished when New Zealand 
received the staggering news of Japan's advance through 
Southeast Asia . On 15 February Singapore fell, the Battle 
of Java Sea took place on the 27th, and the next day the 
Japanese landed in Java. On 7 March Rangoon was evacuated. 
For many New Zealanders the news shattered the illusions of 
a lifetime, and in a few short months the distant possibility 
of invasion from Japan became an urgent threat. The effect 
on public opinion was, however , delayed. There were no 
immediate public demonstrations as there had been when the 
demand for conscription was at its height in 1940, but during 
March similar results did occur in the Auckland province when 
the Awake New ~ealand movement began and grew rapidly. The 
movement was mainly concerned with arousing public interest 
in New ~ealand defence, and particularly with procuring better 
equipment for the Home Guard. A spokesman claimed 150,000 to 
200,000 members for the movement, and mentioned some large 
donations, most of it used to buy Home Guard equipment. 
(1) Press, 29 January., 1942. 
(2) Dominion, 4 February , 1942. 
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However, there was also a central organisation to "co-ordinate" 
approaches to the Government "on achieving an all-in war 
effort 11 .(1) The movement included businessmen, farmers and 
trade union leaders among its members. At a meeting in 
Hamilton, when the Prime Minister was present, delegates 
stressed the need for an effective national government, and 
also ranged, for seven hours, over such subjects as sugar 
hoarding and drunkenness in the Services. Fraser praised 
the movement highly, saying "This is an example of democracy 
that is inspiring, and I have enjoyed every minute of it.n(2) 
Public feeling such as this was not sufficient, at that 
moment , to overcome the strong feeling dividing the Labour 
and National parties. When the Labour conference met on 6 
April the National Executive reported that 
utterances made at recent by-elections, including 
those at which Labour did not present candidates, 
have shown that wartime unity can never be achieved 
with a party whose leader has done so much to prom-
ote political ~tfife and disunity during the last 
twelve months . ~3J 
The Conference resolved unanimously 
that it does not consider that a National Government 
as advocated by the Opposition and other political 
opponents and a hostile press would further promote 
such desirable national unity but on the contrary 
would engender disunity. 
The Conference also called on the party to remain pre-
pared for an election. 
( 1l ~~ Nelson Evening Mail, 30 July, 1942. Evening Post, 31 March, 1942. Standard, 16 April, 1942. 
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The Labour Conference's mention of a general election was 
taken up immediately by the National Party . 
Dominion Council adopted a resolution that 
On 17 April the 
in view of the decision of the Labour Conference to 
complete its own preparations for a general election ••• 
the National Party has no alternative but to accept the 
position forced upon it and to prepare for a general 
election as quickly as possible . (1) 
According to Holland , "the responsibility for the present 
political situation rests entirely with the Labour Party," and 
the National Party , if it won the election, would organise a 
"non-party government" immediately . 
Mr . Holland said the only justification for the 
extension of Parliament ' s life during the critical 
war situation last year was the hope that a national 
government would be formed, but the Labour Conference 
had refused to allow the Prime Minister to organise 
national solidarity, and the Prime Minister had 
publicly stated that he would not be a party to 
extending the life of Parliament if the only effect 
was to keep the present Government in offic~~ A 
General Election was therefore inevitable.~ J 
Fraser had indeed said this at one time( 3)but in October 
1941 the National Party had agreed to a postponement even though 
.Fraser had declared a national government to be impossible . 
Holland had admitted at the time that t he postponement was 
sufficiently warranted by the desperate war situation, and this 
had obviously not i mproved since . Hence his statement and the 
National Party's Dominion Council resolution were not greeted 
with much enthusiasm. Even John A. Lee, probably the Govern-
ment's bitterest critic, commented that the statement "does not 
(21) Dominion, 18 April, 1942 . ( ) Ibid . 
(3) See above, p. 12. 
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do credit to Mr . Holland 's leadership or to the National 
Party."(1) 
The formation of the War Administration two months later 
seemed, in this atmosphere , to be highly improbable. Yet it 
happened , and the election was avoided. As in 1940, when the 
War Cabinet was formed, pressure of public opinion broke the 
deadlock between the parties . In this case the body which 
forced the issue was the Returned Services Association , and 
one can assume that it had mucp unorganised public opinion 
supporting it. The RSA had been trying to obtain more polit-
ical unity for some time, and at the end of March 1942 Fraser 
asked it to formulate some specific proposals . There is no 
need here to describe the formation and short life of the War 
Administration . (2 ) However , previous studies of it have taken 
the cause of its breakdown to be the Huntly coal strike in 
September 1942, but this was only the occasion used to put an 
end to a scheme damned from the outset by its political 
unreality. 
Both party leaders defended the arrangement wholeheartedly, 
and in similar terms. They emphasised that a national govern-
ment was not possible, and that the War Administration was the 
nearest approach to one that was practicable. 
fair trial for it; as Fraser said 
(1) John A. Lee's Weekly, 28 April , 1942. 
(2) See Wood , op.cit., pp 231-239. 
Both urged a 
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"People may ask if it will work. My answer is this; 
of course it will work. Anything will work - even 
an inefficient organisation - if the people con9ffned 
put their hearts and their souls into the job."~ J 
There was obviously considerable opposition in the 
National Party, and when it met in Conference on 22 July many 
delegates were out for the scalps of those who had negotiated 
the new arrangement.<2) Holland rose to speak in a hostile 
atmosphere. He stressed that pressure of public opinion would 
have made it impossible to have broken off negotiations. 
"I did not receive one letter from the whole of New 
Zealand suggesting that the negotiations should not 
be proceeded with •••• Had the Prime Minister been 
able to say to the people of New Zealand 'I offered 
the leader of the National Party this set-up - a War 
Cabinet of six three from each side, as part of a 
War Administration of thirteen - six from the Oppos-
ition - I offered them control of War Expenditure, 
Primary Production, Civil Defence, a share in the 
control of t he· armed services, and in Munitions and 
Supply, as well as National Service; and if we had 
turned it down I am sure there would have been much 
more criticism - justifiable criticism - of the 
refusal to participate on thos e terms than there 
has been over the arrangement which we have made." 
Holland said again that as no full national government was 
possible a compromise had to be made, and that although he 
objected to the domestic cabinet functioning as before, 
"Mr . Fraser sa id that what he had in mind was that 
we might have combined meetings of all the ministers, 
whether domestic or War Administration, and that if 
we took things quietly the~~) may be no need for 
domestic Cabinet meetings."~ 
(1) NZPD, Vol. 261, p.373. 
(2) See Press, 24 July, 1942 and Robinson, op.cit., pp.134-135. 
(3) Nationa~ Part~. Annual Conference Minutes, 22-23 July 1942, 
quoted 1n Rob1nson, op.cit. pp.134-135. 
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Despite such assurances, there was considerable unrest 
at the Conference . There were reports of branches breaking 
up and members leaving the party in disillusionment, and one 
delegate warned, "Many people are afraid that this is the end 
of the National Party. 11 ( 1) The Conference delivered a pointed 
rebuff to the Leader by passing a resolution that an election 
should be held as soon as the war situation permitted.(2 ) It 
was clear that Holland had failed to justify the War Adminis-
tration to the Party, and that its approval was only on a 
"wait-and-see" basis. 
Reaction in the Labour Party, though muffled, was no more 
enthusiastic. "Standard", always a voice urging a more aggres-
ive attitude to the Opposition, did not have a single word to 
say about the setting up of the Administration. During the 
debate on the Prolongation of Parliament Bill (1942) the Labour 
MP , Morgan Williams, described it as "absurd", for it would be 
impossible to distinguish between war and internal matters . 
'~hat I do object to is that the Bill itself does not 
deal with the Government , but that the inclusion of 
the new Ministers is the bargaining-price that has to 
be paid to the Opposition in order to get an extension 
of the life of Parliament. I do not believe that the 
Bill, though it provides for the extension of the life 
of Parliament, will mean the continuance of the present 
Government. The present Government is too ridiculous 
to last." 
Asked to withdraw his last comment, Williams explained that he 
meant it "contained too many irreconcilable elements.n(3 ) 
( 1) Ibid. 
(2) Evening Post, 24 July, 1942. 
(3) NZPD , Vol. 261, p.551. 
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The extension of Parliament mentioned by Williams was 
opposed by many who might otherwise have supported the War 
Administration . Strangely enough, Holland , when he put 
the proposals before the National caucus, forgot to tell it 
about the terms of the proposed extensionf 1) When they were 
made public there were protests from such diverse bodies as 
the New 6ealand Freedom Association and the Auckland Trades 
Council(2) as well as from prominent members of the Nat ional 
Party. (3) In the end it was agreed to insert a clause into 
the draft Bill obliging the Prime Minister to move a motion 
either approving the prolongation or requesting a dissolution, 
at least once a year. If a motion for an election was passed 
the Governor-General would be asked to dissolve the House . 
This failed to satisfy many critics, however, for it was left 
to the House to dissolve itself, and then only if it wished, 
for the period of the war and up to a year after. When 
Parliament came to the second reading of the Bill an amendment 
was moved by Atmore , the Independent MP for Nelson, and 
seconded by Lee, to set up a Commit tee of the House to inquire 
into ways of ascertaining public opinion on the Bill, if 
possible by referendum . A division was forced; only Atmore, 
Lee and one Nat ionalist, F.W . Doidge, voted against a second 
reading. However, twelve Labour and five National MP 's 
abstained; hardly an auspicious opening for an experiment in 
national unity.C 4) 
(1) Robinson~ op.cit.p.133. (2) Evening Yost, 8 July, 1942. (3) E. g . W. Appletont speech to Wellington Divisional Council, 
Evening Post 4 July 1942. (4) NZPD, Vol. 261, p. 5B9. 
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Even outside the parties, what could be described as 
non-party opinion was not enthusiastic about the War Admini-
stration. It was criticised by both Independent Members of 
Parliament, H. Atmore and C. A. Wilkinson, as being only an 
arrangement between the parties and not an attempt to form a 
non-party government . Few newspapers were enthusiastic, and 
many mentioned the postponement of elections as an objection-
able feature of the set-up. 
Finally , neither National nor Labour could have been 
oblivious to the implications of J.A. Lee's exclusion from 
the War Administration . Co -operation between the two parties 
would have left the field of opposition, both inside and out-
side the House increasingly open to Lee, and he differed from 
both parties on important questions .<1) National was well 
aware of this, for as soon as the War Administration broke up 
it began to criticise the Government 's manpower policies in 
exactly the same terms as Lee had used for the previous two 
and a half years . The party could hardly afford to forego 
such an opportunity for criticism just when the results of 
New ~ ealand's manpower over-commitment were making themselves 
felt. Lee damned the War Administration as "conceived in 
mystery and bargaining and bearing evidence once again to the 
amazing fertility of the unfit 11 , and saw the "Holland-Fraser 
coalition" as "the death of the Labour Party. 11 ( 2 ) The threat 
from Democratic Labour was best summed up by Lee himself in 
(1) See Chapter 4. 
(2) John A. Lee's Weekly, 8 July, 1942. 
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characteristically colourful terms after the War Administra-
tion broke up. 
The vested-interests mob •••• sensed that Labour was 
on the morgue slab and that the Holland-Fras er agree-
ment put Nationalism on the slab as well. The Nat -
ionalist undertaker had become part of the corpse, 
and the way was open for Democratic Labour to act as (1) the undertaker of both parties. Hence their horror. 
Lee exaggerated the part that Democratic Labour played, 
or might have played, but the dangers of either party being 
too closely identified with the other were clear. The strike 
on the Waikato coalfields was a serious crisis, but it was the 
occasion, not the cause, of the breakup of the War Administra-
tion. Enough has already been said to show the strains and 
stresses that were at work in both parties to undermine it. 
Each party blamed the other for the rift and there was 
much recrimination both between Government and Opposition, and 
between the dissident members of the Nat ional Party and the 
majority. However , the \vhole subject was quickly dropped by 
both parties. It was now clear that an election would have 
to be held , and when the House reassembled in February 1943 
Fras er moved that "in view of the continued improvement in the 
war situation, a general election should be held during the 
present year." Only Sir Apirana Ngata spoke against the 
motion, and the rest of the House contented itself with rais-
ing such points as the rights of candidates in uniform and 
petrol allowances for elect ioneering . (2) 
(1) Ibid. 7 October, 1942. 
(2) N6PD , Vol . 262, pp. 28-36. 
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The process that had made the election inevitable was 
finished, and there was no further talk of political unity 
during the war . The rapid return to "party politics" after 
October 1942 showed that there had never been great support for 
a national government in either party . Both the War Cabinet 
and the War Administration had been formed as a result of 
pressure from public opinion and non- political bodies . Labour 
Party opinion, as expressed by annual conferences and "Standard" 
saw unity with the Nationalists as a threat to the Party 's 
social policies, and Fraser 's obstinacy in the face of such 
opposition probably only hardened this feeling in the long run. 
The National Party ostensibly favoured a full national govern-
ment , but knowing this to be unattainable , it shied away from 
compromise arrangements. The ostracism of Coates and Hamilton 
after 1942 showed that the party was no longer interested even 
in giving the War Cabinet any support. 
No moves toward political unity could really have succeeded 
after mid-1940. It has been shown that moves to oust Hamilton 
from Leadership of the National Party began as soon as he and 
Coates joined the War Cabinet , and the party obviously felt 
that it could not function properly as an Opposition while its 
Leader was a member of such a body . Party considerations aside, 
Coates and Hamilton were more realistic on the question of unity. 
Their experience in the 1931-1935 Coalition had shown them that 
it was not a matter of a sudden and complete cessation of "party 
politics", but of "agreements to differ" and a gradual extension 
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of the area of co-operation. Their own experience of govern-
ment in crisis conditions also made them more sympathetic than 
the younger Nat ionalists to the emergency measures of the 
Government. However, by 1940 National was beginning to make 
significant inroads into Labour's strength, as by-elections 
showed, and the new leadership of the party was committed to 
following up these gains by more aggresive opposition than in 
the past. The "tough-liners 11 in the party definitely had the 
upper hand after the end of 1940. Hence Holland 's decision 
to join the War Administration came as a surprise and a dis-
appointment to most of his supporters. A.D. Robinson, who 
had access to normally confidential National Party documents 
and minutes , concluded that it did considerable,though tempor-
ary, damage to party morale and strength.( 1) 
The threat to both parties from, on one hand, the Democra-
tic Labour Party and, on the other, the People's Movement has 
already been mentioned , and will be dealt with in detail later. 
Both these groups were quick to accuse each of the main parties 
of softness toward the other. At times Democratic Labour 
seemed a really serious threat to Labour. For instance, its 
candidat e polled 27 per cent of the vote at the Christchurch 
East by-election in February 1943. Usually, however, the 
small parties were a potential rather than a real threat, but 
they often played more part in the actions of the main parties 
than the latter cared to admit. 
(1) Robinson, op.cit., pp. 134 et.seq. 
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By 1943, then, the election was generally welcomed . 
There had obviously been some shift in support from Labour 
to National , but neither party knew how much , and both wanted 
to find out. The Government naturally wanted to demonstrate 
that there was, as it hoped , general support for its war and 
rehabilitation legislation, and the Opposition hope to capit-
alise on the various discontents resulting from wartime res-
trictions and shortages. An election would at least bring 
some stability by showing how much support the parties had 
lost or gained in the five years since 1938. Finally, 
Labour expected, and rightly, that an election would shatter 
the Democratic Labour Party and end Lee's political career, 
and National saw the election as an opportunity to settle 
once and for all the relations between Coates and Hamilton 
and their supporters, and the rest of the Party. 
CHAPrER 2 
THE LABOUR PARTY 
Labour in 1943 was a very different party from the one 
that had won such a resounding success in 1938. The changes 
were not all due to war conditions , but the war had brought 
to a crisis and resolved disputes which had divided the Party 
since the early nineteen thirties . The turning point was 
the expul sion of John A. Lee at the Easter Conference in 1940 
but Lee's expulsion was only one incident in the realignment 
of forces within the Labour movement . 
The three great issues that came to a .head in the Party 
at the beginning of the war were conscription , financial 
policy and the power of the Parliamentary caucus . The issue 
of conscription was the only one directly created by the war, 
and it was resolved in a very short time. This was partly 
because the strongest opponent of the party leadership on the 
other two issues - John A. Lee - was in favour of the fullest 
possible war effort , and quite prepared to support conscription 
if it was found necessary . Nevertheless , it is easy, twenty 
years later , to forget the strength of the opposition to con-
scription in the Labour movement during the early months of 
1940. This was, of course, the period of the "phony war 11 in 
Great Britain , when left-wing opinion was very suspicious of 
the war aims of the Allies , and it was doubtful if many in the 
Labour Party dreamt of conscription at this time. Even those 
who realised its inevitability could not have forced it on the 
party and the Federation of Labour. A typical headline in 
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"Standard" at the time, referring to agitation by the New 
L,ealand Defence League, read "Defence League Joins in Great 
Conscription Plot"(1) and "Standard's" reactions to any 
suggestion of conscription were immediate and vehement. 
In February, 1940 a joint meet ing of the party's 
Nat ional Executive and the Federation of Labour Nat ional 
Council considered the Government's war policy. The mani -
festo issued afterwards was in general and unexceptionable 
terms, but there was no doubt about its most crucial para-
graph. The manifesto was pr inted in "Standard" under the 
now famous banner headline "No Conscription while Labour 
Rules in New Zealand'', and the statement on conscription 
read, 
On July 13, 1939, a joint statement on "The Defence 
of Democracy" was issued by the National Council of 
the Federation of Labour and the National Executive 
of the Labour Party. That statement said, among 
other things; ''We are op posed to conscription for 
military service, either inside New Zealand or over-
seas. We are satisfied that there is no need for 
conscription; our young men will rally to the cause 
of the defence of their freedom against any aggressor." 
We now unconditionally reaffirm that statement. 
Labour still is, as it always has been , opposed to 
conscription and in favour of the voluntary principle 
of military service •••• We further desire to say 
that in our opinion there is no good reason for 
either conscription or anti-conscription movements 
in New Zealand. 
"THERE IS NO CONSCRIPT ION IN NEW 6EALAND, AND THEBE 
WILL BE 0 ONSCRIPTION WHILE LABOUR IS I POWER" (2) 
A short symposium on the question in "Tomorrow" (24th 
January 1940) throws an interesting light on the attitudes 
Standard, 15 February, 1940. 
Standard, 29 February, 1940. 
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of the Party's "left wing" at the time. The interesting 
features are first, the hesitancy of all the contributors 
in voicing an opinion either way, and second, the lack of 
unanimity of views among the four contributors, all "left-
wingers". W. E. Barnard was extremely vague and did not 
even mention conscription, but expressed a common anxiety 
about the lack of popular enthusiasm for the war. James 
O'Brien was plainly unhappy about the lack of defined Allied 
war aims, and feared that the war would develop into a World 
War I "slaughter", with nation after nation becoming involved 
against its will. "It is fairly obv ious", he wrote, "that 
until we have something definite to go on, opposition to war 
in all its forms will continue". A.H. Nordmeyer was the 
only contribut or to advance any arguments against conscription. 
His points were that people unwilling to serve would not be 
any more willing if compelled to do so, that one volunteer was 
worth many conscripts, and that New ~ ealand's geographical 
location demanded that she maintain a high proportion of man -
power on her own soil. His closing remark "that conscription 
of wealth must precede conscription of life and that the 
Government does not appear to have any plan for introducing 
the former," touched a point on which the Government was very 
sensitive, and cont inued to be long after the conscription 
controversy was settled. 
Lee 1 s statement made it clear that he was much more 
interested in supporting a full war effort against the Axis 
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powers than in arguing over conscription. 
"My attitude", he wrote, "to conscription or 
voluntaryism is determined by the extent to which 
I think we can and should make a war contribution 
in manpmver . I am not anti-conscription in all 
circumstances." 
Lee's stand, and the fact that he and Barnard had excellent 
war records, stopped any agitation against conscription 
when it became clear that its introduction was inevitable. 
Actually, agitation against the war and conscription was 
confined to a fringe group, some of them Labour Party 
members, who organised the Peace and Anti-Conscription 
Councils early in 1940. At a meet ing of the Wellington 
Council in January 1940, at which the Rev. Ormond Burton, 
Ian Mil~er and H. E. Herring , a former Labour M. P., spoke, 
the Chairman defined its aims as 
1. To bring together persons and organised bodies 
opposed to New Zealand 's participation in the war. 
2. To launch an immediate campaign against 
conscription . 
3. To defend civil liberties and social welfare 
of the people of New Zealand .(1) 
This movement was dealt with in short order by the 
Government under the Emergency Regulations . Its literature 
was suppressed, many of its leaders, notably Ormond Burton, 
were imprisoned or fined, and in Mar ch 1940 the Labour 
Conference forbade members of the Party to belong to it. 
In May "Tomorrow", a strong opponent to conscription, was 
quietly put out of action by a Government threat to 
(1) Tomorrow, 24 January 1940. 
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confiscate the printer •-s plant. ( 1) 
The Labour Hovement•s acceptance of conscription at the 
special joint FOL-Labour Party Conference in June 1940 came 
as an anti-climax but not a surprise. The 11 phony war 11 was 
well and truly over; ay had seen the German advance 
through the Low Countries, the partial collapse of France, 
and the air raids on Britain. Chamberlain's Government was 
replaced by Churchill's and British Labour entered the 
coalition. Churchill fully realised the value of a full 
statement of war aims, and his accession to power reassured 
most doubters of Allied intentions. In New ~ealand public 
agitation in some places almost reached the level of hysteria, (2) 
and the Government had no difficulty in persuading the Labour 
Party to approve conscription. The small group of pacifists 
in the Party had nearly all left it after the Easter Confer-
ence, and those who supported the war but had doubts about 
conscription had been silenced by the expulsion of Lee. Few, 
however, cared to debate the issue with the war situation as 
desperate as it was. 
The government carried the Labour Movement with it on 
conscription and it did the same on the question of finance. 
Here, however, the issue was more complicated, for it had been 
in dispute since the early 1930's, and it was one which the 
11 left-wingers 11 considered fundamental. The war, and the 
(1) See Denis Glover, 11Yesterday and Tomorrow", in New Zealand 
Listener, 3 July, 1959. 
(2) See Wood, op.cit., pp.132-138. 
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vastly increased State expenditure it entailed, naturally 
threw into sharp relief the differences between those in the 
Party who believed in free use of the public credit and those , 
notably Walter Nash , who followed in lines of conventional 
finance . This conflict was directly resolved by the expulsion 
of Lee from the Party , for he, more than any other "left -winger" 
was prepared to force a showdown on financial policy . There 
is plenty of evidence that before this event the Cabinet was 
treading warily. In September 1939, on the debate on the 
second reading of the War Expenses Bill , Nash said, 
"It is proposed, under certain circumstances , to see 
if we can raise some money by way of a loan but, in 
addition , and without creating any misunderstanding , 
I wish to point out that , where necessary , all the 
money required for the prosecution of)the war will 
be obtained from the Reserve Bank . " ~1 
In the same debate Nordmeyer, Mc 1illan, Lee, Combs and Atmore 
all spoke in favour of the lowest possible interest rate, or 
an interest - free public loan . S . G. Holland, speaking for the 
Opposition, alleged that the Bill's introduction had been 
delayed three weeks because of division over finance in the 
Labour caucus . 
"I suppose one of the first reactions of the public as 
they listened in last night to the Minister of Finance 
unfolding the Government ' s proposals for financing the 
war was a reaction of relief •• • • I say "relief" 
because the public is aware that in the Government 
benches there are a considerable number of members who 
are strongly opposed to savings in any form, and to 
capital in particular . There was intense fear in the 
minds of a great many people that Cabinet might not be 
able to resist the urge by those people to use the war 
(1) NZPD, Vol . 256, p. 340 . 
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as an opportunity to overthrow the capitalist 
system and the present financial system in 
general . 11 U J 
However , the rebels were far from quieted . Practically 
every issue of "Tomorrow" from late 1939 to May 1940 contained 
an article by Lee or W. E. Barnard attacking the financing of 
the war by raising loans. Had Lee not laid himself open to 
certain expulsion by his attacks on the dying Prime Minister, 
he and his followers would have caused the Government many 
anxious moments at the Party Conference. As it was, Lee's 
expulsion was accomplished with very little reference to his 
financial ideas, although some members , notably A. H. Nordmeyer, 
protested that these were really the major point at issue.<2) 
However, the Conference was greatly influenced by the emotional 
atmosphere of Savage 's last days. Lee 's enemies charged that 
he had hastened the Prime Minister 's death by his attack on him 
in the article "Psychopathology in Politics 11 .(3) 
Hence the 1940 Budget provided for the financing of the 
war on completely orthodox lines. Gone was the talk of Res-
erve Bank credit and debt-free loans. War expenditure was to 
be met by taxation and by borrowing, as many of the loans as 
possible to be raised in New Zealand . However , Nash(4)admitted 
that about £20,000 ,000 would have to be borrowed from Britain . 
Nash 's long speech at the end of the 1940 Budget debate was 
(1) NZPD, Vol. 256, p.384. 
(2) Standard , 28 March, 1940. 
(3) Tomorrowi 6 December 1939. (4) NZPD, Vo • 257, pp .585-598. 
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published by the Labour Party as a pamphlet entitled "Nash 
Replies to the Critics". After summarising economic cond-
itions between 1935 and 1939, Nash defended the level of 
civil expenditure for 1940. The rest of his speech was an 
answer to critics within his own Party. The following 
passage was printed in heavy black type in the pamphlet, 
"But if we take from the Reserve Bank large sums of 
money and just thro~oT the money into the purchasing 
pool without getting commodities in return then we 
shall damage the economy of this country to a 
greater extent than it has ever been damaged before, 
and in addition we will cause untold hardship and 
suffering to a very large section of the community 
including wage and salary earners and those on small 
fixed incomes whose welfare and protection is this 
Government's first and foremost responsibility. 
Unless new money creates new goods the people are 
penalised and not benefited by its creation . If 
the new money results i~ the production of new goods 
it is all to the good."~1J 
In his introduction to the pamphlet the Prime Minister 
described its purpose as a rebuttal 
To the critics who range from those who would prac-
tically destroy all our social services in the name 
of equality of sacrifice to others even more imposs-
ible who would merely use the printing press to 
supply the necessary money and create inflation 
with disastrous results to wage earners and all 
others on small incomes. 
In other words answering critics in the Labour Party was 
placed in equal importance with answering those in the National 
Party. With the notable, but lone exception of Frank Langstone, 
there was no further public challenge to the Government ' s finan-
cial policy during the war. The crusade against 11debt finance" 
(1) Ibid., p.596. The wording of the speech was changed 
slightly in the pamphlet. 
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was taken up by the Democratic Labour and the rejuvenated 
Social Credit Movement . (1) 
The third issue resolved in the early months of 1940 
was that of the relation between the party 1 s Parliamentary 
caucus and Cabinet. This problem did not become apparent 
when Labour first formed a Government, for in 1935 the caucus, 
containing a majority of new M. P. 1 s, was prepared and glad to 
leave the Prime Minister to select the Cabinet from among the 
Labour veterans. However , it gradually became clear that 
Savage would not regard caucus decisions as binding on matters 
of policy.<2) During 1936 and 1937 there were clashes over 
pensions and the nationalization of the Bank of New Zealand 
and it was when caucus passed a resolution on 30 November 
1937 demanding the latter, that Savage for the first time said 
he would refuse to accept a majority resolution. Wilson, the 
Secretary of the Party, laid it down that the National Execu-
tive would probably support the Prime Minister in such an 
impasse. (3) After the 1938 election Lee moved that Cabinet 
be elected preferentially from a list of caucus members and 
that the Prime Minister be re-elected. The scene was des-
cribed by Lee, 
11 Caucus carried the resolution by 26 to 22. 
Prime Minister gathered up his papers, said 
ends matters 1 , used a few unprintable words 
wa lked out. He sent no message to caucus. 
few Cabinet Ministers came back but not the 
(1) See Chapter 4. 
(2) See J.A. Lee, I Fight for New Zealand . 







inister. A Cabinet Minister or two tried to 
persuade the Prime Minister to return but he 
sulked in his tent. The late Teddy Howard set 
the chaps community singing. Thus did the 
caucus, following upon Labour's great victory, 
disperse. The M.P.'s returned to their homes, 
and the Prime Minister breathed threats and 
imprecations at his Party through the Press, (1) which was delighted at "his statesmanlike stand". 
No caucus was held for several months, and during this 
time relations between Cabinet and the "left wing" were 
further strained by the accidental publication of the famous 
"Lee Letter", a memorandum written by Lee to all Labour M. P.'s 
strongly criticising the Government's economic and financial 
record. Savage's illness and the war damped down the centro-
versy to some extent, but it broke out afresh at the end of 
1939, when Savage proposed the appointment of Wilson, the 
party secretary, to the Cabinet and the appointment of Barclay, 
Roberts , Thorn and O' Brien as Parliamentary Under-Secretaries. 
At the caucus, the last one Savage attended, he refused to 
accept any nominations against Wilson 's, but a vote was forced 
and the result was only 19 to 18 in favour of the appointment. 
Caucus refused the offer of Under-Secretaryships. (2) 
It was known that Fraser was a strong believer in demo-
cratic control of the Party, and when he became Erime Minister 
Caucus did not try to change the composition of Cabinet. 
However , some mending of relations between Caucus and Cabinet 
was imperative, and Fraser could not have carried on in 
(1) Ibid., p.25· 
(2) Ibid., p.31. 
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Savage's manner even had he wanted to. Fraser therefore 
agreed that any future appointments to Cabinet would be 
selected by a majority of caucus. The first Minister to 
be so chosen was McMillan , in June 1940, and thereafter 
until 1949 all Ministers were nominated by Caucus. Cabinet 
was not reconstituted, but during the war McMillan , Nordmeyer -
Harclay, O' Brien and Skinner were added as older members died 
or retired. The list of names gives an important clue to the 
• 
collapse of the 11 left wing 11 after 1940, for all these Ministers 
had been identified with it. One of the main grievances of 
the "left wing" in the 1930 1 s had , after all, been the exclus-
ion of their most able members from Cabinet, and the knowledge 
that this would be remedied was all that was necessary to pre-
vent defections from the Party. Lee was dismayed at his fail-
ure to take any of the "left wingers" (other than Barnard) with 
him when he was expelled, but the prospect of following him into 
the political wilderness was hardly to be compared with the 
chance of ministerial office. This is not to say that the "left 
wingers" gave up hope of influencing the Government from inside 
the party. In fact, Lee 's eclipse only emphasised the fact that 
this was the only way the "left wingers" could influence it. But 
without a recon&itution of Cabinet any major policy changes were 
impossible, and the new Ministers were gracefully absorbed with-
out any being made . 
The expulsion of Lee from the Party was probably the main 
reason for the failure of the rebels in 1940. There is no 
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reason to suppose that Lee would have been a party to a 
campaign against conscription; indeed, he later took steps 
to see that anti-conscriptionists and pacifists were expelled 
from his ovm party. However, in other respects Lee 's removal 
became imperative in wartime conditions. He and his followers 
were utterly opposed to the Government 's policy for financing 
the war , and their lack of realistic alternatives did not 
detract from the emotive appeal of terms like "debt finance" 
and "debt-free currency". They were opposed too, to co-oper-
ation with the National Party, (1)and Fraser could not negotiate 
with the Opposition if he had a divided Party at his back. 
Therefore Wood (2 )in saying that 
Though J . A. Lee had differences with the Party 
leadership as to hovl the war should be waged , both 
their charges against him and his against them were 
mainly concerned with domestic issues, 
overlooks the interrelation of "domestic" issues with the war 
effort, and the importance, in wartime conditions, of ridding 
the Party of a critic who carried on a running battle with 
the leadership in public . Lee had many sympathisers inside 
the Labour Hovement, but few cared to step outside to join 
him after March 1940. Association with a party explicitly 
designed to split the Labour Movement was too heavy a liabil-
ity in Parliamentary and Trade Union circles. 
(1) Langstone in Dominion, 8 December, 1942. (2) Op.cit., p.129. 
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The question remains - what did the Labour Party lose 
in 1940? In other words, what was the "left wing"? The 
answer is vital to an understanding, not only of Labour after 
that date, but also of the loss of support from Labour in 
1943, and of the character of the Democratic Labour Party. 
The division in the Party did not emerge until after the 
Labour victory in 1935, when 22 new M. P.'s were returned. 
As a group they vlere quite different from the "old stalwarts 11 • 
Much younger on the average and with better educational 
qualifications, they brought a broader social and occupational 
background to the Party . Many of them, for instance, Nord-
meyer, McMillan and Barclay, were men of considerable ability. 
However , their connection with Labour was often of short 
standing, and there seems to have been some lack of confidence 
between "old" and 11new 11 groups. H. E. Herring , one of the 
latter, remembers that 
J.A. Lee, and Langstone, amongst the "stalwarts" 
were both under suspicion for hobnobbing with the 
22 (or perhaps with some of the 22.) They 
received the name of the Girondins. 
Too much of 'cloak and dagger• •••• or better 
still 'lower fifth form' atmosphere. Rather a 
trial at times.(1) 
Nevertheless, conflict did not begin for some time. As 
already mentioned , there was no move to elect Cabinet from 
caucus in 1 935. James O' Brien at the 1937 Labour Conference 
claimed that "there was no Left Wing until Mr. Savage resisted 
a decent increase in old age pensions in 1936", (2)and it seems 
(1) H.E . Herring, letter to the author. 
(2) Quoted in J.A . Lee, I Fight for New Zealand , p. 21. 
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to have been Savage's disregard of caucus's wishes that 
turned the "left wing" into a consciously dissident minority . 
The difference, however , went deeper than old age pensions. 
The term "left wing" had , in New Zealand conditions, a very 
different meaning from in British or European Socialist parties. 
Apart from a few exceptions, notably Ormond Wilson , there was 
no body of theoretical Socialists among the new Labour members 
of 1935. The "socialism" of New Zealand experience has been 
well summarised by Lee himself . 
In New 6ealand , political evolution has never been 
compelled to accord to a 'revealed truth', 'revealed 
truth' being a political concept given the force of 
imperative testament. Each problem has been studied 
separately and a practical adjustment made; and if 
the adjustment has been more and more socialistic, 
and if a definite socialist pattern now exists in our 
economy, that has only been because socialism is the 
commonsense answer to mass production promising imm-
ediate good, and not because socialism is accepted 
as an alternat t·v~ article of relgious faith promising 
eternal bliss. 1J 
In other words , the "left wingers" conception of socialism 
was broad and pragmatic enough to accept previous progressive 
legislation as part of a socialist tradition in New 6ealand . 
They were realistic in doing so. Since New Zealand was 
scarcely developed at all industrially, the slogan "Socialisation 
9f the means of production, distribution and exchange" was appli-
cable only in one part - the last. The original Labour Party 
socialists - veterans like Savage , Webb and Semple - had long 
ago given up any idea that their beliefs had any relevance to 
New ~ealand conditions, and by 1935 they were content to carry 
(1) J.A. Lee, Socialism in New Zealand, p.12. 
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out only the we l fare planks in the Party 's platform. The 
notable exceptions , the Guaranteed Price Scheme and state 
marketing of farm produce, were not in themselves socialistic . 
Where the "left wingers" of t he nineteen- thirties differed 
from the older members was in their determination to carry out 
the third part of the party's fundamental policy - the social-
isation of the means of exchange and the use of them by the 
state to promote economic development. The veterans saw 
little value in this, and laid themselves open to the accusation 
that they were not interested even in achieving what measure of 
socialism was feasible in New 6ealand. State control of the 
monetary system was of cardinal importance in Labour policy in 
the thirties, when interest in monetary reform was intense. As 
Lee put it, 
read 
Hundreds of meetings , of a size never achieved 
prior to 1931, were held from end to end of New 
Zealand. The mind and voice of everyone seemed 
to be concentrated on money . On street corner, 
or tram, in the sitting-room or at the sale yard, 
at the dairy factory of a morning - wherever and 
whenever people gatheredt there was a discussion 
about banking and money. 1) 
In 1933 the first point in Labour 's new financial policy 
Immediate control by the State of the entire 
banking system. The State to be the sole auth-
ority for the issue of credit and currency. 
Provision of credit and currency to ensure pro -
duction and distribution of t he commodities 
which are required and which can be economically 
(1) Ibid., p.38. 
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produced in the Domin~on, with guaranteed prices, 
wages and salaries . \1J 
In the Labour Party itself this was widely interpreted 
in the broadest sense - namely the nationalisation of the 
entire banking system, or at least the setting up of a State 
trading bank . Lee wrote before the 1938 election that 
With a socialist Government in power , the Bank of 
New Zealand and, indeed, the banking system of 
New Zealand, must finally be owned in their enti~ety, 
else the Government is socialistic only in name .\2) 
And in 1939, speaking on the Reserve Bank Amendment Bill , 
Nordmeyer was just as emphatic 
"The (Reserve) Bank is still at the mercy to a 
greater or lesser extent , of the private trading 
banks, and until the state controls one or all of 
the private trading banks it will not be able to 
claim that it ha9 Qontrol of the credit structure 
of the country . " \ 3J 
This emphasis on monetary reform led many Social Crediters 
or "Douglas Crediters" into the Labour Party in the early 
thirties. Lee in 1938 recognised them as a source of strength 
to Labour when he wrote that "the Douglas Credit Movement ' s 
activities were the corridor through which tens of thousands 
of voters entered the Labour Party". Lee added , significantly, 
that 
Douglas Credit agitation must have a big share of 
the credit for any Labour success ~ although the 
Labour Party is thoroughly social1stic in its policy .C 4) 
( 1 ) Ibid . , p . 42 . 
(2) Ibid., p.73.-(3 ) NZPD, Vol . 256 2 p. 769 . (4) J .A. Lee, Soc1alism in New Zealand, p. 43 . 
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Although glad enough to accept Social Credit support, 
few of the Labour leaders had any intention of carrying out 
the Movement 's more extreme proposals , such as the issue of 
large amounts of credit to consumers. Social Credit 
disillusion with the Labour Party came early. Specific 
complaints were the continuing high level of taxation, 
failure to utilise "debt-free credit" and "undemocratic" 
control of the Labour Party. The last complaint was made 
bitterly by W. B. Bray , a prominent Canterbury Social Crediter, 
when he resigned from the Party after the 1938 Conference, at 
which he had put forward his views by circular and had been 
severely reprimanded by the chairman, James Roberts , who had 
advised delegates to "tear the circular up" •. 
Bray summarised what he saw as the Government failures • 
••••• The Party has not carried out its election 
pledges and will not give the public a straight-out 
answer as to its intentions regarding the debt system 
of finding money for its purposes . The Party prom-
ises to increase the buying power of the people . It 
has increased the incomes of sections at the expense 
of other sections of the people , and at the expense 
of all through a rise in prices . Its promises 
regarding the abolition of sales and exchange taxes 
are now found to have strings attached, and it is 
becoming clear that, in spite of all their protest-
ations about the need for the reform of the monetary 
system, they are just as eager as any other Govern-
ment to play the game for(the credit monopolies, by 
acting as tax collectors. 1) 
Although many Social Crediters had left the Labour Party 
by this time, they did not have a monopoly of monetary reform 
sentiment in the Party. Most Labour supporters expected 
(1) Dominion, 20 August, 1938. 
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State control of the banking system to be extended after 1935, 
and more use to be made of Reserve Bank credit. However, 
opinion in the Party was divided on how far this was to go . 
The conservative members, including most of the Cabinet, 
considered that nationalisation of the Reserve Bank and the 
issue of a certain amount of credit for public works and 
housing was all that was advisable . Others, notably Lee 
and Langstone, stood for nationalisation of the entire bank-
ing system, or at least the Bank of New Zealand, and liberal 
use of credit to establish secondary industries and cut down 
on overseas borrowing . This division in the party was evident 
as early as 1933, when the caucus considered an amendment to 
be moved in the House to the Unemployment Board ' s annual report. 
The amendment, calling for "a planned system of primary and 
secondary development and a comprehensive public works scheme ••• 
with the establishment of the necessary credits and the issue 
of whatever currency is required by the State," was opposed by 
a small minority, including most of the future Cabinet, who 
favoured borrowing to provide the finance. (1) 
As Lee remarked "the sore hearts arising from that day in 
March, 1933, persisted until the end. 11 ( 2) Actually , the front 
benches of the Labour Party were never converted to the "left 
wing's" ideas on finance. The section on finance in Labour's 
election policy was progressively watered down over the years. 
(1) J . A. Lee, I Fight for New Zealand , pp . 4- 5. (2) Ibid., p. 5. 
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In 1935, as already mentioned , it read , "Immediate control 
by the State of the entire banking system" , but by 1938 
this had become "·· · · the Government proposes to maintain 
and extend the control of credit and currency until the 
State is the sole authority for the issue of credit and 
currency" . (1) 
The only step taken in this direction was the Reserve 
Bank Amendment Act of 1939, consolidating State control of 
the Bank. This was clearly all that the Government planned 
to do , for its 1943 election policy read 
Labour will continue the control of the Dominion ' s 
banking, credit and currency system for the 
expansion of production , primary and secondary, 
and the prevention of inflation and deflation •••• 
While ensuring control of banking , credit and 
currency , the Labour Government has always recog-
nised the wisdom of keeping public expenditure 
within the bounds of public revenue.(2) 
This was a clear indication that no further extensions 
of control over the financial system were planned . These 
shifts in emphasis masked a continuing and bitter s t ruggle in 
the party during the nineteen-thirties. Most of it, later 
chronicled by Lee in his pamphlet "I Fight for New Zealand", 
took place in the Labour caucus , but at times the quarrel 
boiled over into public view. Lee ' s book "Socialism in New 
Zealand", published before the 1938 election , showed that he, 
and apparently many other Labour M. P.'s, thought the time had 
(1) Labour Party Election Manifesto, 1938. (2) Dominion, 2 September, 1943 . 
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come to use credit to establish secondary industries. His 
warnings against raising further loans were also most pointed . 
The book was a considerable embarrassment to the conservative 
leaders of the party during the 1938 campaign. When Lee 
proposed to publish the chapter on "Banking and Finance" as 
a pamphlet( 1)he received a letter from Wilson , the party 
secretary, describing it as the best summary of Labour's 
financial policy he had seen - and asking Lee not to publish 
it! The Grey Lynn branch went ahead and did so, forcing the 
party's head office to take over production of the pamphlet.C2) 
Shortly afterwards came the accidental publication of the 
"Lee Letter". This was a circular addressed by Lee to all 
Labour M. P.'s shortly after the 1938 election and accidentally 
shown to a member of the Opposition by W.J. Lyon, M. P. for 
Waitemata . (3 ) It was certainly not intended for publication 
for it attacked the Government , particularly Nash , the Minister 
of Finance , in trenchant terms. Lee held that the Government 's 
timid financial policies had resulted in the sudden and drastic 
imposition of import controls, which would have been quite 
unnecessary had exchange control been used after 1935. His 
criticisms also ranged over such sore points as pension increases 
and the nat ionalisation of the Bank of New lealand, and his 
criticism of individual Ministers was sharp. The unintended 
publication of the document made many people aware for the 
(1) J.A. Lee, Money Power for the People. (2) J.A. Lee, letter to the author. 
(3) J.A. Lee , A Letter Every New Zealander Should Read . 
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first time of the rift in the Party, and the Opposition 
seized on it gleefully. At the 1939 Easter Conference Lee 
was censured for allowing the document to be made public , 
and for attacking Cabinet Ministers. There was some com-
plaint that the conference had been forced to vote for the 
motion of censure because Cabinet made the issue one of 
confidence. (1) The letter itself was loudly applauded, 
much to the discomfiture of the platform, when it was read 
to the conference on the motion of Nordmeyer . (2) 
The "left wing" rebellion on financial policy simmered 
down rapidly when Lee's position was weakened, first by the 
publication of the article "Psychopathology in Politics" 
(suggesting, correctly, that Savage was dying and should 
retire) which gave his opponents a convenient stick to beat 
him with , and second, by his expulsion from the party in 
Mar ch 1940. Anyway , it was obvious to most that in war 
conditions severely deflationary policies would be necessary. 
By the time Nash laid down the main lines of his wartime 
policies in the 1940 Budget , the sting had been drawn from 
the "left wing" on this issue. Only Langstone among the 
Labour members continued to preach the virtues of "debt-free 
money" on every occasion. 
The changes in the party in the early months of the war 
left effects which were plain by the 1943 elections. Most 
(1) Tomorrow, 26 April, 1939. 
(2) H. E. Herr ing, letter to the author. 
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obvious was the increased reliance of the Government on its 
record . In 1938 the Party's policy was essentially forward-
looking; Labour had the initiative still. It could promise 
the implementation of the Social Security Act, extension of 
state control of credit and currency, encouragement of second-
ary industries, and expanded housing and public works progr-
ammes. The party's manifesto was circulated in a number of 
forms, principally as part of a pamphlet entitled "The Prime 
Minister ' s Personal Message to You" . In 1943 the party's 
policy statement was not widely circulated, and in fact con-
tained little of interest. The most important points on 
which the Government promised action were (1) an extension 
of war pensions and (2) a pledge to "re-establish in a secure 
and prosperous civil life all men and women, Maori and Pakeha, 
who have served in the war or been engaged in the war effort 11 . C1) 
Continuation of economic stabilization and a "free health 
service for all" were also promised . Fraser ' s opening of the 
Labour election campaign on 30 August was symbolic of the 
party's reliance on its record. His speech was a survey of 
Labour achievements since 1935, (2)and it was stated that a 
policy announcement was to come in "the next four days 11 • 
Fraser made it quite clear that the main lines of Labour 
policy would be followed without change when he said 
It was essential for him to review the administration 
of the Government since •• • 1935, because the Govern-
ment ' s policy was inextricably bound up with the 
(1) Dominion, 2 September 1943 . 
(2) Dominion , 31 August 1943 . 
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administration, and that policy would continue 
to be followed". 
It is likely that Fraser did not appreciate how much 
this would result in Labour being forced into defensive 
positions, for if the party relied on its performance in 
office alone, then it was open to attack from Democratic 
Labour where it had failed to implement parts of its 
original policy, and from National where its actions had 
misfired. An instance of the latter was the legislation 
controlling land sales passed in 1943. 
The time when the party spoke in broad radical phrases 
about "Socialism" and "the publiccredit 11 was gone , and such 
extravagant talk was now officially discouraged . Yet this 
aura of broad , undefined radicalism had a lot to do with the 
success of the party in the previous elections , and it is 
fair to say that in 1943 this had passed to Democratic 
Labour . The Labour Party tended to replace it with an 
increased emphasis on the social security and welfare planks 
in its platform. In the Party's 1943 policy statement the 
only fields in which it promised further action, as opposed 
to stressing previous achievements, were rehabilitation, the 
provision of a minimum "home and family income" and a uni-
versal free health service. (1) Labour speakers in the campaign 
relied heavily on these topics. Again, the type of pamphlet 
material issued during the campaign differed from that of 1935 
(1) Ibid. 
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!nd 1938. In both these years the Party had circulated its 
policy statement widely, summarising proposals for the future 
under such headings as "Social Security", "State Control of 
Credit and Currency", "Defence", "Guaranteed Prices", "Housing" 
and "State Advances". In 1943 there was no wide distribution 
of a formal party policy statement, but instead a series of 
small pamphlets , nearly all summarising the Government's 
record on specific topics. Typical titles were "The World 
Pays Tribute to New Zealand in Peace and War" (four pages of 
laudatory quotations from many sources), "Labour's March to 
Economic and Social Security", "Safeguarding the Home" and 
"Labour's Magnificent Record in House Building". The 
Federation of Labour also circulated a series of pamphlets 
summarising advances in wages and working conditions since 
the depression. Although Labour could still offer construe-
tive programmes for rehabilitation, the trend towards the 
policies of its post-war term in office was already quite 
clear. Speaking of that period fifteen years later the 
president of the party said 
"We had become too obsessed with materialism and 
acted as though mankind existed entirely on an 
economic plane •••• we tried desperately to think 
of ways in which we could make the people better 
off- financially- and we kept thinking of what (1) they could do for us - electionally - in return". 
•t 
The party's move to the right brought withlan increase 
in the power of industrial labour leaders in it. Union block 
(1) Evening Post , 8 May 1961. 
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votes had swung the balance in favour of Lee's expulsion at 
the 1940 Easter Conference , and many of the larger unions 
did not consult their membership on the question . There 
had been little love lost between the "left wingers" and the 
unions, and the contrast between the Labour M. P. ' s in Parlia-
ment before 1935, and those elected in that year , gives one 
reason why . Of the 24 Labour Candidates elected in 1931, 
13 had held office in a trade union, but out of 28 new members 
in 1935 only 2, James Thorn and J . B. Cotterill , were, or had 
been, union officials. Of the rest, mostly farmers, small 
businessmen or professional men , few had any contact with the 
industrial labour movement, and there was naturally some 
suspicion of them in the unions. 
Fevl of the big unions, which by 1943 wielded so much power 
in the party , had helped it much in its years of growth. s 
Lee wrote, 
Theirs was no evangelical effort to modify a 
capitalist system. They had no policy which 
visioned any long-distance effort toward a new 
social system, the tactic of these organisations 
being exclusively one of expediency. All that 
was sought was the best wage and condition bargain. 
Indeed, some of the largest groups of organised 
workers did not team up with the Labour Party until 
it appeared likely that the Labour Party was bound 
to become the Government , and a Government so likely 
to yield a dividend that a measure of trade union 
shareholding became justifiable. Some of these 
leaders over the years addressed meeting after meet -
ing in the various centres throughout New Zealand , 
at which they frankly stated that they had no concern 
whatever with politics.t1J 
(1 ) J . A. Lee. Socialism in New ~ealand , p. 260. 
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Many Labour supporters who, like Lee, had no affiliations 
with industrial Labour, felt bitter that the unions should 
have become so powerful in the political movement that they 
had taken little part in building. 
twenty years in the party was that 
Lee's impression after 
The balance sheets of the Labour Party at election 
time would show that although trade union capitations 
were largely responsible for maintaining the national 
offices and the district offices of Labour (Represen-
tation) Committees the actual work of winning New 
Zealand, the actual expenditure of time and money and 
of energy, was thrQugh branches of the Party '\oThich 
anyone could join.\17 
That was the heart of the matter; the hard work in the 
early years, the gradual increase in Labour's vote, and the 
winning of the marginal seats in 1935 was done by the dedic-
ated branch members alone. 
The conflict eased over the years . In 1938 eight of 
the . P. 's elected in 1935, including such "left wingers" as 
H. E. Herring and Ormond Wilson, lost their seats. The joint 
Labour Party-FOL conference on conscription in 1940 symbolised 
the acceptance of industrial labour as a full partner of the 
party in the Labour Movement . Although relations between the 
political and industrial movements lie outside the scope of 
this study, it may be said generally that Fraser and the Cabinet 
worked in close co-operation with the FOL leaders during and 
after the war , and relied on their support in making Government 
( 1 ) Ibid. , p . 261 • 
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manpower and stabilisation policies acceptable to the unions 
and in dealing with the crises such as the strike in the 
Waikato coalfields in 1942. (1) The appointment to Cabinet 
in 1942 of McLagan, the president of the FOL , gave the unions 
a direct voice in the government for the first time. Although 
constitutionally unprecedented it was a successful risk, for 
McLagan was able to identify Government manpower policy with 
the Federat ion without losing his own authority in it. 
Finally, when Fraser , in June 1942, went to speak to the 
Nat ional Party caucus on the War administration proposals, 
he was accompanied by two of his ministers, Sullivan and 
Jones, and also by McLagan and Walsh, the President and Vice-
President of the FOL . (2) 
Despite the changes since 1940 the Party in 1943 was ready 
for the election as a united party. Since the departure of 
Lee and his supporters there had been no major defections. 
The new Ministers appointed to Cabinet since 1940 - McMillan, 
Barclay, Nordmeyer, Skinner and O' Brien - were an infusion of 
new blood , although their addition did not alter Government 
policy. McHillan, Nordmeyer and O' Brien were definitely "left 
wingers" and all had voted for caucus election of Cabinet in 
1938. (3) There were still differences of opinion on such 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
(3) 
See L.C. Webb, Leadership in the Labour Party , in "Political 
Science", September 1953. 
Ni PD, Vol. 261, p.702. 
John A. Lee's Weekly, 20 January 1943 and J.G. Barclay; 
letter to the author. 
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sub jects of finance and manpower, but they were no longer 
paraded publicly or an immediate danger to party unity . 
Nevertheless there were two disputes in the party which 
played some part in t he 1943 election : one was Frank Lang-
stone ' s resignation from Cabinet over t he post of Minister 
to the United States, t he ot her t he alleged 11railroading 11 
of C.G. Scrimgeour , Director of Commercial Broadcasting, 
into the Air Force. Langstone 1 s case was potentially more 
embarrassing . In Hay 1 941 , when he was 1'·1inister of Lands, 
Langstone went to the u.s. to discuss trade, and to make 
preliminary arrangements for the New 6ealand legation in 
Washington. He remained t here with his status undefined 
until 18 November, when it was announced that Nash was 
appointed Minister to the United States. Langstone was 
then appointed High Commissioner to Canada , but resigned 
in November 1942. On his arrival in New Zealand he made a 
statement maintaining that he had been 11 doublecrossed as to 
t he Washington appointment . 11 ( 1) His bitterness suggests that 
there might have been an informa l agreement that he would be 
appointed Minister, but no official announcement had been 
made, and by the end of 1941 Fraser had apparently decided 
that, as war with Japan drew nearer , a member of the War 
Cabinet should have the job . What made the case important 
was that Langstone had been a consistent critic of the 
financial and credit policies of the majority in Cabinet, 
(1) Dominion, 8 December 1942. 
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and the wrangle over the Washi ngton appointment was only 
the "last stra1.v 11 in a series of disagreements. As he 
said, " I have swallowed my own views and opinions on many 
matters. 11 ( 1) 
There was a danger that t his mat ter might provoke 
another flare-up of "left wing" discontent in the Party . 
Shortly before the 1943 Easter Conference t he Labour 
Representation Committee in Waimarino, Langstone's 
electorate, adopted a resolution 
"re-affirming its confidence in Mr . • Langstone 
as its member and expressing the view that diff-
erences of opinion on the Party's banking , curr-
ency and credit policy were behind the dispute 
culminating in his resignation of (~he New Zealand 
High Commissionership in Canada . " J 
After a full discussion at the Party Conference it was 
voted with only three dissentients , that no injustice had 
been done Langstone, and the matter simmered down. (3) 
Nevertheless, Langstone now made no secret of his disagree-
ments with Government policy , and his speech in the 1943 
Budget debate , at a time when little dissent at all was heard 
in the Party, was a slashing attack on "debt finance" worthy 
of Lee himself . (4) On 30 May the Waimarino LRC , after a long 
discussion of Langstone's position and attitude, pledged 




Dominion, 3 March 1943. 
New Zealand National Review, 
NZ PD, Vol. 262, pp.761-769. 
15 May 1943. 
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confidence in him as its candidate in the election, and 
inferentially in his ideas as well . (1) Langstone remained 
in the Party until his resignation in 1949. 
The Scrimgeour affair was less serious but its sensa-
tional aspect and nearness to the election gave the Govern-
ment some anxious moments . In some ways "Uncle Scrim's" 
survival into the days of Fraser 's rule was an anomaly. 
His Sunday night radio session "The Man in the Street 11 had 
been broadcast over the Friendly Road station during the 
depression and was credited with a large part in Labour's 
victory in 1 935. The programme, a mixture of popular 
Christianity and vague, rather saccharinish humanitarianism, 
was fantastically popular. 
To many folk Sunday was the highlight of the week -
"Uncle Scrim" could be heard from 1ZB, Auckland . 
Radios were tuned in in every city, in every town 
and every village. Si1e~ce reigned in many homes. 
"Scrim 11 was on the air. (2J 
In 1936 his old friend, Savage , now Prime Minister , appointed 
Scrimgeour Director of Commercial Broadcasting over the 
objections of most of the Cabinet. (3) 
"The Man in the Street" continued on the air throughout 
the thirties, and up to 1942, but Scrimgeour's first open 
breach with the Government came just a few days after Savage's 
death. The following Sunday "Scrim" delivered a eulogy 
(1) Standard, 10 June 1943. 
(2) J.R. Hastings . The Uncle Scrim Mystery , p.3. 
(3) NZPD, Vol . 263, pp .639-643. 
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praising not only Savage , but also Lee, who had just been 
expelled from the Party. As time went on his broadcasts 
became almost openly critical of the Government . During 
1941 he also offended some people with a timely talk on 
"Sex and its Contagious Diseases" and further angered the 
Government by giving a laudatory account of the U. S. S. R. 
shortly after she entered the war . This talk began with 
a word of praise for the New ~ealand Society for Closer 
Relations with Russia , a proscribed organisation for Labour 
Party members . 
In June 1942 "The Man in the Street" again went off the 
air , allegedly because Scrimgeour was ill. The session was 
not resumed when he recovered. The writing was obviously 
on the wall for "Uncle Scrim" and early in 1943, the Govern-
ment seized a ready-made chance to get rid of the unwanted 
Controller by refusing to appeal for him when he was called 
up for military service. On June 14, a few days before he 
was to go into camp, he issued a statement complaining that 
he had been "railroaded" into the Air Force for political 
reasons and that the case was "discrimination and victimiz-
ation at its worst . 11 ( 1) The next day Fraser and Wilson both 
replied, denying the charges and making public an exchange 
of letters in which Scrimgeour had agreed to "faithfully 
carry out the Government's policy in regard to broadcasting", 
to make no public statements without the Minister's permiss ion, 
(1) Dominion, 15 June 1943 . 
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and not to "take up a hostile attitude toward the Minister". (1) 
Scrimgeour repeated his charge of victimization(2)and the 
f ollowing day Cabinet with caucus approval dismissed him. 
Fraser said the reason for this was the public statements 
Scrimgeour had made in the past few days, which were "attacks" 
on Wilson and the Cabinet. 
"Apart from this being a complete breach of the 
undertaking given by Mr. Scrimgeour," said the 
Prime Minister ,- "it was an act of most serious 
insubordination and could not be tolerated, nor 
could anyone guilty of such conduct be retained 
in the Public S~ryice without disastrous results 
to discipline".~3J 
There the matter could - and should - have rested. 
Although Cabinet could not legally impose a ban on statements 
by a public servant and therefore could not dismiss him for 
breaking it, it could have based a case for dismissal on 
Scrimgeour's imputations that state machinery had been used 
to "railroad" him. However , an element of low farce was 
introduced when Fraser somehovl acquired a recording of a 
function held in Scrimgeour's office to farewell a member 
of his staff. According to Fraser this was a "drunken orgy" 
at which "obscene and blasphemous language" was used(4) and 
visitors to the Prime Minister's office were regaled with 
private playings of "The Record" as it soon came to be known. 
Whether the record was offensive or not, the private 
( 1l ~~ 
(4) 
Ibid., 16 June 1943. 
Ibid., 17 June 1943. 
Ibid., 19 June 1943. 
NZPD, Vol. 263, p.640. 
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performances and Fraser's shocked references to it only 
made the Government look ridiculous as well as subjecting 
Scrimgeour to a nasty form of character assassination. 
The affair of "The Record" strengthened suspicions 
that the former Controller had been unfairly treated and 
probably helped him in his campaign as an Independent cand-
idate in ~vellington Central, Fraser 1 s own electorate. 
Scrimgeour , as was expected, proved a most effective camp-
aigner. Running on the Democratic Labour platform, he 
received 2,253 votes, resulting in Fraser winning his seat 
with a minority of the votes (46.12 per cent).(1) Scrimgeour's 
case, still fresh in the public 's mind at election time, was 
made much of by Nat ional and Democratic Labour candidates as 
a dreadful example of Labour's treatment of the public service 
and the unwisdom of "patronage" appointments. 
The Langstone and Scrimgeour affairs, both at bottom 
symptons of the decline of the party's "left wing", were 
embarrassing rather than dangerous to Labour. Lang stone 
could not plead unfair treatment, as he freely admitted the 
choice of Minister to Washington was the Prime Minister 's 
alone, and Scrimgeour probably had more enemies, including 
most of the Cabinet, than supporters in the Labour Party. 
His appointment had been a political one, and therefore 
dismissal for polit ical reasons was seen as a risk he should 
have been prepared for rather than an injustice. 
(1) See below, Chapter 7. 
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The approach of the election and the increasing tough-
ness of the Opposition during 1943 completed the closing of 
Labour ranks that had been so carefully fostered since 1940. 
The quiescence of the "left wing", the absorption of its 
leaders into Cabinet , and the closing of the question of 
unity with the Opposition had removed the main causes of 
dispute in the party. 
CHAPrER 3 
THE NATIO AL PARTY 
National emerged from the 1938 general election a 
demoralised and bewildered party. Its share of the vote 
had increased 6 .1 9 per cent since 1935 , but Labour's had 
increased 6 . 49 per cent. (1 ) Although National won seven 
seats , all these were in rural farming electorates , the 
party ' s traditional stronghold. Elsewhere its performance 
was unimpressive. It lost the New Plymouth seat and failed 
to make any headway at all in the cities. In fact , Labour 
won Wellington West from R. A. Wright , an Independent who 
usually supported National, leaving the party with only two 
city seats - Christchurch North and Remuera. 
National obviously expected to do better than this and 
many supporters were surprised at the small gains made. The 
party had certainly not stood still since 1935 . After the 
formal fusion of the Reform and United Parties in 1936 an all-
out effort was made to improve party organisation , and to build 
up a mass membership.( 2 ) There had been much dissatisfaction 
and apathy among party workers at the 1931 and 1935 elections, 
when leaders intervened to force unwanted candidates on some 
electorates. The result had been a rash of unofficial cand-
idates, many of them attracting enough support to split the 
vote and allow Labour to win the seat. In 1 938 the selection 
(1) These increases were due , of course , to the elimination of 
the third party and Independent candidates who had stood 
in 1935 . 
(2) See A.D. Robinson, The Rise of the New ~ealand National Party, 
t936-1949, Chapter 3. 
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of candidates was left in the hands of the electorates, and 
a Divisional Committee could call on a sitting member to 
submit his name to ballot, with the approval of the elector-
ate concerned. (1) The party also worked to build up a strong 
organisation -something sadly lacking in 1935 - and had 
succeeded by 1938. The results of the election, however, 
showed that this was not enough by itself. The party ' s 
image was still one of a "depression party" and its policy 
was bacbvard-looking and unappealing. It included abolition 
of the compulsory unionism laws and promised not to operate 
the Social Security Act. Although the party was equivocal 
on the latter point, most of its utterances were hostile. 
The main National propaganda pamphlet had been a crude attempt 
to identify Labour rule with the social collapse that had 
preceded Fascism in Europe. It was scarcely surprising that 
demands for a new Leader and policy were heard as soon as the 
election results were known, and the next four years saw their 
gradual fulfilment. Moves to replace Hamilton began early in 
1939(2)but no public evidence of them was seen until the forma-
tion of the War Cabinet in 1940. On this, as on other occasions 
during the war, the question of political unity was the catalyst 
of change in the party; changes in National's relationship with 
Labour were always followed by changes in the balance of power 
in the National Party. 
(1) National Part~ Constitution and Rules (1936). 
(2) Evening Post, 28 December, 1940. 
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The appointment of Coates and Hamilton to the War Cabi net 
was immediately followed by a move in the National caucus to 
replace Hamilton as Leader . The Christchurch "Press" reported 
that 
a section of the party, mainly the younger members , 
considered that the two offices (Minister and Leader 
of the Opposition) were incompatible if the National 
Party was to function fully as an Opposition . When 
the question was cons i dered, however , at a caucus , a 
move in the direction of a new Leader was blocked by 
some of the older members, WhQ gave their opinions 
as experienced politicians .\1) 
The "Press" also reported that caucus had decided Hamilton 
was to "act as Leader" , but that S . G. Holland was favoured by 
the younger members. ~aucus had made its decision , but the 
matter did not rest there oy any means . It was soon made clear 
that the organisation was calling the tune on the leadership 
issue. On 4 September the quarterly Dominion Council meeting 
received reports from several Divisions that "a new policy and 
leader were essential". One delegate stated that 
"Speaking from the organisational side , we are faced 
with the continual cry 'W? cannot support you until 
you get a new Leader.• 11 (2; 
The Council meeting came to no decision, but it accelerated 
discussion and many Divisional Executive meetings were held to 
discuss the matter. On 1 November the Dominion Executive met 
in Wellington and unanimously decided that Holland should 
replace Hamilton . E. T. Beaven, the Canterbury divisional 
(1 ) Press, 19 July 1940 . 
(2) Dominion Council. •finutes , 4 September 1940, quoted in 
Robinson op . cit . , p. 104. 
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chairman, said later, in some rather indiscreet remarks at a 
National Party function; 
"From Auckland to Bluff, the executive of the National 
Party was unanimously behind •s.G.' and for that reason 
you in Christchurch North should feel proud of the 
entire rank and file organisation expressing their n( 1) opinion, through their chairmen , in favour of •s.G. ' 
C. H. Weston, the party 's president, was asked by the 
executive to break the news to Hamilton and recommend his 
retirement. The executive also resolved that Coates and 
Hamilton should stay in the War Cabinet and that the new Leader 
should not join it, and that the new Leader should submit him-
self to re-election by caucus after the next election. (2) 
Hamilton shortly afterward announced that the question of 
Leadership would come up when caucus met before the session 
resumed on 26 November.C3) This was interpreted in some 
quarters as an announcement that he was retiring, (4)but when 
caucus met on 25 November Hamilton was obvious ly not willing 
to retire at the dictation of the Dominion Executive without 
putting a case to caucus. The result was that no nominations 
were made after a full day '~ discussion on the 25th.(B) At 
the start of the next day 's meeting members were asked to write 
on a piece of paper the name of the person they proposed as 
Leader, with the result that Holland received a majority of 





Evening Post , 28 December 1940. 
Dominion Executive. Minutes, 1 November 1940, quoted in 
Robinson, op . cit ., p.1 06. 
Evening Post 6 November 1940. 
See Waikato fimes, 8 November 1940 and Te Awamutu Courier, 
11 November 1940. 
Dominion, 27 November 1940. 
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"five votes in a poll of twenty . 11 ( 1) This was then endorsed 
in an open vote, and Holland vras confirmed by the Dominion 
Council on the 28th. 
Apart from the wider i mplications of the change which 
will be discussed later , the party had obv iously gained a 
more effective Leader. Hamilton was hard -working, patently 
honest and sincere - too sincere - i n his conservatism. 
Elected Leader as a compromise candidate in 1936, he comple-
tely lacked any inspirational qualities and was a poor plat-
form and a poorer radio speaker. What was "i'rorse , he was 
irretrievably identified in the public mind with the "old 
gang 11 who formed the Coalition Government during the depres -
sion. Yet, perhaps because this had made him sympathetic 
with the difficulties of a Government in crisis conditions he 
was more interested in co - operating with the Labour Government 
in the War Cabinet than in making capital out of its difficul-
ties. It was National dissatisfact ion with the War Cabinet 
which first brought the question of Hamilton 's leadership into 
the open and gave the party a convenient excuse to replace him . 
Holland, on the other hand , was a young member elected in 
1935, and had no connection with the Coalition "old gang". 
Like all his contemporaries in the party , he favoured stronger 
criticism of the Government, and as time went by this was dir-
ected at its war effort as well as its domestic policies. The 
(1) Press, 27 November 1940. 
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younger members felt that the War Cabinet , or any such body 
short of a full coalition government , put the Opposition a t 
a disadvantage wi thout gi v i ng it much i n return. They wer e 
not i mpressed by Hamilton's argument that the Opposition ' s 
f irst duty in the war was to he l p t he Government and give up 
some of its critical privileges. Holland certainly did not 
be lieve that it should, and the Nat ional line t oward the 
Government hardened quickly i n 1941. Holland 's vigorous 
and ebullient - if not very profound - personality made him 
an attractive Leader , and he was determined to give the party 
a 11 new look". 
Between 1940 and 1943 National po licy became more positive 
and popular , accepting Labour's achievements but criticising 
it on tactical points as v igorously as ever . Holland himself 
did not have a dogmatically ort hodox approach to social or 
economic probl ems ; his submissions to the Monetary Commit tee 
i n 1934 wem in some ways pure Social Credi t . 
The change in Leadershi p only worsened the breach between 
the old and new elements in the party , and many of Hamilton's 
supporters wer e d isgruntled at the methods used to get rid of 
hi m. Early in 1941 D. W. McClurg, the party's secretary since 
1936, resigned(1 ) because of his disapproval of the absorption 
of t he People 's Movement by the National Party , one of Holland ' s 
first accomplishments . In September 1941 the Christchurch "Star 
describing the still obvious disunity in the party, said, 
(1) Dominion, 6 March 1941. 
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As far as the Opposition in the House is concerned, 
it is obvious to keen observers that the members do 
not constitute a homogenous whole. The "old gang 11 
studiously avoids the "new gang". Some of the 
older members have steered a non-party course ever 
since the outbreak of the war. These include the 
members who were not happy about the displacement 
of the Hon . Adam Hamilton by ~tr. Holland. \1J 
However, Holland in July 1942 scored a "personal triumph" 
in persuading a hostile party conference to accept the War 
Administration. (2 ) Holland , of course, had wholehearted 
support from the older member s of the Parliamentary party in 
entering the Administration, and its short life marked the 
high point in National Party unity during the war. Only one 
member, F.W. Doidge, voted against the Prolongation of Parlia-
ment Bill, and his objection was not to the new body so much 
as to the postponement of the election. However , National 
Party divisions played their part in the break-up of the War 
Administration. One of the minor matters which contributed 
to it was the censor's refusal to release a statement of 
Ho lland's announcing an inquiry into war expenditure. Apart 
from the fact that the statement , like many of Holland's was 
of phenomenal length for the amount it said, it also inferred 
that the War Cabinet had been lax in its administration of the 
War Expenses Account~ 3 ) Sullivan, the Minister of Supply, later 
said that a member of the War Cabinet had threatened to "go to 
(1) Star-Sun, 8 September 1941. 
(2) Press , 14 July 1942. 
(3) See "Cabinet Resignations and Why" (Nat ional Party, 1942). 
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the papers" in its defence if the statement were issued, (1) 
and this was probably the reason for its retention by the 
Government. Holland challenged Sullivan to reveal who had 
made the threat, but the Minister refused to say. Polson, 
one of the ex-Ministers in the War Administration, was quite 
outspoken in revealing that it was Coates who had done it. 
"I know to whom the statement was submitted. I 
know that the right honorable the member for Kaipara 
has disapproved of everything the Leader of the Opp-
osition has tried to do. I know the friction there 
has bee~ 1 and I know where the opposition has come from. 11 ~ 1 
Coates 1 personal dislike of Holland was well known, and 
the two men were not on speaking terms after 1940. 
The break-up of the War Administration finally forced 
National M. P. 1 s to take sides. The exact chronology of 
events in September and October 1942 is quite significant. 
During the second week in September the strike on the Waikato 
coalfields became comp lete, and Semple, Webb and Sullivan all 
made firm statements criticising the miners for striking and 
promising the strongest action against them. 
these with his own statement. 
Holland followed 
"This is a time for the strongest action. I must 
assure the public that the law will be observed and 
that those who break it will be dealt with fearless-
ly and firmly . There can be no thought of any arr-
angement that interferes with the processes of the 
law, by which those who break it are punished •••• 
The question of who is to rule this country must be 
settled once and for all . 11 (3) 
(1) NZPD, Vol .261, p.691. 
(2) Ibid., p.698. 
(3) Dominion, 16 September 1942. 
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Bodkin, one of Holland's colleagues in the War Adminis-
tration, told him not to make the statement. "I said that 
the Government was mishandling the business and getting into 
an impossible position which it could not sustain."(1) Bodkin 
showed more judgement than Holland in realising that the Govern-
ment would soon have to back down. On 18 September 182 miners 
were sentenced to one month's imprisonment for taking part in 
an illegal strike, (2)but the following day the sentences were 
suspended and cLagan, the Minister of Manpower and secretary 
of the Miners• Federation, travelled to Huntly to try to per-
suade the men to return to work. (3) His mission was at first 
a complete failure; the miners boycott ed his meeting and moved 
away when he tried to address t hem in the street. The next 
day a meeting was held, however, at which cLagan accidentally 
mentioned t hat the Government was considering State control 
of the mines. The miners i mmediately seized on this, the 
meeting continued for seven pours, and apparently McLagan was 
forced into promising State control if the miners resumed work. (4) 
The Government now had to make up its mind between State control 
and a resumption of work, or continuance of private control and 
the stoppage . There was little point in hedging once McLagan 
had let the cat out of the bag, and on the evening of the same 
day (21 September) as the Huntly meeting, a joint meeting of 
(1) NZ PD, Vol . 261, p.704. 
(2) Evening Post, 18 September 1942. 
(3) NZ PD, Vol.261, p.643. 
(4) Dominion, 21 September 1942. 
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Cabinet and the War Administration was held. Fraser proposed 
that work in the mines should be resumed, that the dispute 
should go the National Disputes Committee, that the Waikato 
mines should be a State-controlled industry for the duration 
of the war and that the miners should give "adequate guarantees" 
of uninterrupted work during the war.<1) Holland later said 
t hat Fraser also proposed that the sentences on the strikers 
should be suspended and the men bound over. (2) Holland told 
Fraser t hat he· disagreed with the proposals and left the meet-
ing. The other four National Ministers (Bodkin was away from 
Wellington) voted for the proposals. Next morning before nine 
o'clock, however, Polson went to see Fraser and told him that 
he and Broadfoot stood with Holland.( 3) There was no talk of 
resignations, however, for Holland "came back and sat \vith the 
War Cabinet for two or three days afterwards. 11 ( 4) 
Events in the Waikato moved quickly after the meeting. On 
22 September Webb, the Minister of Mines, and Coates flew to 
Auckland to talk to the mine-mvners, and next day Webb announced 
that the Government was taking control of the mines during the 
war, the owners to resume control afterwards. (5) At the same 
time Coates issued a statement distinguishing State Control 
(1) Evening Post, 30 September 1942. 
(2) NZ PD, Vol.261, p.633. 
(3) Ibid., pp.696-7. 
(4) Ibid ., p.644. 
(5) Evening Post, 24 September 1942. 
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from nationalisation . On the 24th Holland openly criticised 
the Government 's actions for the first time . 
11The question of vlhether or not t he Government 1 s 
proposals constitute socialisation, nationalisation 
or merely s ome other form of state control is bes ide 
the point. The immediate issue in this dispute is 
whether the Government 's authority is to prevail and 
whether its laws are to be enforced or not. With 
regard to the decision to take over t he control of 
the mines I accept no responsibility whatever.n(1) 
It is significant that at this stage Holland was still 
speaking for himself only. On the 25th a ballot was held 
among the strikers, who voted 715 to 418 in favour of return-
ing to work on the Government's conditions, and by the 28th 
all work had been resumed. 
On the evening of the 29th, the National Party caucus 
met, and voted to withdraw its ministers from the War Cabinet 
and the War Administration . Hamilton was not at the meeting , 
but two other members voted against withdrawal.(2) The follow -
ing day the party 's Dominion Council unanimously endorsed the 
caucus decision, (3)and on 1 October the resignations of Holland, 
Broadfoot, Polson and Bodkin, but not of Coates and Hamilton, 
were f orwarded to the Prime Minister. At the same time, 
H. S. S. Kyle, M. P. for Riccarton, r resigned from the party, and 
announced that he and Coates had voted against the withdrawal 
of Ministers nbecause he be lieved it was vital to the war effort 
(1) Evening Post, 25 September 1942. 
(2) Evening Post, 6 October 1942. 
(3) Dominion Council· Minutes 30 September 1942, quoted in 
Robinson, op . cit., p .142. 
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that Mr . Coates and • •• • Mr. Hamilt on should remain in the 
War Cabinet . 11 ( 1) The breach was now quite open and Coates 
and Hamilton delayed handing in their resignations for 
several days, finally doing so because "the selection was 
endorsed by members of the National Party." Both immediately 
rejoined the War Cabinet at ·Fraser 1 s invitation. In a state-
ment they declared their support for the Government and called 
the resignations a 11 political strike". The decision that "our 
duty to the country is more important t han our duty to party" 
must have been a hard one to make for the t wo former party 
leaders, and was a break wi th t he assoc iation~ of a lifetime.(2) 
Holland replied that 11 by their dec ision Mr. Coates and Mr . 
Hamilton have chosen to sever t heir connection with the National 
Party."(3) Four National members , Coates, Hamilton, Kyle and 
Massey ceased attending caucus meetings, and later spoke and 
voted against the motion of no-confidence in t he Government 
moved by Holland. The rest of the party, including those 
Ministers who had originally supported the Government 1 s prop-
osals for ending the strike supported Holland in the House and 
voted for the motion. 
Of the four rebels, Hamilton and Massey later made their 
peace with the party, Coates died, and Kyle stood at the election 
as an Independent but withdrew before polling day. Had Coates 
lived the split might have done great damage to the party. 
(1) Dominion, 20 October 1942. 
(2) Evening Post, 6 October 1942 . (3) Ibid . 
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Despite his political isolation the former Prime Minister still 
had tremendous prestige, and his opinion that party politics 
should be subordinated to an "all in" war effort must have been 
shared by many people who felt no great attachment to either 
party . Whether Coates made any effort to rally Parliamentary 
support, particularly National Party support, to his way of 
thinking is hard to tell, but indications are that he did. 
After Coates' death, John A. Lee wrote 
Gordon on many occasions over the war years sounded 
me as to the possibility of my joining a Coalition 
team, but I gener~lly looked at the ceiling and 
tried to whistle .~1) 
Just before he died, Coates wrote to a friend in Kaipara 
(the letter was later quoted in the election campaign in the 
electorate) 
For your information I feel that the National Party 
has been badly led and their tactics open to public 
criticism. An afterthought occurs to me that the 
National Party no more represents the views(of the 
farming community than the man in the moon. 2) 
Nevertheless, when Kyle issued a statement on 1 April 
saying that a "Win-the-War" group had been formed by Coates 
and Hamilton to contest "many seats"(3)the two Ministers merely 
commented that 
Mr . Kyle expresses a purely personal view i n his 
statement.) r~ . Kyle is free to say whatever he 
cares to(4 
(1) John A. Lee's We ekly, 16 June 1943 . 
(2) Northern Advocate, 24 September 1943 (My Emphas is) 
(3) Dominion, 2 April 1943. (4) Dominion, 3 April 1943. 
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and repeated their view that an election could and should 
have been avoided. However , Coates was not prepared to let 
matters slide in his own electorate. At the beginning of May 
he travelled to Kaipara and met delegates from his committees 
in the northern part of the electorate at Dargaville. At the 
meet ing Coates annoQDced his intention of standing as an Indep-
endent, and on his return to Wellington said that the meeting 
had given him a "blank cheque" to do as he thought best .C1) 
He secured a similar endorsement from the committees in the 
southern part of Kaipara on 22 May.(2) Feeling in Kaipara was 
summed up later by a member of Coates ' committee who said 
":Hr. Coates has (sic) represented us for 32 years and we trusted 
him. Hence the blank cheque. 11 ( 3) Loyalty to Coates was, among 
many of his supporters, loyalty to the man rather than to the 
party he represented, and had he lived it is doubtful if 
Nat ional could have found much support for an official candi-
date against him. 
Coates ' announcement had imraediate effects. On 14 May 
Massey met the Franklin electorate committee , which at the 
end of the meet ing resolved that 
Mr . Massey having declared his intention to contest 
the Franklin seat as an Independent Nat ionalist, 
this meet ing, after having given serious considera-
tion to the matter , is of the opinion that Mr . Massey 
can win the seat in this capacity, and earnestly 
urges the National Party to support this candid~t~e 
in order to present a united anti-Labour front.\4J 
(1) North Auckland Times, 3 May 1943 and Dominion, 4 May 1943. 
(2) North Auckland Times , 25 May 1943. 
(3) Ibid., 20 September 1943. (4) Evening Post , 17 May 1943. 
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On 19 Hay the "Southland Times" announced that 
a decision to support the present member for Wallace, 
the Hon . Adam I{amilton , as National Party candidate 
for the electorate at the forthcoming general elec-
tion was reached at the annual meeting of the Wall-
ace branch of the New 6ealand National Party •••• 
yesterday. 
The position of Massey and Hamilton was different from 
Coates' in that their committees hoped for official National 
co-operation (for Massey) or endorsement (for Hamilton) for 
their candidates, who had voted against the party on a conf-
idence motion . Nevertheless , the declarations were a serious 
challenge to a Leader who had virtually read Coates and Hamilton 
out of the party a few months before , and it appeared as if 
Kyle's prediction of a group of Independents defecting from 
National might come true. However , all hopes of this were 
ended when Coates died suddenly at his desk in Parliament 
Buildings on 25 May, two days after his last visit to Kaipara. 
He was the only Nationalist who could have led a possible break-
away group. Of the other rebels, Kyle and Massey had little 
ability or personality, and Hamilton had lost prestige after 
his defeat in 1940 and seemed tired of politics. He rarely 
spoke in the House during the next Parliament, and retired in 
1946. Coates' death saved National from an awkward loss of 
face in Kaipara and probably in other electorates as well. 
Hamilton and Massey made their peace with the party in June, 
when both began attending caucus meetings again, (1)and at the 
(1) Press, 6 July 1943. 
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election they were endorsed as official National candidates. 
With the exception of the Remuera affair (1 ) Nat ional ranks were 
closed in good time for the election. 
This outline of events between 1940 gives only a partial 
picture of the changes in the party. In many cases the app-
arent clash of personalities and opinions really masked funda-
mental changes in the balance of power. 
The most obvious was the growing influence of the extra-
Parliamentary organisation. The Nat ional Party's founders 
had consciously set out to see that the organisation was not 
completely dominated by the Parliamentary party, as had 
happened in the Coalition at the 1931 and 1935 elections, and 
in fact throughout the twenties and the depression period . In 
the Reform and United Parties the Leader and Cabinet had had 
almost complete control over policy formation. In 1931 and 
1935 the situation became more irksome when the Coalition 
leaders agreed among themselves that sitting members would be 
nominated as official Coalition candidates, thus giving the 
electorates no opportunity of getting rid of unsatisfactory 
members . The Coalition also allowed its electoral organis-
ation to run down completely between 1931 and 1935, and this 
fault was blamed for a major share in the 1935 debacle. 
The founders of the National Party set out to give the 
organisation more say in policy-making , the electorates means 
of refusing nomination to a sitting member , and tQ improve 
(1) See below , pp. 86-89. 
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electoral organisation. A Policy Committee was set up 
consisting of six members appointed by Dominion Council and 
three M;P . 's nominated by the. Leader. This body was to 
advise on "general policy" . (1) In 1941 the constitution was 
amended to ensure that the Leader consulted the Committee on 
"immediate policy" as well. Procedures for the election of 
candidates were laid down , and a Divisional Committee could 
call on a sitting member to submit himself for renomination, 
with the consent of the electorate concerned. (2 ) Party 
membership was given a more permanent and real nature , and 
fruitful efforts made to recruit a mass membership with an 
active core in every electorate that would keep the local 
organisation functioning between elections. 
Members were first of all organised into local "branches", 
which sent delegates to an electorate committee according to 
t heir membership. Above electorate level were the six Divi-
sions, representing the electorates, and the Dominion Council, 
consisting of the President, five vice-Presidents, sixteen 
members elected by the Divisional Committees , five elected by 
the Nat ional H. P. ' s and six others. 
The Divisional and Dominion Councils each had executives, 
and their functions were defined loosely. The Divisions were 
to control organisational work, employ organisers, and to give 
f inal approval to candidates. The Dominion Council was to 
(1) Nat ional Party. Constitution and Rules (1936) Sect.XVI (3) (2) I bid., Sect. XIV (5) 
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control the party ' s "general affairs" . The organisation as 
a vTho le, said C. • \veston, the party 1 s first President, was to 
be independent in managing its funds and selecting Candidates, 
and to "consult with its Parliamentary representatives in 
framing its policy from time to time. 11 ( 1) 
The organisation improved greatly before 1938 and member-
ship built up rapidly. However , the party did not make great 
progress in 1939 and the feeling grew that the main reason had 
been the association in the public mind of Hamilton and other 
members of the "old gang" with the depression. Enough has 
been said about the replacement of Hamilton to show the part 
pl ayed by the Dominion Executive , which was acting only after 
the Dominion Council ' s meet ings had revealed that some Divi-
sions would cease supporting the party unless a new Leader were 
found. Faced with this the Parliamentary caucus, in whose 
hands the matter theoretically rested , had little choice. The 
Dominion Executive also res olved that the new Leader shoul d not 
join the War Cabinet , and that he should submit himself tore-
election by caucus after ea ch elect ion . (2 ) The resolution 
concerning the War Cabinet s hows t he organisation's attitude 
to co-operat ion with the Government. It was , after all, 
Hamilton 's des ire to promote polit ical unity which had hastened 
his replacement and given the party an excuse to effect it. The 
organisat ion , whose pr i mary task between elections was to ma i ntain 
(1) National News, 20 May 1937. (2) Dominion Executive. i nutes, 1 November 1940, quoted in 
Robins on , op . cit., p.1 06 . 
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interest in the party and keep supporters in touch with their 
members, saw l i ttle value in polit ica l uni ty . Its outlook 
may have been small-minded, but it is easy enough to under -
stand; supporters who saw their party co-operating with its 
oponents would lose interest as controversy died down, member-
ship and f i nancial support would fa ll off and party machi nery 
would run down . The organisation's fee lings of frustrat ion 
a t the move s for unity were intensified by knowledge that war 
conditions left Labour open to criticism as never before , and 
Nat i onal was now at the stage where gains could be made at 
Labour's expense . To Nat ional's supporters , therefore , it 
seemed folly to softrpedal party politics in return for the 
uncertain and unspectacular rewards of political unity. For 
the same reason the organisation was firmly against postpone-
ment of the election, for party enthusiasm waned the longer 
the contest was postponed. 
It is easy to see why the War Administration was greeted 
with chagrin by the extra-Parliamentary party. Hol land had 
~ovided the aggressive Leadership expected of hi m; his 
criticism of the Government had been far more vigorous and 
partisan than Hamilton ' s , and there had been no moves for 
political unity dur i ng 1941 , the election itself only being 
postponed at the last minute. The War Administration fell 
short of the "full nat ional government" that Nat iona l had 
prev i ously demanded . It seems obvious that the National 
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organisation played a part in modifying the Prolongation of 
Parliament (1942) Bill to include annual renewals of Parlia-
ment ' s life. The original proposals, simply allowing for 
the extension of Parliament "for the duration of the war and 
one year thereafter", were approved by the National caucus 
with only one dissentient. (1) However , the party organisation 
seemed much less happy about the indefinite postponement . (2 ) 
This indeed seems to have been the feeling in both parties and 
on 9 July the changed draft of the Bill , to provide for a mand-
atory annual renewal of Parliament ' s life , was announced . (3) 
In spite of this , the National Conference on 23 July passed a 
resolution calling for a general election as soon as the war 
situation permitted. (4) Holland was lucky to get off so lightly 
at Conference . One newspaper stated that delegates were "at 
first openly hostile to those who had taken part in the negotia-
tions" and were determined to "record their disapproval" of the 
War Administration. CB) Holland ' s speech , already quoted, saved 
the day and was described as a "personal triumph". (6 ) Nevertheless, 
delegates were using phrases like "the end of the National party" 
and there were alarming reports of branches breaking up and mem-
bers resigning. (7 ) 
(1 ) Evening Post , 24 June and Dominion, 7 July 1942 . 
(2) See , e . g . \v . Appleton in Evening Post , 4 July 1942 . 
(3) Evening Post , 10 July 1942 . 
(4) Evening Post , 24 July 1942 . 
(5) Press, 24 July 1942 . 
(6 ) Ibid. 
(7 ) Robinson , op . cit . , p. 134 et seq . 
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Dominion Council seems to have played an important part 
in the National resignations from the War Administration . 
Holland had dissociated himself from the Government 1 s policy 
on 24 September, but had not mentioned resigning. The next 
day the miners voted to return to work , and by the 28th all 
mines were working normally. The National caucusdid not 
meet until the 29th, by which time delegates for the quarterly 
Dominion Council meet ing had arrived in Wellington. Thus the 
Council was in session at the same time as caucus was to decide 
whether to withdr aw its Ministers , and it unanimously endorsed 
the caucus decision the next day. <.1) The caucus meeting seems 
to have been deliberately postponed to coincide with the 
Council meet ing, and any waverers among the M. P. 1 S would 
certainly have had an opportunity of finding out how strongly 
the organisation felt on the subject. 
The organisation, which had, as feared, run down badly 
during the War Administration period, (2 )was galvanised by 
Holland 1s speaking tour late in 1942. There was now no uncer-
tainty about whether an election would be held , but the organ-
isation vTas still plagued by constant loss of man-power and by 
paper shortages. (3) Party electoral organisation for 1943 has 
been summarised by Robinson~4 ) A big step forward was taken 
when the party wound up the "National Newsletter 11 and replaced 
(1) Evening Post, 6 October 1942. 
(2) Robinson, op.cit., p.1 47. 
(3) See W.A. Broadfoot in Dominion, 13 pril 1943. 
( 4) 0 p. cit • ' p p . 1 4 7 - 8 . 
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it in 1•Iay 1943 with a monthly newspaper, "Freedom". The 
new paper did not measure up to rtStandard" , its Labour 
counterpart, in content or format, but it was on sale to 
the public and was used to publicise National policy and 
candidates at election time. 
Holland seemed to have worked more harmoniously with 
the party organisation than his predecessor had done, perhaps 
because Hamilton tended toward the Reform Party practice of 
keeping the organisation very much in its place , where it was 
neither seen nor heard very much . In addition, by 1940 both 
the organisation and the younger M. P.' s , typified by Holland , 
had both come to the conclusion that the "old gang" were an 
electoral liability which the party could no longer afford . 
In 1938 Labour had made much of the fact that the party was 
still led by Hamilton and Coates , two leading Coalition 
Cabinet members, and the two men seemed linked firmly with 
memories of the depression in the public mind . The result 
of the election seemed to bear out the feeling that National 
needed new leaders who had no association with the per iod 
before 1935. The eight new N. P. •s elected in 1935 and 1938 
were all young men and impatient with the leadership of a 
group that had been repudiated by the electors. That Coates 
and Hamilton should have been singled out for attack was some-
what unfair , for the former had been the most progressive 
Minister in the Goalition, and the latter never a member of 
its "inner circle". 
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The overhauling of the par ty's image by no means stopped 
at the ejection of Hamilton fr om the Leadership. The older 
Reformers took the defeat of Hamilton with very bad grace, and 
the rift between the "old" and "new" gangs widened as a result. 
H. S . S. Kyle, a veteran Reformer, resigned as Chief Whip when 
Ho lland became Leader, and he joined W. P. Endean , J.N. Mass ey 
and T.D. Burnett in a group who made no secret of their dis-
satisfaction with the new regime in the party. All these 
members had had long polit ical experience; Coates had been 
in Parliament since 1911, Burnett and Hamilton since 1919, 
Kyle since 1925, Massey since 1928 and Endean since a by-
election in 1930. To the younger members they represented 
the "old gang" with a vengeance, and a somewhat rash attempt 
was made to force some at least to retire as the 1941 election 
approached. Some , such as Coates and Burnett , were so well 
entrenched in their own electorates that the par ty had no 
choice but to renominate them, but it was rumoured that the 
others had threatened to stand as Independents if the official 
nomi nat ion were denied them. (1 ) 
In Remuera , however, the electorat~ committee exercised 
its right under new party rules to require Endean to submit 
his nominat ion to a postal ballot of party members. Endean 
had announced his intention to stand again early in June, and 
when nominations were called for the following month , ·he did 
(1) Standard, 30 July 1941. 
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not submit his name . Announcing that he would stand instead 
as an Inde pendent National candidate, he said, 
"I was advised •••• that there was a bias against 
me worked up by a small group of members , and that 
I would not get an impartial consideration if I 
were to submit to a ballot. 
I do not think that the National Party in Remuera 
at present is truly represent~tive of the people 
nor do I think that the 9,605 electors who voted 
for me in 1938 will, to any great extent, not cast 
their votes in my favour at the coming General 
Election •••• u(1J 
The chairman of the electorate committee , T. Clifton 
Webb , (later a well-known Nationa 1 Party figure) replied that 
party members "had a perfect right •••• to review the candid-
ature of a sitting member if they felt there was a substantial 
desire for change 11 .(2) The committee already had five nomina-
tions (but not Endean's) and could have held a ballot then and 
there. At this stage Holland stepped in, saying that a "dead-
lock" had been reached at Remuera and that the matter had been 
referred to him. "After consultation with various interested 
parties, including the Parliamentary Opposition", he said, he 
had decided to support Endean .<3) Apparently the Remuera elec-
torate committee was not one of the "interested parties" so 
consulted, for Webb described the news as "a bombshell" and said 
"The first intimation I got of it was when I read it in the news-
paper this morning", and hinted darkly that it was not the end 





Evening Post, 23 July 1941. 
Another Remuera Nationalist accused by Endean of "working 
up a bias" against him was Mr . (later Sir) Leslie Munro. 
Dominion, 2 August 1941. 
Dominion, 4 August 1941. 
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A postal ballot was held after Holland 's announcement 
to decide simply whether Endean should be nominated or not, 
and the result was an affirmative vote of 676 - 563. A 
month later Holland and Gordon, the President of the National 
Party, addressed a meet ing of the party in Remuera , which then 
confirmed Endean as its candidate. (1) The affair was , for the 
"new gang 11 , a rather humiliating demonstration of the local 
strength of the older members. 
In 1943 four veterans, Cobbe, Dickie, For bes and Ransome 
announced their retirement. (Ransome died before the election 
and Burnett died in 1941.) However , the four Nationalists who 
had voted with the Government on the no-confidence motion in 
1942 all intended to stand again . In the end, as already des-
cribed, only Kyle stood as an Independent; Coates died, and 
Hamilton and Hassey were adopted as official candidates after 
their electorate committees publicly supported them. Kyle's 
hold on his electorate had never been strong and he had nearly 
been unseated in 1938. His campaign in 1943 attracted little 
interest, and he withdrew just before polling day after making 
a few speeches criticising the decision to leave .the War Admin-
istration and attacking the "handful of Hereford Street gentle-
men" who he said now controlled the Christ church National Party. (2 
(1) Dominion, 8 September 1941. 
(2) Press, 3 September and 23 September 1943. 
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Endean, however , although he voted with the National 
Party on the no-confidence motion in 1942, was not as lucky 
as Hamilton and Massey. While he was overseas, in ugust 
1943, nominations were again called for and R. N. Algie was 
adopted as the official candidate. Algie offered to go to 
a postal ballot with Endean , but the latter, despite urging 
from the Auckland Divisional Executive refused and again 
announced that he would stand as an Independent. (1) Intense 
pressure was put on him to withdravl, and on 7 September he 
did so, leaving Holland to make the announcement . (2 ) 
Despite the capitulation of the "old gang", National 
candidates showed an extraordinary sensitivity on the subject 
during the campaign. For instance, R. G. Gerard, the National 
candidate for id-Canterbury, stressed that 
The National Party in this election was definitely 
not the "old gang" criticised by the Labour Party . 
The party was reformed in 1936, and of the seventy-
seven candidates now i n t he field, only eight were 
in Parliament from 1931 to 1935. Th~ party had a 
new philosophy and a v irile leader .(3J 
. R. Guthrey, the candidat e for Christchurch South, 
promised new conquests 
"Vle are going to purge the party of its old Tory 
tradition. I say that without apology to any 
old Tory who may be here tonight. ( )We are going 
to build a new and better party . " 4 
Such statements were commonplace from ational s peakers 
in 1943. 
(1) Dominion, 17 August 1943. 
(2) Dominion, 8 September 1943. 
(3) Press, 18 September 1943 . 
(4) Press, 21 September 1943. 
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The hypothesis of "old" versus "new", however , only 
goes part of the way towards explaining the split in the 
National Party between 1940 and 1943 . Apart from the 
problem of breaking the 11 old gar:g s 11 dominance the party 
a lso had to adjust its policy and out look in keeping with 
the results of Labour's rule. This resulted in the paradox 
that those Nat ionalist s most bitterly opposed to Labour 
during the war were those who were most progressive in their 
policy, simply because they realised that Labour could be 
beaten only if National became more forward-looking . Thus 
Ho lland was supported by a number of former United Party 
members, particularly those who had been back-bench critics 
of the Coalition. Two of these , W.A. Bodkin and W.J. Broad-
foot, became Holland 's closest associates . During the elec -
tion campaign Bodkin, in reply to an interjection about the 
11 old gang 11 , said 
"The back benchers of the Government of the 
depression fought those proposals tooth and nail, 
but they had I)O) "say" and I knmv because I was 
one of them. 11 ~ 1 
The quarrels in the Coalition were finally worked out 
in the National Party in the 1940' s. A section of the 
United Party nursed a grievance after some of their Ministers 
lost office when the Coalition was formed, and these members 
grew increasingly rebellious against Reform dominance. This 
minority, which included the United city member s and some 
(1) Oamaru Mail, 7 September 1943. 
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rural ones, notably Bodkin (Central Otago) and McSkimming 
(Clutha), was opposed to the alteration in the exchange 
rate and other measures which they regarded as unwarranted 
concessions by Reform to its rural supporters. In 1935 
two United members stood as Democrats and several other 
Coalition dissidents as Independents. The more far-sighted 
remained in the hastily-formed National Political Federation , 
which became the National Party in 1936. The Nationalists 
who survived the election numbered 18; 9 Reform , 8 United, 
1 former Independent (Polson) and 2 new members . However , 
of the Reformers , two (Holyoake and Hargest) were young men 
who certainly fav oured a change in the party ' s leaders and 
policy. The situation was later described, somewhat impress-
ionistically, by Bodkin. 
fter the 1935 Conservative landslide, due to the 
i mplementing of the economic policy of Professor 
Copland during the depression , the Liberals and 
the more progressive Reform members were left to 
get together under l~ . S. G. Holland, to hammer out 
the present progressive policy of the Nat ional 
Party. That party was not the "same old gang" 
as was in office during the depression .(1) 
Bodkin's omission of any reference to Hamilton shows that 
his Leadership was regarded as a transition period by many in 
the party . The election of six nm·T Nat ionalists in 1938 
decisively tipped the balance against the veterans. Most 
of the latter supported Hamilton ' s policy of soft-pedalling 
party politics during the war; if newspaper reports of the 
(1) Southland Daily News, 17 August 1943. 
I 
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voting on Holland ' s election as Leader were correct( 1)the 
number voting against him exactly equalled the number of 
old Reformers at the caucus. Their eclipse became com-
plete under Holland 's Leadership. His closest associates 
were Broadfoot and Bodkin, both former United members, and 
Polson, who entered Parliament as an Independent after 
defeating a Reform member in 1928. These three all favoured 
a much stronger line towards Labour than the Reformers . The 
seal was put on the association of the United remnant with 
Holland 'ItT hen For bes , the former United leader, was made 
Deputy Leader of the Opposition when Holland was overseas s 
in 1941. In the vote on the no-confidence motion in 1942 
the four rebels were all old Reform members. On the other 
hand Forbes broke a long Parliamentary silence to support 
Holland , although he had previously been in favour of co-
operation with the Government. (2 ) As a footnote on this 
subject, National's candidates in 1943 included a number of 
well-known former Liberals or Independents. W.A . Veit ch, 
who contested Wellington Suburbs for the party in that year 
(and polled better than most National candidates in the 
cities) had been a Coalition United member in 1931 but had 
joined the Democrats in 1935. Miss Ellen Melville, contest-
ing the Grey Lynn seat, had stood unsuccessfully six times 
since 1919, three of them as an Independent Reformer against 
official candidates. A. J . Murdoch (Marsden) had first won 
See above, p. 68. 
NZPD, Vol .261, pp.686-90. 
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the seat as an Independent in 1922, lost it in 1925, and 
regained it in 1928. He , like Veitch , was one of the 
United Ministers who "retired voluntarily" when the Coali-
tion was formed in 1931, and he lost his seat again in 1935. 
He was successful in 1943 and held the seat until 1954, when 
he retired. R.A . \'/right , who had held the We llington Sub-
urbs seat as an Independent in 1935 after twenty-seven years 
as a Reform member , was to have stood as a Nat ionalist for 
his old seat in 1941, (1)but was not renominated in 1943. 
Finally , William Sullivan , who won the Bay of Plenty seat 
for Nat ional at a by-election in 1941, had been an Indepen-
dent United candidate for Tauranga in 1931, and had been 
listed by one newspaper as Labour!(2) 
The bas ic reason for the bad feeling in the party, and 
for the changes in it, was the slow realisation that the 
rural seats had ceased to hold the balance of power in New 
lealand politics, and that the party would have to make 
substantial inroads in Labour's urban strength before it 
won another election. The table on page 2,s be low shows 
how weak Nat ional's vote was in urban areas. In 1935 its 
share of the total vote in all seats with between 66 per 
cent and 85 per cent of urban populat ion was 33 . 95 per cent 
and in seats with over 85 per cent urban population, the 
"city seats" proper , only 25.94 per cent. In 1938 its 
share in the two groups increased by 7.80 per cent and 6 .94 
(1) Nat ional Newslette+ , August 1941. 
(2) Dominion, 22 November 1931. 
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per cent respectively , but Labour's share increased by 
7.78 per cent and 7.25 per cent, for both parties gained 
votes that went to third party and Independent candidates 
in 1935. Thus National actually made smaller gains than 
Labour in these two classes of seats in 1938. In the 
number of seats won, National's position was mucp worse. 
In t935 it held only two of the 66 percent - 85 per cent 
urban seats, and after 1938, with the loss of New Plymouth , 
only one. In 1935 and 1938 the party held only two "city 
seats", and the loss of Wellington West by R. A. Wright, an 
Independent, in 1938 was in practice a loss of a seat for 
National. 
A perspicacious warning was given to the party in 1943 
by a periodical which usually reflected urban business and 
commercial opinion. The occasion was the Christchurch East 
by-election, in which National had run third after the 
Labour and Democratic Labour candidates and polled only 25 
per cent of the vote. 
The farming community would be well advised to 
appreciate that the day of their political dominance 
was doomed when the Exchange rate was raised to pro -
vide a bonus to aid farmers in adversity , and when 
this action was followed by Mortgage adjustments , 
again to the detriment of the investing rentier class, 
the warrant of unfitness for the farming community to 
dominate the community was endorsed in red ink. The 
f utur e of New ~ealand depends upon the future develop-
ment of the farming interests, but there will also be 
an enlargement of industries and increasing urban pop-
ulations . Urban populations have shown no indication 
to turn to the National Party after a period of nearly 
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eight years of Labour in office, and this must be 
attributed to the lack of sympathy and interest 
exhibited by t he National members representing 
rural constituencies towards the urban population . 
They must either mend their \vays or get men in the 
cities to take the platform for the Party. They 
would be wiser to take both courses. The only 
way to secure a wider rank of men of ability is to 
assure outstanding men t hat if they fight on the 
political frontiers they will not be pushed into 
the background so that the soft-spot M. P.•s may 
enjoy cabinet rank because of their longer stand-
ing as members of Parliament. There is no chance 
of men of ability coming forward to pull the chest-
nuts out of the fire for the men who have shown no 
capacity to win t;lfban votes even in their o-....m 
constituencies.C1J 
ctually, the 11new men 11 in the party had taken such 
advice to heart long before 1943; the rural elements in 
the party still held the ma jority of National seats, but 
the power was slipping from their hands . This was sho-....m 
dramatically in 1940 when Hamilton, a farmer representing a 
Southland rural electorate, was replaced by Holland; a manu-
facturer from one of the party •s two city seats. The "old 
gang 11 mostly represented rural seats, and they felt that their 
exclusion from power in the party after 1940 as a sign that it 
was neglecting rural interests. Coates• opinion in 1943 that 
"the National Party no more represents the views of the farm-
ing community than the man in the moon 11 shows how he himself 
felt . The cry was taken up astutely by some Labour candi-
dates in rural seats. 11They (the National Party) pushed out 
the farmers with Mr . Coates and 1r . Hamilton, 11 ( 2)was a theme 
used often by c.w. Boswell in the Bay of Island back country. 
(1) N.~ .Economist and Taxpayer, 29 February 1943. 
(2) Northern Advocate, 21 September 1943 . 
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(Boswell, a school-teacher, lost the seat to a National 
farmer candidate.) 
Much of this feeling was due to National's acceptance 
that Labour wage levels and social security benefits had to 
be maintained, for farmers had found the increase in agricul-
tural wages and taxation a sharp increase in costs, particu-
larly during the war when labour was scarce and award rates 
meant very little. Sometimes there were more specific 
grievances. Some farmers were disappointed that the party 
had dropped the compensated price for farm products from its 
policy in 1938. This idea, sponsored by the Farmers' Union 
after the depression, claimed to equalise "the reward of the 
exporter •••• with the value of wealth he has procured for 
the Dominion in foreign trade". To do this, farmers ' returns 
from exports were to be subsidised to relate Sterling prices 
to New iealand and British price levels. (1) 
The proponents of the scheme argued that if protection 
for New Zealand secondary industries were abandoned, it would 
present no difficulties , but since it entailed a subsidy to 
be paid by general taxation it understandably enjoyed little 
support outside the more extreme advocates of "farming first ". 
Nevertheless, in some quarters t he dropping of the compensated 
price was seen as a "betrayal" of the farmers by the National 
Party . Two Independent candidates, Closey (Manawatu) and 
Penniket (Waikato~, based their campaigns on the compensated 
(1) N. :l. Farmers' Union (Auckland Province), "Compensated 
Prices 11 ( 1 936). 
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price , and claimed that National no longer represented 
farming interests. Closey held that this was the result 
of National 's absorption of the Democrats in 1936. This 
enlivened the Manawatu contest considerably, for M. H. Oram, 
the National candidate, was a Palmersto~ North lawyer who 
had stood as a Democrat in 1935. 
The party 's candidates in 1943 showed some attempt to 
move away from the old predominance of farmer M. P.'s. 
Coates ' successor was T.C . Webb , an Auckland lawyer, and 
Cobbe's in Manawatu was Oram, another lawyer. But in most 
cases, as in previous elections, National nominated farmer 
candidates for farming seats. The fact that only seven out 
of seventeen new members were farme~reflected National 's 
gains in more urban seats, not a general rejection of farmer 
candidates. 
Closey's charge concerning the Democrats brings to light 
another pressure at work to change the National Party. The 
Democrats themselves were mostly absorbed in 1936, when a 
formal fusion took place , and in 1943 there were four former 
Democrats among National's candidates- W. A. Clark (T hames), 
T. C. A. Hislop (We llington North), the former leader of the 
Democrats, M. H. Oram (Manawatu) and W. A. Veitch (Wellington 
Suburbs). (1) However, this by no means ended moves by organ-
ised political groups to change the National Party. 
(1) H.L. Harker, Democrat candidate for Bay of Plenty in 1935, 
was a brother of C. G.E . Harker , National i. P. for Waipawa 
since 1940. 
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In 1937 a group of "men vlho hold or have held positions 
of trust and responsibility in the community" (a hallmark 
phrase for conservative groups) met in Auckland to found 
the New Zealand Freedom Association . The Association soon 
gathered considerable financial support and in 1938 enlisted 
Professor . 1. Algie , of Auckland University, as its execu-
tive officer. Its aims were to 
protect rights be ing filched away from us one by 
one in exchange for some system of so-called 
securityi with its necessary accomp~niffient of 
politica and bureaucratic control.~1J 
With its theme of freedom lost and bureaucracy rampant 
the Association was obviously an anti-Labour body. Its 
importance was that its programme of educating the public 
about these dangers involved an almost explicit intention 
to put pressure on the National Party to become a more effec-
tive anti-Labour organisation. At the 1938 election the 
Association supported National, admitting that "there was 
clearly no popular desire for the setting up of a third 
political party, and the only other alternative was that 
support should be given to the National Party". However, 
as the Association admitted it had been coldly received by 
the party. (2 ) After the election in a pamphlet called 
"Democracy Re-discovers its Backbone" with the significant 
sub-title 11The Middle Way 11 , the Association voiced the dis-
satisfaction that many National supporters must have felt 
a t the party's ineffectiveness. Griticising those who 
(1) Democracy Re-discovers its Backbone, p.2. 
(2) Ibid., p. 4. 
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would "support the National Party simply because it opposes 
the Labour Party", (1) the Association pinned its hopes on a 
large group of uncommitted, non-political electors . 
The Association believes that between the extremes 
of current pol itical thought in this Dominion, 
there is , in fact , a middle way which the majQ~ity 
of our citizens desire to find and to follow. ~ J 
The Association ' s criticism of the National Party ' s 
11 extremism 11 , shows that dissatisfaction with National was 
widespread among those who should have been the party ' s 
strongest supporters. Seen in this light , the talk of a 
11middle way 11 was an attempt to pr i se the party away from its 
unpopular conservatism , to improve its public image and enable 
it to compete more effectively with Labour . This , in fact , 
was the problem of Holland after 1940. 
The Freedom ssociation did not follow up its hints of 
political action , and it does not seem to have made much 
impression on the public. Algie ' s speeches, though witty 
and interesting , did not go much beyond fairly general expos-
itions and constitutional law . The Association was wound up 
in July 1943 when Algie ac cepted nomination as National cand-
idate for Remuera . 
The People ' s Movement , launched in March 1940, was a far 
more ser i ous threat to the National Party; for the first 
time since 1934 , when the Democrat Party was born , a new , 
(1) 'Ibid., p. 5 . 
(2) Ibid . , p.1. 
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frankly political group was challenging National on its 
own ground.( 1) The Movement , although claiming to be a 
centr e group politically, was actually to the right of the 
Nat ional Party. Its demands for a more effective Opposi-
tion, and a change of Leaders obviously frightened the party 
and must have been a major factor in Hamilton ' s replacement. 
It is easy to see in retrospect that t he People's Movement 
was not very important , but in 1940 its threats looked 
serious, and there was no telling how powerful it might 
have become. At the Mov ement 's first meeting in the 
Wellington Town Hall in April 1940, the president, E. R. Toop, 
set out its attitude to the existing parties. 
'~e are not satisfied with the Socialistic record 
of either the Government or the National party ••• 
if there is no alteration in personnel, consti tu-
tion and policy of the existing parties, we will 
not hesitate to place our whole organisation and 
candidates into the political arena to oppose 
them •••• There are thousands of dissatisfied 
National supporters today. They cannot vote 
Labour , but they would vote for a middle party . 
A third party at the next election will have a 
greater chance of success than either of the 
present parties. The selfishness of those who 
try to frighten the electors with the split -vote 
bogey is beyond belief . 11 ( 2J 
The National Party reply to Toop( 3)showed no desire to 
come to terms with the new group . Nevertheless, negotiations 
began between the ovement and the party ' s leading Parliamen-
tarians to try to iron out their differences. These met with 
no success , and since the ovement •s demands were for a 
(1) See below , Chapter 4. (2) Evening Post, 1 May 1940 . (3) Dominion, 2 May 1940. 
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"completely new party with a new name, a new leader, a new 
personnel and a new policy", (1) this was not surprising. 
The Movement then showed signs of moving into active politics, 
holding a series of rallies in November 1940 and publishing a 
programme entitled "A Lead for New Zealand". However, nego-
tiations had resumed again when Holland 1vas elected Leader, 
and on 12 February 1941 one newspaper reported that "repres-
(2) 
entatives of both organisations" had agreed on a merger. 
A week later Holland officially announced this, saying that 
"steps are being taken to ensure that the People's Movement 
is given full and adequate re presentation on the various 
branches and headquarters of the wides pread National organ-
isation11.(3) Holland gave no details of how the National 
Party had mended its ways in accordance with the Movement's 
previous conditions, except to mention . t hat t he party 's name 
remained unchanged. So, apparently did its other features. 
Toop and another member of the Movement joined the party's 
Dominion Council,(4) and Toop stood as a National candidate 
in Wellington South in 1943. The "amalgamation" was immed-
iately repudiated by the 1ovement, (B) but, to judge from its 
subsequent statements, it had lost most of its politically 
aggressive leaders and now came out in favour of a national 
government and a cessation of party politics. 
(1) Dominion, 15 November 1940. 
(2) Truth, 12 February 1941. 
(3) Dominion, 19 February 1941. 
(4) Dominion 1 March 1941. (5) Evening Post, 17 March 1941. 
At the end 
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of it all the National Party seemed to have absorbed some 
of the Wellington personnel of the Movement with very little 
concession in return, for Toop was content to commend 
Nat ional to his supporters on the strength of Holland's 
accession to the Leadership. (1) 
At the same time mergers were concluded with two embryo 
parties , a New Liberal Party and a returned soldiers' polit-
ical movement. (2 ) Neither of these created any public stir, 
although mention was made of a New Zealand Liberal Hovement 
in Southland in July 1943(3)but no more was heard of it. 
The abs or ption of these movements was Holland's first success 
as Leader, and it was the beg i nning of a movement by Holland 
and his younger colleagues to rejuvenate the party . 
How true was the claim that National was "a new party 
with a new leader 11 ( 4)by 1943? The contrast between Holl and 
and Hamilton needs no furt her stressing. · The new Leader's 
colleagues, too were men who had no part in the Coalition 
Government, and had in fact severely criticised it. They 
made it clear, after 1940 , that they considered the "old 
gang" a liability to the party and were glad to see most of 
them retire in 1943. No attempt was made to use the exper-
ience of such men as Coates and Hamilton, and their open dis-
agreement over the War Administrat ion and their decision to 
(1) Evening Post, 1 March 1941. 
(2) Dominion, 20 February, 1941. 
(3) Dominion, 24 July 1943. 
(4) Round Table, December 1943. 
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stand as Independents in 1943 indicates they they felt they 
no longer had any role in the party . 
National ' s candidates in 1943 were predominantly "new 
men" , as Table I shows. (1 ) Only candidates not in Parlia-
ment between 1938 and 1943 are included , but two who had 
been before 1938 are . 
TABLE I 
Number of Previous Contests of 
Nat ional Candidates 
(Excluding i • • •s at Dissolution, 30/8/43) 
No . of Contests No. of candidates No . successful 
None 41 12 
One 8 2 
Two 2 
Three 2 1 
fore than 4 2 Three 
Candidates who had stood once: 
Aderman (New Plymouth) 1938 Nat i onal (Dunedin South) 
Fortune (Eden) 1940 Independent (Auckland West 
by- election) 
Hislop (Wellington North) 1935 Democrat (Masterton) 
Kealy. (Auckland West) 1938 Nat ional (Auckland West) 
l'1erritt (Auckland East) 1938 Nat ional (Auckland East) 
(1) T. C. Webb is included in this table, for although he stood 
as "Independent National" he was virtually an official 
candidate. (See below pp ) • 
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Or am (N:anawatu) 1935 Democrat (Manawatu) 
Park (Onehunga) 1938 National (Onehunga) 
Taylor (Lyttelton) 1935 National (vfestland) 
Candidates who had stood t\vice: 
Clark (Thames) 1935 Democrat ( uc kland Sub.lrbs) 
1938 National (Thames) . 
Falconer (Dunedin West) 1935 National (Dunedin North) 
1938 Nat ional (Dunedin North) 
Candidates who had stood three times: 
Appleton (Wellington Central)1931 Coalition (Wellington Sth) United 
1935 Independent (Otaki) 
1938 National (Wellington Cen-
tral) 
She at (Patea) 1925 Labour (Taranaki) 
1 931 Labour (New Plymouth) 
1935 Independent (New Plymouth) 
The candidates who had stood more than three times were 
an interesting quartet. The youngest, K. J . Holyoake, had 
held the Motueka seat as Coalition Reform in 1932 and as 
National in 1935, losing it to G. F. Skinner in 1938. A. J . 
urdoch ( arsden) had first contested the seat as an Indepen-
dent in 1919 and had won it in 1922. He joined the Liberal 
Party in 1925 but lost the seat, regaining it as a United 
candidate in 1928. He was Ninister of Agriculture in the 
Governments of Ward and Forbes, but "retired" when the 
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Coalition was formed . He lost his seat in 1935, regained 
it in 1943 and remained in Parliament until 1954, becoming 
Minister of Agriculture again in the National Government. 
W. A. Veitch (Wellington Suburbs) had boxed the political 
compass between Labour and Democrat as M. P. for Wanganui 
from 1911 to 1935. Although ?3 years old in 1943, he 
fought a vigorous campaign but actually polled a slightly 
lower percentage of the vote than O. C. Ma zengarb in 1938. 
~he only National candidate in this last group who had not 
been in Parliament was Miss Ellen Melville, an Auckland law-
yer . She had contested every election, in various Auckland 
seats, between 1919 and 1931, three times as official Reform 
) 
and three as an Independent. On one of the latter occasions, 
the 1926 Eden by- election, her intervention split the Reform 
vote and Labour::: the seat. Standing in Grey Lynn in 1943, 
she was swamped beneath the large votes for Hackett and Lee 
and finis hed third with only 1? per cent of the vote . 
The new members elected i n 1943 brightened National's 
image as a "new party". Most of them were young; their 
average age was 48 and four were under 40. Although many 
of them had local body experience they were generally new 
faces in the National Party . 
As a further proof of his party ' s changed character, 
Holland after 1940 made much of the "freedom" allowed M.P. 1 s 
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in votes in the House . He cla i med that this had been 
a llowed since 1940, but his first public announcement of 
it was not made until shortly before the election. 
Except on motions of no-confidence in the Govern-
ment when members were naturally expected to 
conform to their electoral pledges, the National 
Party did not place its members in strait-jackets . 
The former custom by which they were expected to 
vote a s decided by the leader had been ended when 
he be came leader, and members v1ere nQiv) free to 
vote a ccording to t he ir consciences. ~ 1 
Holland stressed the difference of this from both 
Coalition and Labour Party pr a ctice , and he was a lso trying 
to capitalise on a revulsion from "party politics" expressed 
by the People ' s Ivlovement and by other non-political bodies . 
Before the election, of course, it was hard to tell how wides-
pread this feeling was, and both main parties were more concerned 
than they need have been . Actually, Holland ' s formula was so 
obviously an attempt to pl ay on this popular feeling that it 
pr obably had the oppos ite effect from that intended. He 
could only point to two instances of members using this right; 
Doidge ' s vote against t he rolongation of Parliament Bill in 
1942 and Ky le ' s for the River Control and Soil Conservation 
Bill in 1941. Ngata 1 s speech aga i nst the ho lding of an 
election in 1943 had to be dragged in as anot her case of "free-
dom" being exercised . The proposal was criticised by Fraser 
as "humbug" dur i ng the campaign. \v . E. Barnard, a severe 
critic of party poli tics i n wartime and an Independent candi-
date himself , put his finger on its weakness. 
(1) Dominion, 7 April 1943. 
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"So long as the National arty remains in oppos-
ition, it is possible to a llow each of its Parl-
i amentary members to vote a ccording to his O'ivn 
views , but as a Government this would be imposs-
i ble, as Mr. Holland knows. Any leader of a 
Government must be ab le to rely on the full supp-
ort of its followers in the Hous e on every measure 
involving Government poliGY' otherwise no Prime 
ll1inis ter could carry on. 11 ~ 1 
This, however, was only an incidental to the party 's 
"new look". In other respects its policy in 1943 was as 
different as could be from 1938 -not in specifics, but in 
outlook and tone. Na tional did not repeat the mistake of 
trying to frighten the electors with the bogey of Socialism 
and of simply opposing and pointing out flaws in Labour 
proposals. Instead, the policy had a new tone; an optim-
istic, undoctrinaire belief that it was within the ability 
of man and the state to settle all social problems, and a 
full acceptance of Labour's welfare legislation. 
The first characteristic was typical of Holland himself. 
In a pamphlet called "Passwords to Progress", published in 
July 1943, he gave an outline of the party's political philo-
sophy which also gives a first-hand idea of Holland ' s own. 
These passages show its tone 
Poverty is avoidable and must be banished . (p.9.) 
Every person subject to our laws who accepts 
the liabilities and obligations of citizenship 
is also entitled as of right to be guaranteed 
the essentials of a decent life •••• living 
standard does not consist of a bare minimum of 
food and clothing. People who work hard and 
are industrious are entitled to more than the 
bare mi n imum. (p.13.) 
(1) Dominion , 16 September 1943 . 
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Governments have learned that •••• slumps can 
and must be avoided in future •••• VJe will 
never allow another 1930-35 to ha ppen in this 
country - that is definite and positive. (p.21) 
The pamphlet ranged over a wide field , mostly stating 
broad aims with which anyone could agree , as the chapter 
headi ngs - "Our Rights and Duties as Citizens", "A Christian 
Democracy", for instance - show. Holland's "Ten passwords", 
however, had a more political ring. Under such headings as 
"Work", "Freedom", "Government From the People Upwards - not 
fr om Officialdom Dowmmrds 11 , "Private OWnership", "Free Enter-
pr ise and Competition", and "Industrial Harmony", there were 
sharp criticisms of trade unions, "agitators", "leaners" 
allegedly living off social security, and "dictatorial regul-
ations and restrictions". 
(1) 
The pamphlet set the tone for National's election policy. 
To begin with , the war mi ght just as well not have been going 
on; it received mention in only one short paragraph (in five 
pages) stating the mandatory pledge of a "full war effort". 
The specific proposals on the war included only an examination 
of war expenditure by a Commission of Enquiry and an overhaul 
of publicity and censorship. The rest of the policy was con-
cerned solely with the domestic and rehabilitation proposals . 
The policy was said to be founded on four planks; employment 
"as of right", removal of the avoidable causes of want (unem-
(1) The following points and quotations are from the "Election 
Manifesto; New Zealand National Party, 1943 11 • 
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ployment and sickness), "the restoration to New Zealanders 
of their fundamental British right of freedom", and "justice 
for the family" . On subjecmsuch as Rehabilitation and 
Taxation virtually nothing substantial was said, although 
tax revision to encourage larger families was promised. 
One of the most important points was housing . State 
tenants would be allowed to purchase their homes . This prop-
osal was played up, apparently successfully, by Labour, using 
the slogan "Houses on the Market , Tenants on the Street" , as 
an attempt to sell all State houses , for by the end of the 
campaign National was forced to emphasise that tenants who 
did not wish to buy could remain in their houses . A housing 
plan "surpassing in magnitude and type anything hitherto 
attempted in New Zealand" , with 25,000 men employed on it for 
ten years was promised . 
In other fields , the party promised the abolition of 
much licencing and the need for permits for various under-
takings, and a ba llot of trade unionists on the question of 
compulsory unionism. This replaced the 1938 promise to 
abolish the compulsory unionism laws. Under the heading 
"Cost of Living" a lowering of prices following a return to 
"competition" and complete abolition of the Internal Market -
ing Division \vere promised. The same sweeping, impractical 
"solutions" to complicated problems were evident in the prop-
osals for pr i mary production . 
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Producer-control of production and marketing in 
co - operation vTith Government. 
Guaranteed minimum prices for farm produce with 
ceiling(prices determined by the producers them-
selves. 1 J 
What the last proposal meant the party never explained , 
despite urging from farm spokesmen, particularly from the 
dairy industry. Apparently, from what National speakers said 
in the campaign, the money required to finance the minimum 
price would have been found out of general taxation and any-
t hing above the minimum price would have gone to the producers. 
It is doubtful if the party had thought out this point at all; 
it seemed to be playing on the general demand for an increase 
in the guaranteed price while hoping that it would not have to 
try to put its ovm scheme into practice. 
It will be clear by now that the election manifesto was 
not designed to put forward specific proposals for action 
(there was no mention of manpower , for instance) but to create 
an impression - an impression of a liberal, middle-of-the-road 
party dedicated to free enterprise but believing in government 
responsibility for social welfare and social security. For 
this reason the general announcements in the policy - for 
instance that the party would extend social security benefits 
in some cases and maintain wage and pension rates - were more 
important than any specific proposals. The party was largely 
successful in creating a new image of itself; Labour 1 s attack 
(1) See also below, pp. 211-8 
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still made use of the depression memories and warnings that 
National would cut wages and benefits, but Fraser himself 
admitted the increasing weakness of these charges when he 
remarked, 
"After reading the manifesto by 1r . Holland, I am 
not sure that there are two contending principles . 
It appears that the Nationalists want to trot 
alongside of us and are stammering in(a)language 
that is natural to the Labour Party . " 1 
There could hardly be a testimonial for the "new party" 
from a better source than that . 
CHAPI'ER 4 
THE NEW PARTIES, 1940-1943 
i. The Democratic Labour Party 
Of the three new parties in 1943, the only one with 
sufficient org_anisation and cohesion to be worthy of the 
name was the Democratic Labour Party. Beside the votes of 
the two main parties, its performance appears unimpressive. 
Its 51 candidates( 1)polled a total of 40,433 votes, or 4 per 
cent o~ the total, averaging 793 per candidate. These 
figures, however , give little idea of the achievement of 
starting a new party - a breakaway from the Labour Party -
in wartime, and of keeping it alive for three years to con-
test an election with candidates in more than 50 electorates. 
All this had been done i n the face of hostile Labour propa-
ganda at a time when paper shortages, censorship and black-
outs made political activity unusually difficult. 
The man whose personality and energy were mainly respon-
sible for the party 's existence was John A. Lee, probably the 
most interesting political personality in wartime New Zealand 
and certainly the only one really able to enliven party poli-
tics in those years . Lee had been the Labour Party's best 
propagandist after H. E. Holland; he had written some of the 
most effective .party pamphlets i n the early thirties, and had 
prepared its Speakers' Notes for the election in 1938. When 
the Labour Government was formed in 1935 Lee was made Under-
(1) These figures apply to European seats only. 
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Secretary to the Minister of Finance, with control over 
housing , but he never attained Cabinet rank . The usual 
Labour criticism of Lee after his expulsion was that he was 
"no team man". This was unfair in that Lee never had an 
opportunity to work as a responsible member of the Cabinet 
team, but it was true that after 1938 he carried his fight 
with the party leadership on in public with increasing vigour. 
Tensions in the Labour Party were brought to breaking 
point by Savage's illness and there were some heated scenes 
in caucus after the war broke out . In December 1939 
"Tomorrow" published Lee's notorious "Psychopathology in 
Politics", giving his opponents an opportunity to force a 
final showdown with him on an extremely emotional issue. 
The conference that expelled Lee was in fact dominated by 
the knowledge that Savage was dying, and it is undeniable 
that this was played on expertly by those who sought Lee's 
expulsion. The party has since always denied that Lee was 
expelled because of his financial ideas. The charge levelled 
when the matter was raised again in 1946 was "disloyalty to 
the Party and treachery to the Leader, M. J . Savage" .C1) There 
was foundation for the first point in that in January 1940 
Lee had agreed , under the threat of expulsion, to submit any-
thing he wrote to the National Executive , and that he later 
wrote a strongly worded letter to the party secretary refusing 
to do this. (2) The publication of the "Lee Letter" although 
(1) Labour Party, Annual Conference Report (1946), p. 5 . 
(2) J.A . Lee, Expelled from the Labour Party for Telling the 
Truth. 
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accidental , was in itself a serious breach of party disci-
pline. However, whether Lee was expelled because of his 
ideas or not, it was t he publication of "Psychopathology in 
Politics" that finally tipped the balance against him. 
Lee 1vas expelled by the Labour Party Conference on 
25 March 1940. The resolution, which read 
That ~ . J.A. Lee, M.P. for Grey Lynn, having been 
guilty of conduct and acts inconsistent with his 
position as a member of the Labour Party , this 
conference, in the interests of the Labour move-
ment, h~1eby expels him from the New Zealand Labour 
Party. ~ J 
was carried by 546 votes to 344. 
Lee i mmediately showed that he was considering political 
action on his own. The day after the Conference decision he 
told the "Evening Post" that 
he supposed he could now regard himself as a 
"Democratic Labour(~~rty - and all completely 
returned soldier". J 
The Labour Party must have waited anxiously to see how many of 
their supporters would follow Lee out of the party . His pos-
ition had looked fairly strong in the months before his expul-
sion. On 11 January t he Auckland L. R.C. had met to discuss 
"Psychopathology in Politics" and to consider disciplinary 
measures, but had instead passed a resolution expressing con-
fidence in Lee by 109 votes to 85. The meeting then passed a 
motion in the same terms regarding the Prime Minister. (3 ) 
(1) Evening Post, 26 March 1940. (2) Ibid. 
(3) Tomorrow, 24 January 1940. 
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Savage promised that "it would not be left at that"(1)and 
it was probably the result of the Auckland meeting that 
decided Lee's opponents to for ce his expulsion. The 344 
votes - over a third of the total recorded at the Conference 
against Lee's expulsion - were a very substantial minority, 
especially if, as Lee claimed, they were most ly cast by 
branch delegates with only one vote. (2) One delegate 
believed that several 1'1 . P. 1 s resigned from the party after 
the vote, but thought better of it the next morning.C3) 
Lee went to work immediately. On the day after his 
expulsion a meeting of about 30 delegates in his Wellington 
house decided to form a new party .C4) On 10 April the Grey 
Lynn Branch of the Labour Party joined Lee. The meeting, 
attended by between 150 and 175 members, lasted about two 
hours. Lee was not present, but Mrs. Lee attended and 
strongly supported her husband. 
with 22 dissentients) read 
The resolution (passed 
That members of the Grey Lynn branch of the Labour 
Party ••• believe that Mr . Lee was disciplined for 
refusing to compromise in his efforts to put into 
operation the policy on which Labour was elected 
on two occasions and for his fight for democratic 
control of the Parliamentary Labour Party. There-
fore, in order that the branch 1 s support can be 
accorded Mr . Lee, this branch '"ithdraws from the 
New Zealand Labour Party and plegges itself to 
support Hr. Lee wholeheartedly.~ l 
(1) Dominion, 13 January 1940. 
(2) Evening Post, 26 March 1940. 
(3) H. E. Herring, letter to the author. 
(4) John A. Lee ' s Weekly , 25 September 1940. 
(5) Dominion, 11 April 1940. 
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On 7 April W.E. Barnard, M. P. for Napier and the Speaker of 
the House , also resigned from the Labour Party, giving as 
his reasons the lack of democracy within the party, the 
Government's financial orthodoxy, and (a hint of controv-
ersies to come) its nservility 11 to Britain over the dispos-
ition of the New ~ealand Division .(1) The loss of Barnard 
was serious for the Labour Party . He had never been regarded 
as a militant left-winger, and his moderation, as seen in his 
restrained letter of resignation, and his ability as Speaker 
had given him great prestige. His resignation made it seem 
for a time that disaffection might have been more widely spread 
than was thought, but no other M. P.s resigned although Carr and 
Langstone came very close to it. (2) And, as Lee said later of 
his younger supporters, they "showed a greater desire to grab 
portfolios than to reach for the stars 11 • ( 3) 
On 17 April the foundation meeting of the Democratic 
Labour Party was held in the Grey Lynn Library Hall. Over 
500 were present. Lee said he was "definitely starting a 
new party" and outlined his plans for the future .(4) At the 
beg inning of l•1ay , he and Barnard toured the main cities and 
attracted large audiences despite the serious war situation. 
The tour was climaxed on 8 May by a rowdy meet ing of 3 7000 
at the Auckland Town Hall, where the 20 police in attendance 
(1) Standard , 11 April 1940. 
(2) Press, 19 July 1940. 
(3) John A. Lee's Weekly 17 March 1943. (4) Dominion, 18 April 1~40. 
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had to remove several interjectors. (1) any of those who 
attended were probably only curious, but the packed halls 
and enthusiastic meetings described in newspaper reports 
reflected a great deal of genuine interest as well. 
Lee and Barnard put the interest to work quickly, and 
there is no evidence that either of them had any hesitation 
in 1940 about forming a party. A Provisional National Exec -
utive was set up, with the follO\ving members: 
P. Connors - Chairman 
W. G. Bishop - Vice Chairman 
F. M. Earle - Secretary 
A. H. Carman - Treasurer 
A. E. Yarker 
H. E. Herring 
Mrs . Lee 
P. Adds 
J . Thomson 
G. J . Hamilton 
N.V. Douglas(2 ) S.J. Bennet 
The most important single point about the party at this 
stage was that it was so completely dominated by Lee and 
Barnard that neither bothered to take any official position . 
The other personnel , however , were interesting. Most had 
been Labour Party members. Herring had been M. P. for Mid-
Canterbury between 1935 and 1938, and a thorn in the flesh 
of the Cabinet, and Connors, Bishop, Earle , Carman , Yarker 
and Douglas were all members who left or were expelled from 
their party branches after the 1940 Conference . This first 
executive also had a fair representation of trade unionists. 
Douglas, who was editor of "John A. Lee's Weekly" and an 
associate of Lee's for many years, was a member of the Auck-
land Trades Council and had been Secretary of the Federation 
(1) Evening Post , 9 May 1940. 
(2) John A. Lee 's Weekly , 10 July 1940. 
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of Labour as well as a member of t he Auckland City Council. 
Connors and Yarker were both members of the Wellington Water-
siders' Union executive, Connors ~ater being elected President. 
dds was a prominent Lower Hutt Social Crediter, the first of 
many who joined the party. 
Strict control was kept of t he setting up of branches. 
The first moves had to be taken by a "convenor" appointed by 
the National Executive. His task was to form a small commi-
ttee - half a dozen members or less - preferably at a meeting 
in a private home. This was to discuss "ways and means and 
when of forming a branch, i ncluding possible officers and a 
candidate". The committee could t hen make its first move by 
calling a public meeting to set up the branch proper and elect 
officers. embership cost three shillings, and party members 
were exhorted to buy books of membership tickets and enrol new 
recruits. A minimum of ten members could form a branch, and 
Lee made it clear that this was sufficient in some cases: 
uantity is not as i mportant as quality. Better 
a branch of one dozen members, than a large one 
like many in the Labour Party whose members are 
only "paper members". 
Branches were urged to meet about once every fortnight, and to 
concentrate on discussion, social occasions and singing "workers' 
songs 11 .C1) Progress, as recorded in the "Branch News" column 
of "John A. Lee's Weekly", was rapid. On 10 July, 17 branches 
were operating , mostly in Auckland and Wellington, but with one 
in Napier, two i n the VJaikato and one in Christchurch. On 28 
(1) John A. Lee's Weekly, 7 August 1940 and 7 April 1943. 
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August, the number was "about thirty" , on 25 September, 36, 
and by 30 October, at the time of t he first conference, it 
had leapt to 61. Since branches were at first expected to 
be small, they were formed at below electorate level, although 
sometimes, as in Napier, a branch took in a whole electorate. 
How many members the new party took away from Labour is 
of course the crucial question. Democratic Labour never 
published any membership figures, and with branches continu-
ally dying and being created it is doubtful if the National 
Executive itself knew what they were. The number of resig-
nations from Labour Party branches in Lee's Grey Lynn was, 
however, published by 11Standard 11 • 45 out of 450 resigned at 
Grey Lynn, 17 from 120 at Westmere and 33 from about 130 at 
Point Chevalier, (1)in all about one seventh of the total. 
Other electorates probably fell well below t his. Neverthe-
less, there was evidence to show that, as Lee always maintained, 
Labour lost some of its oldest members and best workers to 
Democratic Labour. (2) At Point Chevalier, for example, the 
President, Vice-President, Secretary, Assistant-Secretary 
. (3) 
and Treasurer all res1gned, and at Grey Lynn the vrhole execu-
tive joined Lee. 
The packed meetings addressed by Lee and Barnard in 1940 
showed that people were eager to hear what line the new party 
would take. The criticisms made of Labour followed the lines 
(1) Standard, 23 May 1940. (2) J.A. Lee, letter to the author. 
(3) N. Z. Herald, 17 May 1940. 
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already hinted at in the muffled "left wing" protests after 
the outbreak of war . The Government's failure to conscript 
wealth and the effects of war taxation on the lower-paid 
were the main ob jects of attack. Lee and Barnard saw the 
financial orthodoxy of the 1940 Budget as the final betrayal 
of Labour's policy , capped by the coalition of "Tory and Tory-
Labour" voting agai nst Lee and Atmore when they forced a 
division on it in the House. (1) Lee linked this vote with 
the formation of the War Cabi net - the first step, as he saw 
it, toward an inevitable coalition between parties with no 
real differences in policy. (2 ) 
Lee's mai n theme, in his speeches, in "John A. Lee's 
Weekly" and in his pamphlets, was the decline of the Labour 
Party as a radical organisation. This formed a background 
to all Lee 's propaganda, and was a constant theme in his 
newspaper , often filling most of the editorial space when 
politics were quiet. His comment after the Waitemata by-
election in July 1941 was typical. 
Labour has held its machine vote , but all the 
radicals who build a machine vote are elsewhere 
th~se days? and~that machine vote is a deterior-
atmg qual1ty. ~ J 
(In other words , Lee was learning that Labour could 
lose its radicals and still win e lections!) Shortly before 
the 1943 election Lee wrote, in a scornful obituary for 
Labour 's radical past, 
(1) NZ PD, Vol.257, p.343. 
(2) John A. Lee's Weekly, 24 July 1940. (3) Ibid., 23 July 1941. 
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All that t he Labour Party has is a Social Security 
into which Cabinet is be ing kicked against its 
will, and which is be ing swallowed up by the high 
price of cabbages, potatoe-s , clothes, fuel, etc ., 
a determination to stabilise purchasing power as 
it was stabilised back in 1914-1918, i . e . the 
Mas sey policy , or an ability to shed tears at the 
mention of Labour saints , or use a tombstone as a 
soapbox. New Zea land listens and is no longer (1) 
stirred . The song is ended , the melody is stale. 
Democratic Labour •s criticism of Labour •s f i nancia l 
policies attracted much Social Credit support , just as Labour 
had done during the depress i on . Strangely enough, 11 Standard 11 
regarded this as a further proof of Democratic Labour ' s depr-
avity , and went so far as to state that the Social Credi t Move-
ment , which was entering politics , would not oppose Democratic 
Labour candidates at the next election.<2 ) Lee later stated 
that had it come to the point his party would have opposed 
social Credit candidates in 1941, (3 )but he was glad to acknow-
ledge t heir support. 
Our monetary policy is not a Douglas Credit policy, 
but they (t he Social Credit Movement) realise that 
it is radical and sound . Members of the Douglas 
Social Credit Movement are co-operating with us for 
the same reason that they assisted the Labour Party 
to power in 1935 , when certain successfut4rabour candidates were members of the movement. 
Lee warmly we lcomed the New Zealand tour of John Hogan, 
the Aus tra lian Social Credit or ganiser , and Barnard chaired a 
number of his meet ing s , stressing the similarities of Hogan's 
po licy with that of the D. L. P. on i mportant points. 
(1l Ibid ., 14 Af.ril 1943. (2 Standard, 1 7 October 1940 . 
(3 Intervimv with the author . 
(4) John A. Lee 's Weekly, 13 November 1940. 
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However , the main driving force in the party was Lee 
himself, and it was he who attracted most of the attention . 
He was an exce l lent speaker , and his hard - hitting , colourful 
addresses brought packed houses at a time when controversy 
between the main parties was muted. Lee also made good use 
of his new freedom in Parliament . In May 1940 he proposed , 
on the second reading of the Emergency Regulat i ons Amendment 
Bi ll , 
That the question be amended •••• with a vie\v to 
inserting the following words •••• "This house 
wi ll agree to read this Bill a second time when 
there has been inserted therein provision for the 
taking of a referendum ( b~fore conscripting men 
for servi ce overseas . " 1J 
The amendment lapsed for want of a seconder, and Lee 
did not take up a campaign against conscription , being act-
ually not opposed to it in principle. Dur i ng the Budget 
debate in July he again moved an amendment , this time critic-
is i ng the proposals for their failure to use the "public credit 
to increase New 6ealand's internal production 11 , the increase in 
the public debt and reductions in purchasing pm-rer. This t· e 
he found a seconder in tmore , the Independent member for Nelson. 
They forced a division , and Labour and Nat ional voted together 
against the amendment , giving Lee a fine example of "Tory-
Laoour" co-operation to use for years afterwards . Atmore 
flirted 1-vith Lee only briefly , returning to his safe position 
as a supporter of official Labour when the new party's first 
appeal wore off after 1940 . 
(1) N6PD. , Vol . 257, p. 33 . 
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Probably Democratic Labour's most permanent legacy 
will be the series of pamphlets written by Lee and Barnard 
in 1940. The first, "I Fight for New Zealand", written by 
Lee and published in June, was the longest and best known. 
Obviously written in the heat of the moment after his expul-
sion, it reviewed the quarrel in the Parliamentary Labour 
Party between the right and left wings since the early nine-
teen-thirties. Although obviously biased on some points, 
it remains the only source for details on the Labour caucus 
during this period , and its revelations of Cabinet's disregard 
of caucus votes on important policy issues provided chapter 
and verse for Lee's charges of undemocratic control in the 
party . "Expelled from Labour Party for Telling the Truth 11 
was a reprint of "Psychopathology in Politics" with an 
exchange of letters on the art icle between Lee and Wils on, 
the Labour Party secretary. nDebt -Free Currency for War 
and Peace" and "This Debt Slavery" set out Lee's financial 
ideas, and a speech by Barnard at Na pier explaining his res-
ignation was reprinted as "The Speech of a New Zealander". 
The circulation of these pamphlets after Democratic Labour 
had been in existence for a year s hmvs the interest in the 
party. 
"Debt-Fr ee Currency" 
"The Speech of a New Zealander" 
"I Fight f or New Zealand" 
11This Debt Slavery" 
20 , 000 
10 , 000 
40 , 000 
"many thousands" 
"Expelled From t he Labour Party 
for Telling the Truth" "many thousands" (1) 
(1) John A. Lee ' s Weekly, 2 July 1941. 
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July 1940 saw the first issue of 11 John A. Lee ' s 
Weekly 11 , a considerable achievement in vmrtime conditions. 
The paper created a sensation i n its first few months of 
life , and continued to be the mos t lively political journal 
seen in New Zealand since 11Tomorrow 11 • Beginning as a f our 
page broadsheet-~ize paper , it was changed in January 1941 
to eight pages with a smaller size. Most issues contai ned 
tvvo pages of editorial comment (mostly written by Lee), 
some Democratic Labour branch news (later dropped), articles 
from foreign periodicals and a two-page article by Lee on 
some current topic. Lee's editorials often ranged widely 
over his own life and past events in the Labour Party, and 
11 John A. Lee ' s Weekly 11 is a fascinat i ng source of information 
not only on Democratic Labour , but on the Labour Party as well. 
Added to this, of course, was a fair amount of abuse of Labour 
leaders and resurrections of old quarrels. Lee's writ ing and 
his outspoken, pithy commentaries brought to the Weekly a wide 
enough membershi p to keep it alive , if not financially healthy . 
In July 1942 it had 11 50,000 to 60 , 000 regular readers 11 (1)and by 
February 1943 the circulation was twice what it had been two 
years before . (2 ) Nevertheless, the paper ran on a shoestring, 
and for much of its life Lee and the editor, Norman Douglas, 
themselves wrapped up the issues for posting . All told, 1 940 
was the annus mirabilis for the Democratic Labour Party. In 
(1) Ibid., 12 August 1942. (2) Ibid., 7 July 1 943. · 
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not quite a year it spent £2 , 000, all of it from private 
donations, on "political activity". (1) 
Democratic Labour•s first conference was held in 
October 1940 in the Wellington Town Hall. The opening 
address by Patrick Connors , the party cha irman, was a clear 
statement of Democratic Labour •s aim; to capture Labour•s 
image as a progressive , and particularly as a left-wing 
party . 
"The Labour Party was elected to substantially 
change the old order. The Democratic Labour 
Party represents the nevi order promised to the 
people in 1935 and 1938 and betrayed in 1939 
and 1940 •••• This conference is the first step 
in the creation of a party that will give to 
t he pe ople of New Zealand the splendid things 
promised by the Labour Party. The Democratic 
Labour Party \vill give effect to the most vital 
part of the Labour Party •s policy •••• the imm-
ediate control of credit and currency i n the 
interests of the people •••• This party will 
not fail in its effort to make banking and 
finance the servant of the man instead of the 
master •••• 
"The Labour Party, dominated by a few political 
and industrial bosses, has become a machine with-
out a soul, without a purpose except self - perpet -
uation . The National Party is a party of yest-
erday , a party representing the banking interests. 
e have recruited , and we shall recruit, from 
both the old parties . Our mission i9 to scrap 
both the old gangs and start afresh . 11 ~2J 
The policy statement approved by the Conference, pro-
vides the best illustrations of the character of the new 
party, and is worth quoting in full. 
(1) Ibid., 12 February 1941. 
(2 ) Ibid., 6 November 1940. 
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Monetary 
1. Complete control in the interests of the people 
of currency and credit. 
2 . Recognition of the pr inciple that debt -free 
currency can be issued to the extent of 
unutilised capacity. 
3 . The sett i ng up of a tribunal to determine the 
best means of securing price stability under 
a state-controlled monetary and credit policy. 
4 . Provision of finance to farmers , homebuilders, 
manufacturers and local bodies , at t he lowest 
possible rate of interest and the development 
of a stock and station finance department with-
in a State-m•rned Bank of New Zealand. 
5. Recognition of the fact that external debt ser-
vices must be revised if the post -w·ar standard 
of living is to be maintained. 
War and Peace 
6 . Support of New Zealand's war effort with def-
inite regard to the democratic objectives to 
be achieved by the war and the necessity of 
defending the Dominion itself against aggres-
sion . 
7. Provision of adequate works , remuneration and 
pensions to soldiers on demobilisation , or on 
return incapacitated. 
8. Encouragement of good relations with all coun-
tries bordering on the Pacific and, as a first 
step , t he appoi ntment of a representative at 
Washington. 
Industrial 
9. Diversification of pr i mary industries •••• 
10. The appointment of a Minister of New Industries; 
investigation and settlement of a definite prog -
ramme for t he development of new industries and 
the expansion of existing ones •••• Establish-
ment of an Industries Finance Corporation to 
assist manufacturers and others in the produc -
tion of consumer goods. 
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11. Transference of workers from non-productive 
work •• • • 
12 . Expansion of housing construction , provision 
of funds for modernisation of older houses 
and •••• the definite undertaking of slum 
clearance. 
13 . The representation of farmers and workers 
on boards of management of industries and 
marketing projects under State direction or 
control . 
14 . The basic wage to be fixed by Parliament . 
15 . Equal pay for equal work. 
Social 
16 . Provision of assistance to enable children, 
regardless of the economic circumstances of 
the home, to enter the train for any prof-
ession •••• and up to the number determined 
by the requirements of the State. 
17 . Free school requisites . 
18. Increased expenditure out of radio revenue 
for the encouragement of New Zealand music , 
drama and art . 
19. Special provision for motherhood endowment , 
plus a family allowance commencing with the 
first child , without any sustena~ce or in-
come qualification, with a view to expansion 
of the population . 
20. The Social Security Act to be given effect in 
its entirety . 
21. Benefits under Social Security Act , War Pen-
sions Regulations and State superannuation 
~~~:~e~~t~~r~~e~d~~s~~~ ~~~~ta~~ ~~~~~~~i~ .( 1) 
(1) Ibid. 
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The policy statement was an accurate portrait of the 
party itself . The emphasis was on development , not social-
ism , which was not mentioned at all . Economic development 
was to be achieved by a radical approach to the monetary 
system , and by an extension of social services. Apart, 
however , from these two points there was little echo of 
Labour policy. Lack of support in the trade union movement 
was one of the party •s chief weaknesses, and the policy was 
attacked in the following terms by the 11 Union Record 11 , one 
of Lee's bitterest critics . 
The so-called 11 industrial 11 section of the programme 
has nothing to say of the workers• interests - ex-
cept that the basic wage should be fixed by Parlia -
ment and there should be equa l pay for equal work. 
But it has a lot to say about the establishment of 
new industries (with 11 cheap credit 11 ) to benefit 
the manufacturers and smal l employers . 
Let Lee beg in to do a job for the trade union move -
ment - and show that he is interested in the workers 
and not the bosses - then we might believe there is 
som~ s~nr~rity in all thi s talk of trade union corr -
uptlon. ~ J 
Hmvever, Democratic Labour candidates in 1943 seemed 
unsympathetic and in some cases quite hostile to unionism . 
It was obvious that the party considered its monetary prop-
osals the most important part of its policy. For instance, 
A. E. Petty, the party's candidate in Marsden, stated that 
11 No one would deny that the pledge which swept Labour into 
power in 1935 was control of credit and currency . 11 ( 2) It 
(1) Union Record, 1 ay 1943 . 
(2) Northern Advocate , 9 September 1943 . 
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was Labour's alleged neglect of this pledge, more than any 
other, which was ment ioned by Democratic Labour speakers 
when they criticised Labour for failing to carry out its 
programme. The placing of the "Monetary" section of the 
party 1 s policy at the head of the election manifesto \vas 
no accident; this was the part of the programme stressed 
most often by candidates, and the one to which they could all 
subscribe with equal fervour. To some it was a means of pro-
moting industrial development, others regarded it fr om a trad-
itional Social Credit standpoint, but all agreed that national-
isation of all or part of the trading bank system was essential. 
The 1940 conference also showed up another characteristic 
which was to dog the party; domination by the National Exec -
utive , and particularly by Lee himself . In the formative 
months this was not particularly resented, for it was Lee's 
inspiration that built the party i nitially , but when branches 
were well established, as at least some of the fifty represen-
ted at the 1940 conference were , they naturally felt that 
their efforts entitled them to some autonomy . The initial 
clash was over the selection of candidates. Lee proposed 
that they should be chosen only from a "short list", approved 
by the Nat ional Executive, from which electorates could select 
a candidate, by a ballot of party members if necessary. (1) 
This system was far stricter than that operating in the Labour 
Party , which allowed electorates to choose their candidates 
(1) John A. Lee's Weekly, 23 April 1941. 
130 
without preliminary vetting. Lee's proposal was greeted 
with ironical laughter by the conference, and a large number 
of delegates walked out then and there.< 1 ) The proposal was , 
however , adopted. Even the party 's policy was not made by 
conference. The policy statement, drafted by Lee and Barnard, 
was s i mply presented to conference for approval , with a promise 
that the party could consider changes after the next election. 
For many supporters the conference was a sad disillusion-
ment, particularly since Lee had so bitterly attacked undemo-
cratic control in the Labour Party . In December 1940 the 
• 
National Treasurer, A. H. Carman , and his Tawa Flat branch 'ivith-
drew from the party claiming that 
The old mistakes that wrecked the 
of the Labour Party are repeated , 
the new party are all the factors 
to leave the old.(2) 
true democracy 
and inherent in 
which caused us 
Carman also complained that Democratic Labour was only 
a 11 halfway compromising" party between capitalism and social-
ism. Early i n 1941 there was some unrest in Chr istchurch 
branches over the decision by the Nationa l Execut ive not to 
contest the municipal elections, (3) and in April the Petone 
branch execut ive resigned, claiming that the party policy was 




becomi ng National Socialist , with just a tinge of 
Labour politics to make it seem a cce ptable to un-
wary pers ons who have found cause for dissatisfac-
tion i~ the rapidly changing nature of the Labour 
Party . ~4) 
Infor mation from A. E. Yarker, 
foundation executive member. 
Dominion 6 December 1940. 
Press 2 21 March 1941 et. seq. Dominlon , 27 April 1941. 
a conference delegate and 
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number of executive members who incurred Lee ' s dis-
pleasure found that they simply were not sent not ices of 
meetings after a few months. (1) Lee claimed that these 
troubles were due mainly to pacifists who had joined the 
party in the hope t hat it would adopt an anti-war policy and 
oppose the Emergency Regulations. (2 ) It was quite true that 
many of the foundation members were also members of the Peace 
and Anti-Conscription Movement, and Barnard himself had impl-
icitly welcomed them with the remark that "he was a very poor 
hand at heresy hunting". (3 ) Carman, for instance, was fined 
for holdi ng a meeting prohibited under Emergency Regulations 
shortly after he left the party. However, Lee decided that 
there was a distinct danger of the party becoming a vehicle 
for anti-war propaganda. He himself was determined to support 
a full war effort, although differing from the Government over 
the disposition of New Zealand forces. He and Barnard there-
fore decided t hat pacifists could belong provided they ''did 
not bring any anti-war activity into the party". (4) This pro-
viso was accepted by some; H. E. Herring and W. G. Bishop, both 
members of the Wellington Peace and Anti-Conscription Council 
in 1940, remained prominent in the party through the rest of 
its life. 
On 6 September 1941 another conference was called on 
"matters appertaining to the policy and organisation of the 
(1) Information from A. E. Yarker. 
(2) John A. Lee 's Weekly, 28 May 1941. 
(3) Dominion, 2 May 1940. 
(4) John A. Lee 's Weekly, 26 August 1942. 
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party". (1 ) What it actually discussed is something of a 
mystery . A few policy measures were adopted for the expected 
election , including closer relations with Russia, annual paid 
holidays and better pay for the armed services. 
tive was elected with the following members: 
W. E. Barnard 
P. Connors 
F . lvl . Earle 
F . G. J . Temm 
J.A. Lee 
H. E. Herring 
W. G. Bishop 
T.W. Dick ( ) 






Besides the contraction from twelve to nine, there was 
little change in membership from 1940 , except that Lee and 
Barnard be came members for the first time. The new treasurer 
had been Lee's secretary in the days of his Under-Secretaryship. 
However, it appears that the real importance of the conf-
erence was that it produced another clash between the executive 
and par ty members over organisation. When the Auckland Central 
branch left the party in 1942 after complaining about "Fascist 
tendencies", it stated that "attempts had been made to have the 
constitution so amended as to afford a greater measure of rank 
and file authority and pov1er , but without result". (3) Lee dis-
missed the resignation contemptuously. 
(1) Ibid ., 1 October 1941. 
(2) Ibid . 
(3) N. Z. Herald , 22 January 1942. 
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This branch is merely excited because the last 
conference of the D.L. P. ruled that all candi-
dates must be approved by the National Executive 
before being submitted to ballot . This is , of 
course, necessary to prevent any freak with a 
pound forming a branch of eight members and ann-
ouncing hi mself as ~ ~andidate. The freaks 
naturally objected.~1J 
The National Executive had in fact been busily sorting 
out candidates for ballots for some time and the first list 
had been announced in April 1941. (2 ) 
Later, in an article , "Barnard and Lee Not for Sale" , 
Lee made clear his opposition to any major a lteration in the 
party ' s policy, and his bitter tone suggests that in many ways 
his party had been a hindrance rather than a help. 
Democratic Labour was not formed so that reaction-
aries or alleged revolutionaries might come in, 
form a machine, f i nd new pr i nciples for Barnard 
and myself , cash in on our political integrity, 
and give another example of betrayal •••• We have 
no ambition to allow some opponent to join our 
e~~~h ~~ ~~b~~~i~;1~yas~~~~~ga~dp~~~i~w~~~lg~~~~~ - (3) 
Later, Lee described the party 's programme as 
our deed of trust , our reason for existence, not 
amendable at an annual phrase-choppi ng holiday 
by groups of people who be lieve th~t pri nciples 
can be altered by majority vote. (4J 
Democratic Labour fought its first campaign, and received 
its first setback, at the Waitemata by- election of 19 July 1941. 
The party nominated Norman Douglas , a member of the Auckland 
(1) John A. Lee's Weekly, 4 February 1942. 
(2) Ibid., 23 April 1941. 
(3) I bid., 12 August 1942 . 
(4 ) Ibid., 24 February 1943. 
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Trades Council and editor of "John A. Lee ' s Weekly", as its 
candidate and fought the campaign mainly on opposition to 
the Government's war taxation and the conscription of married 
men for overseas service. Interest in the election seems to 
have been slight; Lee considered attendances of thirty to 
sixty at his meetings as good. (1) There were five candidates. 
Labour nominated Irs . •Iary Dreaver , a well-known Auckland City 
Councillor and President of the New Zealand Spiritualist Church. 
W. B. Darlow , although running as an Independent , received Nat-
ional support and was in effect the party ' s canaidate. R. P. 
Gardner appealed mainly for the support of ex-servicemen and 
H.T . Head represented something called "Pan-New Zealand Polit-
ical Union". Despite Lee's wild surmises that Douglas would 
win the seat and that ~Ir s . Dreaver would lose her deposit, 
Labour won the seat, though with a minority (45.22 per cent) 
of the votes, and Douglas polled only 940 votes , or 9.6? per 
cent of t he total . 
The party was not put to t he test of a general election 
in 1941, which in the light of the Waitemata result was proba-
bly a good thing . However, with the postponement of the 
election , interest in the party flagged and , as Barnard later 
admitted, it "virtually ceased to function" after the 1942 
Prolongation of Parliament Bill was passed . (2 ) "John A. Lee 1 s 
Weekly" dropped its "Branch News" section early in 1942, and 
its place was taken by overseas commentaries and extracts 
(1) Ibid ., 9 July 1941. (2) Press, 8 September 1943. 
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from radi cal English and American periodicals. The paper 
lost most of its early enthusiasm and pioneering flavour . 
As one reader complained in 1943 
After reading time and again how Mr. Lee was 
expelled from the Labour Party , and numerous other 
little incidents which the writer is determined 
will never be allowed to die in the minds of New 
Zealanders , one becomes rather wearied and bored •• 
He has managed skilfully to rehash a(9~ld stew , 
and serve it up hot week after week. 
During 1942 Lee parted company from John Hogan when the 
latter ' s paper, "Democracy", was suppressed under the Emer-
gency Regulations . Lee said that the suppress i on was warr-
anted , as Hogan ' s campaign against War Loans was "one likely 
to lead almost to an anti -vlar campaign", and refused to print 
any of his articles. Hogan replied that Lee was forsaki ng 
his ideals of monetary reform , but Lee stressed that "genuine" 
Social credit articles were always welcome. (2) 
Democratic Labour was at a low ebb, then, when H.T . Arm-
strong , the Labour member for Christchurch East , died in 1942 . 
Despite the fact that the party ' s organisation in Christchurch 
had died completely, Lee decided to contest the seat and immed-
iately launched a campaign appeal for £200. <3) Early in Decem-
ber a meeting of party members in Christchurch selected H.E . 
Herr i ng , the Labour member for Mid-Canterbury fr om 1935 to 
1 938 and a D. L. P. executive member, as the party 1 s candidate. 
At the same time Lee made it clear that the party would f i ght 
(1) John A. Lee 1 s Weekly , 4 August 1943. 
(2) Ibid., 17 June 1942 . 
( 3) Ibid., 18 November 1942 . 
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the election on the issue of New· Zealand ' s manpower commit-
ments. It demanded a "rest in New :lealand" for 2 N. L: .E.F., 
a tapering-off of Home Guard and fire-watching duties, and 
condemned the recently announced call-up of the 41 - 45 age 
group .<1) All these were backed by the party's insistent 
assertion that New Zealand's manpower could not support Divi-
sions in both the Pacific and the 1iddle East , and that the 
exhaustion of manpmver resources was leading the country to 
economic disaster. During the campaign the Government 
showed some alarm at these criticisms. It was officially 
announced that men in the 41 - 45 age group would not be called 
up for full time military service,<2)and one Cabinet Minister, 
D. G. Sullivan said 
"I can only say to you t hat it is the desire and 
intention of the Government and the War Cabinet 
to return our division to Nevi L.ealand from the (3 ) Middle East as soon as it is possible to do so." 
To t he public such statements appeared as back- tracking 
in the face of criticism, and Herring and Lee ' s hammering at 
t he issue obviously made the Government nervous. National 
tended to neglect t hetopic of manpower in favour of taxation 
and shortages of consmner goods, and Holland condemned Sulli-
van ' s statement as "hopelessly out of touch with public opin-
ion".(4) Democratic Labour had been the only consistent 
critics of t he Government ' s manpower policies for the previous 
three years, and t he by-election came just at t he time when 
(1) Ibid., 9 December 1942. 
(2) Press, 28 January 1943 . (3) I bid., 21 January 1943. (4) I bid., 5 Fe bruary 1943. 
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Cabinet was almost thinking aloud about revising them . Even 
so , Lee must have been as surprised as anyone at the result . 
Herr i ng polled 2 , 578 votes - 207 more than the Na t i onal cand-
date and 26 . 7 per cent of the total. Although Labour ' s pos-
ition remained comfortable its share of the total dropped from 
75 . 7 per cent in 1938 to 47 . 2 per cent. Herring had an a~va-
tage in that he was well known in Christchurch and had been an 
M.P. v-rhereas the Labour candidate, Hiss Habel Howard, was not 
a very impressive candidate . 
The by-election result was seen by Lee as a confirmation 
of his view that the Labour Party had degenerated beyond repair, 
still able to hold its "machine vote" but bereft of soul and 
principles. After Langstone ' s outspoken 1 943 Budget speech , 
a classic attack on 11debt finance", Lee wrote 
Frank has so far said about ten times as much as 
I was expelled from the Labour Party for saying , 
but the party is a weak, shambling thing unable 
to expel anyone, and at heart ashamed of the 
scoundrellism which was used to expel me •••• Of 
course if all had shown the same spirit (as Lang-
stone) years ago , the Labour principles would not 
have gone down the drain. Certainly the younger 
men showed a greater desire to)grab portfolios 
than to reach for the stars. ~ 1 
Lee was outspoken in his attacks on individual Labour 
leaders. His criticisms of Government propaganda and rest-
rictions on freedom of speech were certainly well founded . 
\'l ilson v-ras described as a "hopeless" Hinister of Information -
"He couldn ' t lift self-raising flour". Lee did not attempt 
(1 ) John A. Lee ' s Weekly, 17 Narch 1943 . 
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to make too much of t he pacifist background of many Labour 
Ministers, but he managed to kee p his readers constantly 
reminded of the fact by such comments as 
The Frasers, Webbs, Semples , Parrys, Thorns did 
all the talking in the last war and are determined 
to do all the talking in this. Most of our Of~PS 
fought in the last war or in this or in both .~ J 
However, Lee reserved his sharpest attacks for the lead-
ing figures in the Federation of Labour , as it was t hey who 
had been the prime movers for his expulsion. Christening 
them "Industrial Bouncers 11 , Lee castigated them as "gold-
diggers11 ensconced in powerful posit ions by an unjust system 
of compulsory unionism. He was on firm ground when he 
poi nted to F . G. Young's ventures in racehorse-owning, or 
James Roberts ' high salary as a Waterfront Commiss ioner, but 
as t i me went by his charges became more sweeping, and by 1943 
Labour was able to accuse Lee of -attacking the trade union 
movement as a whole . Although Lee had little support among 
union leaders, and had never been close to the trade union 
movement, this charge was un just . However , it was uncomfort-
ab l y close to the truth as far as some of the party 's candi-
dates were concerned, particularly those who were farmers or 
businessmen. However , a mild comment by Frame, the candidate 
for \Ve llington Suburbs , was fairly typical. 
(1) I bid., 1 Se ptember 1943. 
r 
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"I believe in trades unionism, but only under 
the old system when it was voluntary and when 
trade union secretaries were human chaps. If 
the Government thinks that compulsory unionism 
is necessary, why don't they let the workers 
vote on the question instead of k~eping them 
dominated by trade union bosses?" ~1J 
Of course , Democratic Labour still based its main case 
on Labour's failure to carry out parts of its policy, partie-
ularly that relating to control of the banking system. Many 
Democratic Labour canaidates had taken part in the Social 
Credit Movement , and a number, like G. Barclay (a brother of 
the i nister of griculture) had held office in it. Lee, 
however , tended to regard credit control as useful only i f 
it accelerated industrial development, and it was this part 
of his policy which he set out to amplify more than any other. 
A very interesting article by H. lvfercer, in "John A. Lee ' s 
Weekly" of 2 April 1941, called "Secondary Industries and 
State Banking" , shows that the party realised that Labour 
had lost the confidence of many businessmen , particularly 
the small ones, and that they were not ready to trust Nat ional -
the "farmers' party". This explains Lee's "Manufacture or 
Perishn campaign, <2>in which he attacked further agricultural 
deve lopment and over -emphasis on public works . Mercer's 
article went a step further in denying socialism a place in 
New Zealand 's present stage of development. 
(1) Dominion, 9 September 1943. 
(2) John A. Lee 1 s vleekly, 29 January. 1941 et seq. 
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The attitude of many Socialists, of regarding 
all owners of means of production as exploiting 
capitalists, does not accord with our situation ••• 
Tackling the bastions of finance is not just the 
best thing we can do, it is the only thing on which 
to base a unity broad enough to be effective. You 
Socialists who feel this is not enough and withdra\v 
in dudgeon or disgust from the political arena can-
not withdraw from the effects of politics on your 
life and ours. Who dreams of heaven still must 
awake on earth. 
Lee 's speech to the Canterbury Manufacturers• Associa-
tion on 16 February 1941, in which he for the first time put 
his ideas forward to a meeting of bus inessmen , attracted wide 
attention. His general thesis was that if New 6ealand was 
to escape a reduction in her standard of living due to the 
difficulty of ex porting primary products during the war , she 
had to pay more attention to developing diversified secondary 
industries to produce consumer goods. The Government, in 
relying on public works, was followi ng the line of least 
resistance in economic develo pment. Lee's outlook was much 
more optimistic -
People used to say it was i mpossible to insulate 
New Zealand economically from the rest of the 
world. I was one of those who alvrays believed 
it was poss i ble to do so.(1) 
The "Press" called the speech "the soundest sense about 
the future of secondary i ndustries in New Zealand that has 
been spoken by any politician for a long time 11 ( 2 )and his 
audience was apparently most impressed. 
(1) Ibid., 26 February 1941. 
(2) Press, 18 February 1941. 
In February 1941 
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a sub-committee of the D. L. P. Nat ional Executive was set 
up to amplify the party's industrial policy. It decided 
that 
1. Population growth should be encouraged by 
lvlotherhood Endowment and other social security 
measures. 
2. An "ever-increasing removal of taxation" from 
companies was necessary so that profits could 
be turned back into the business. 
3. State Advances funds for expansion should be 
secured 11against the new expansion only and 
not as a(charge against all the manufacturer's 
assets". 1) 
However, Lee did not believe that private enterprise 
could find the finance to develop the large-scale raw mater-
ials industries such as paper and iron and steel , and it was 
here t hat he sa\v the need for "considerable state interference 
and direction". The State would provide the finance (prefer-
ably "debt-free") and appoint half the directorate. The other 
half would be appointed by the manufacturers who vTould use the 
raw materials, f or example printers in the case of the paper 
industry. (2 ) 
Lee hoped his advocacy of a better deal for small businesses 
would bear fruit at the election; one of the widely used Demo-
cratic Labour advertisements rea,d "Shopkeeper and Bus inessman -
11r . Lee is t he one N. P. who has sought to defend your interests". 
This was partly a reference to Lee's constant call for a reduc-
tion in manpower commitments. He believed t hat New Zealand 
could maintain only one division overseas and opposed sending 
(1) John A. Lee ' s Weekly1 12 lvlarc h and 16 July 1941. (2) N6PD., Vol . 260, p.11~5. 
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further reinforcements to the Middle East after the Pacific 
war started. In June 1943 he wrote 
The election will be fought largely on manpower. 
There is a progressive destruction of our rural life 
going on, manufacturers are unanimous in their app-
reciation of national breakdown through excessive 
manpower commitments. Only Democratic Labour has 
sounded the warning note. Only Democratic Labour 
is in tune with public sentiment in regard to the 
need for reducing manpower commitments to one Div-
ision with that Division engaged in the Pacific so 
that periodic tropical leave may maintain our home 
life. No Labour or Nat ional voices have supported 
mine in my efforts to avoid a European commitment. 
There is warm appreciation of the urgency of revis-
ing our commitments among the people , and the Fraser-
Nash and Holland parties are hopel~ssly out of touch 
with the people on these issues.C1J 
The question of return of 2 N. l . E.F . to the Pacific, 
potentially a highly explosive issue, was not as simple as 
Lee sometimes made it out to be . He had , in 1940, been 
initially opposed to conscription for service in the Middle 
East , and thought that New Zealand 's Division should serve 
in the Pacific. However , once the Government had made up its 
mind he decided not to make a major issue of the matter , partly 
because he realised that shipping difficulties made the return 
of the Division almost impossible. (2) Lee had first attacked 
excessive manpower commitments in an open session of Parliament 
in October 1942, (3)and he and his party condemned the decision 
to try to equip a division for service in the Pacific. The 
Nat ional Party could not use this issue with the same force, 
for although it called for a reduction of commitments it was 
(1) John A. Lee's Weekly , 16 June 1943. 
(32) J.A. Lee, interview with the author. ( ) NZPD ., Vol .261, pp.757-760. 
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opposed to bri~ging 2 N . ~ . E . F. back to the Pacific. The 
election result was thus a shock to Lee. 
The country voted and voted clearly for the Govern-
ment 's manpower commitments which had only been 
opposed by Democratic Labour, which lost deposits 
everywhere. True, no one knew wh~t)those commit-
ments were , but the country voted.\1 
One field in which Democratic Labour forced the Government 
into act i on was social security , and much of the wind was taken 
out of Lee's sails as a result. He had always believed that 
"a tremendous increase (in benefits) is possible 11 ,(2)and after 
1940 advocated it constantly. Two of his most important 
demands were met , in 1941 when family allowances were made pay-
able for the first child, and in 1943 when war pensions were 
increased. Democratic Labour's campaign on behalf of the 
latter in Christchurch East had probably had much to do with 
its success. In the 1943 campaign Democratic Labour still 
advocated a big increase in all benefits, particularly family 
benefits and old age pensions , and this may well have been the 
most attractive part of its programme. 
The three points of credit control (coupled with indust-
rial expansion), manpower and social security were those 
stressed most by Democratic Labour in 1943. On the whole , the 
party did not put itself forward as a Socialist breakaway from 
the Labour Party . Some candidates were quite explicit about 
this. A. E. Petty (Marsden) "believes that his party provides 
(1) John A . Lee's Weekly, 8 December 1943. (2) W~PD ., Vol . 263, p.927. 
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the middle choice for electors between the Government and the 
National Party", read one newspaper report. (1) Petty also 
said that "the only difference we have with the Labour pe ople 
is over credit and currency 11 ( 2 ) and D. Cresswell (Timaru) · was 
even more definite. 
11We are Socialists , if Socialism means a State bank. 
Give us that State ba~k and we are a hundred per cent 
private enterprise. \ 3J 
The party , given its cue by Lee, opposed violently the 
Servicemen ' s Sett lement and Land Sales Act , rivalling the 
Nat ional Party i n its warnings of "land socialisation". Lee 
obviously considered that the issue was too good to leave 
unused, but nevertheless his party failed to poll significant 
votes in rural electorates. 
Democratic Labour candidates a lso give an important clue 
as to the classes to which the party appealed in 1943. (4) 
There were twelve farmers, a higher proportion than in any 
other party, and ten bus i nessmen of various types. The 
party's relatively high representation of professional engin-
eers is also interesting; two of them (H. E. Herring and C. M. 
Moss) were Labour Party veterans. anual workers were actually 
better represented proportionately than in the Labour Party, but 
the DLP ' s lack of support in the trade union movement was under-
scored by its having only one union official (N. V. Douglas) 
among its candidates. 
(1) Northern Advocate, 27 August 1943. 
(2) Ibid .? 22 September 1943. 
(3 ) Domin1on, 9 September 1943. 
(4 ) See Appendi x B. 
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Apart from Lee, only four Democratic Labour candidates 
had stood for Par liament before; 
N.V. Douglas (Onehunga) 1 941 Democratic Labour (Waite-
mata by- election) 
M.W. Grace ( 1arlborough) 1935 Independent (Marlborough) 
H. E. Herring (Wellington 1 935 Labour (Mid-Canterbury) MP 1935 - 8 
North) 1943 DLP (Christchurch East by-elec-
tion) 
C. M. 1oss (Dunedin 1922 Labour (Dunedin \1est) 
North) 1928 United (Dunedin \'Jest) 
Subsequent appearances of Democratic Labour candidates are 
more interesting . Lee himself stood in 1945, at t he Hamilton 
by- elect i on , and in 1949 , when he tr i ed to wi n back his old Grey 
Lynn seat . On the latter occas ion he was still able to poll 
2 ,627 votes . Five others of his candidates stood in later 
elections: 
A. E. Allen (Hamilton ) 1954 National (Onehunga) 
1957 National (Franklin) MP 1957-
R.R. Beauchamp(Riccarton) 1949 National (Lyttelton) 
R. E. Crawford (\IJ air ar a pa) 1960 Social Credit (Wairarapa) 
P. T. Curran (Auckland 1949 Labour (Eden) 
West) 1951 Labour (Roskill) 
1954 Labour (Tamaki) 
N.V. Douglas (Onehunga) 1960 Labour (Auckland Central) MP 
1960-
Allen had been a member of the National Party before the 
war, and rejoi ned again later. (1 ) Crawford had been President 
of the Featherston Labour Party and a member of the Wairarapa 
L. R. C. A farmer, he obviously supported Labour , and later 
Democratic Labour , because of their emphasis on credit control. 
(1) • itchell, The New Zealand Parliaments of 1935-60 in 
Political Science, March 1961. 
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Curran and Douglas rejoined the Labour Party in 1949, and the 
latter's nomination from among five candidates for a safe 
Labour seat in 1960 may mean that the wounds caused by Demo-
cratic Labour are at last healing. 
Democratic Labour began organising for the election immed-
iately after its success in Christchurch East. In March the 
party'sname was changed to Democratic Soldier Labour, largely 
as the result of a misunderstanding over the printing of some 
tickets by the Christchurch branch . (1 ) Lee thought the change 
a great success , but the obvious attempt to make capital out 
of servicemen was generally deprecated , and some candidates 
made no secret of their disapproval .(2 ) The party ' s branches 
had nearly all died by late 1942, (3) but Lee had great faith in 
the ability of a weak organisation with a cause to make inroads 
in the vote of the Labour machine . As he put it 
•••• every worthwhile opinion, every new political 
philosophy , was started without money, without (4 ) halls - started on the street corner or not at all . 
Urging the party not to worry about its lack of money, he 
wrote 




It isn't money that wins. It is the cause and 
brains •••• Our very financial poverty puts a 
premium on brains . The Diplodocus was a crea-
ture which weighed 35 tons. It had no brain. 
John A. Lee ' s Weekly , 7 April 1943. 
The name was not universally used during the campaign, and 
was dropped i mmediately afterwards , therefore the form 
"Democratic Labour Party 11 will be used here except in 
direct quotations. 
John A. Lee ' s Weekly, 13 October 1943 . 
NZ PD • , V o 1 . 2 6 0 , p • 3 96 . 
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It perished. The Brontosaurus 
long and weighed 60 or 70 tons. 
and it perishld. 1an and £500 
and £80,000. ( J 
was about 70 feet 
It had no brain 
versus the achine 
Revealing that the Labour Party in 1935 had a national 
fund of only just over £1 ,000, Lee launched a "David versus 
Goliath" appeal for funds.< 2) The Labour Party Goliath was, 
he said, 11weighed down with over one hundred thousand pounds 
squeezed out of \vorkers 1 wages by Industrial Bouncers". (3 ) 
In the end Democratic Labour raised about £1 , 000 . Of this 
£600-£700 was spent on newspaper advertising - mostly at Lee's 
pers onal discretion. <4 ) £400 of this went to full-page or 
half - page advertisements , usually advertis i ng candidates for 
a city. Some of the remainder went to paying for Lee's New 
Zealand tour. Each candidate was given sheets of small 
stickers to the value of about two pounds . After this there 
were only about three pounds per candidate left, so that "many 
candidates did not get a penny" in grants -in-aid .< 5) This 
meant, as Lee had warned earlier, that branches would have to 
stand on their ovm feet, and "candidates would have to raise 
t heir own funds". <6 ) 
The selection of candidates was made under the same system 
as that outlined for the 1941 elections; branches could nomi-
nate candidates who , if approved by the National Executive, 
(1) John • Lee's Weekly , 14 July 1943. 
(2) Ibid . , 4 ugust 1943. 
(3) Ibid., 15 September 1943. 
(4 ) Ibid., 14 July 1943. (5) These figures were given in John A. Lee 's Weekly, 13 Oct-
ober and 29 November 1943. 
(6) Ibid., 10 arch 1943. 
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vvere placed on a "short list 11 from which candidates for the 
election could be selected by ballot. This could, and did, 
place decisive power in the hands of the Executive. Never-
theless, if a branch was well established, as in Auckland and 
~·Jellington, its choice was more or less automatically approved. (1) 
Lee set out to back up the insertion of "Soldier" in his 
party 1 s name by gi vi ng his candidates a pronounced returned 
soldier content. He first outlined his idea in February. 
At least one third of the Parliamentary seats to men 
and v10men \vho have \vorn the uniform in THIS WAR •••• 
In each area one third of the candidates will not be 
selected until the last moment to give all soldiers, 
sailors, airmen or women serving •••• a fair chance. 
This will necessitate the adoption of some speciAl 
procedure. 
The final result was that thirty-four candidates were 
either in the forces or returned men , t\venty-five having served 
in World War II. No less than twenty were on leave without 
pay from the forces for the campaign. The concentration on 
servicemen candidates had some effect; as a group they polled 
slightly better than the civilians. The median vote of the 
twenty servicemen was 700; that of the civilians \vas 540. 
The servicemen were handicapped by having only a month 1 s leave, 
and that without pay , for campaigning. A number were standing 
in electorates where they were in camp, often well away from 
their home towns. L.A. Harbord , for instance, stood in Inver-
cargill but had his home in Wellington. Thus, in overcoming 
(1) H. E. Herr ing, letter to the author. 
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these handicaps , the servicemen did even better than would 
appear at first sight . 
The "special procedure" Lee had mentioned for selecting 
last-minute candidates turned out to be selection by the 
National Executive , or by Lee himself. The selection of 
R. H. Bates, (Hid -Canterbury) \vas, for instance , announced 
as follows. 
l~ . D. Cresswell (the South Island organiser) was 
advised yesterday by Mr . J . A. Lee that the party ' s 
select~d)candidate for id-Canterbury is Mr. R. H. 
Bates. ~ 1 
One such late selection in Christchurch caused a public 
row in the party on the eve of the election. The Christchurch 
East Branch had originally nominated Ari Pitama, a full - blooded 
Maori, as its candidate, but he had withdrawn after receiving 
legal advice that he was ineligible to stand in a European 
electorate. Lee tried to persuade the Government to introduce 
legislation allowing Naoris to stand for European seats , but 
Fraser said that if this were done the whole question of Maori 
representation would have to be reviewed too. (2) After some 
delay it was announced that H.T . Schou had been chosen to re-
place Pitama, who be came the candidat e for Southern Maori. 
The trouble arose when the Christchurch area executive, repres-
enting all the branches in the city , refused to endorse Schou 
and disclaimed any connection with the Christchurch East ~ranch. (3; 
( 1) Press, 6 August 1943. 
(2) Nl PD . , Vol . 263, pp.326 - 327. (3) Press, 22 September 1943 . 
150 
What was at the bottom of the quarrel was not stated, but 
J.H. Parry , the National Treasurer , dismissed it as "an 
organised attempt by a small gr oup of disgruntled persons to 
disrupt the party's unity", and added, 
"The public should be made aware of the fact that any 
subordinate executive is out of order disclaiming any-
thing which has bee!) ~ndorsed by the Nat ional Exe cu-
tive of the party".~ 1 J 
Obviously the dispute could have been avoided if the 
Executive had consulted the Christchurch organisation more 
carefully about the selection of a candidate. 
Lee had promised a party conference to consider an elec-
tion manifesto sometime before the election. (2) This confer-
ence was never held . In fact , there was no conference between 
that held in September 1941 (which lasted only one day) and the 
election . The party ' s 1943 policy was actually a l most word for 
word that adopted at the 1940 conference . The only important 
addition which was emphasised in the campaign, was the provision 
of 1i per cent State Advances loans for hous ing, and a big exp-
ansion of State rental housing . The question of 2 N. l . E. F., 
said the policy , "will be dealt with in candidates ' speeches". 
This did not reflect any division in the party, but a reluct-
ance on Lee ' s part to be too specific on the issue since the 
Government had recently decided that 2 N . ~ . E . F. should proceed 
to Eur ope . The newspapers, too, were reticent in their report-
ing of speeches on the subject, but most Democratic Labour cand-
(1) Ibid . 23 September 1943. 
(2) John A. Lee ' s Weekly , 28 Apr i l 1943. 
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idates seem to have restated their view that, in principle, 
New Zealand should field only one division and that it should 
fight ~n the Pacific. 
The party 's publicity followed a set pattern. Its main 
pamphlet was a virtual reprint of the 1940 policy , with a por-
trait of the candidate in whose electorate it was circulated 
on the front cover. In addition to these most candidates also 
circulated a small leaflet with a portrait and an endorsement 
fr om Lee on it, with sometimes a sLunmary of part of the party's 
po licy pr inted underneath. The format of these was identical. 
The manifesto and the sheets of stickers were paid out of nat-
ional funds and distributed to candidates • These stickers were 
. 
one of the happiest inspirations of the campaign. Forming a 
sheet about two feet square, they varied from two to four inches 
square in size, ideal for attaching to windows , lamp-posts or 
motor cars. The inscriptions were sometimes quite pithy , to 
say the least. For examp le -
X-CO is a Cabinet decoration 
Lee - the man they slander is DCM 
Aye-aye sir - any Labour MP to an Industrial 
Bouncer. 
£1300-a -year Jim Roberts 
Stabilised Civil Servants• Wag es 
The last, a reference to the high salary paid to the Labour 
Party President as a Waterfront Commissioner , is a good example 
of the technique used. Roberts , of course, had nothing to do 
with carrying out stabilisation policies , but no one could miss 
the point . 
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Lee ~~ew and acknowledged that the election would make 
or break his party , but it was hard to forecast how much 
support i t would attract. By- e lections provided contradic-
tory portents; at Waitemata (July 1941) its proportion of the 
vote was 9. 7 per cent , at Christchurch East (February 1943) 
it was 26 . 7 per cent. Superficially the last result was 
encouraging , but it was achieved at a time when the Government 
was under heavy attack on its manpower commitments, and both 
National and Labour nominated weak candidates. Lee 1 s wildly 
optimistic talk of winning many city seats stopped abruptly 
after Waitemata. After that he obviously hoped to build up 
the DLP vote sufficiently to either split the Labour vote or 
force the party to bargain with him. After Waitemata he 
wrote 
The Labour M. P. 1 S are all becoming ma themat icians. 
They are now subtract i ng a minimum 1000 from t heir 
totals, allowi ng a ten per cent swing to the Nat-
ionalists, ~nd are feeling ill as they contemplate 
the result, \ 1) 
and in July 1943 
On Christchurch East figures we need another fifty 
per cent to challenge Labour in any stronghold .(2J 
This would still not have enabled the party to win the 
seat, but it would have forced Labour to come to terms with 
the DLP as the price of its survival. Still , as the elec-
tion approached, Lee was talking bravely. 
(1) John A. Lee 1 s Weekly 6 August 1941. 
(2 ) Ibid., 7 July 1943. 
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We are of the opinion that candidates of t he right 
calibre can wi n Bay of Isl~nds, Marsden, Thames 
and a host of other seats. ~1) 
Thi s , as the results showed, was pure wishful thinking. 
However , no one was prepared to predict that Lee himself 
would lose his seat . For instance, in its elect ion forecast 
the Christchurch "Press 11 mentioned in pass i ng that he was sure 
to hold it. (2 ) In the end, he was merely the only DLP candid -
ate to save his deposit. 
The details of DLP support will be discussed i n Chapter 7 , 
but here it can be noted that Labour lost probably four seats 
as a direct result of Democratic Labour' s intervention. This 
asswnes , of course , that all Democratic Labour's votes ~ere 
taken from Labour. Labour would have won Hamilton , Masterton , 
New Plymouth and \vaitemata if the DLP votes in these elector-
ates had been added to Labour ' s. This was not the case in any 
other seat lost by Labour, and in New Plymouth the situation 
was complicated by an Independent who polled 689 votes, and 
whose political orientation was neither def initely left nor 
right. Thus even in these four cases there cannot be com-
plete certainty that Democratic Labour 1vas responsible for the 
loss of the seats . 
Democratic Labour ' s performance in 1943 must be accounted 
a failure, even though the gathering of 40,433 votes by 51 
candidates was a considerable feat in war-time conditions. The 
(1) Ibid ., 23 June 1943. 
(2) Press, 23 September 1943. 
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party failed to win any seats and lost the one it held prev-
iously. It failed to split the Labour vote in enough seats 
to seriously embarrass the Government, let alone bring it 
down. 
The reasons for ·t he party 1 s failure are obvious, and in 
retrospect Lee can be seen to have attempted an impossible 
gamble. It was i mpossible to escape the stigma of a "Scab 
Labour" party, a theme constantly reiterated by Labour speak-
ers and by "Standard" and trade union newspapers week in and 
week out. Their plea not to split the Labour vote was succ-
essful, and was probably the main single factor in Democratic 
Labour's failure. The line taken by the "Union Record", Lee ' s 
most virulent opponent among trade union newspapers, shows how 
t he "Scab Labour" argument was used to stifle criticism under 
the overriding demand for "Labour unity". 
Five years ago criticism of the Government meant 
trying to serve the workers by forcing the official 
policy along progressive lines. But now criticism 
can only have the effect of endangering the \vorkers 1 
interests by further weakening the only po~sible 
government which is likely to help them. \ 1J 
The trade unions have vision enough to see that Lee 
is today the most dangerous man in New Zealand to 
the Labour movement. Vie might agree with some of 
his criticisms , but Lee is a dangerous man •••• Lee ' s 
candidates will do only one thing; t hey will reduce 
the Labour vote , for the less wideawake workers will 
express their irritation by voting that way . By 
reducing the)Labour vote , they 'l.vill tend to let the 
Tories in. ( 2 
(1) Union Record , 1 clay 1943 . (2) I bid ., 1 September 1943. 
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Lee himself realised the power of such arguments. 
the election, he told a meeting of party supporters, 
"I am convinced that fear and not faith won the 
contest. eople came to listen and approve , and 
then went m-ray b~lteving in us but not in our 
ability to win . " \ 1 J 
After 
Lee ' s ties with industrial Labour had never been strong. 
As a pioneer Labour worker he was resentful of the position 
the unions suddenly atta i ned in the party after 1930 , and he 
was quite open about this in "Socialism in New Zealand" . He 
blamed the union card votes for his expulsion in 1940 , and 
from then on his attacks on "Industrial Bouncers" and on indi-
vidual union leaders never ceased. Hence in 1 943 the Federa-
tion of Labour was glad to do some of the Labour Party ' s dir t y 
vTOrk in its campaign against Lee . Its chief contribution was 
a leaflet headed by a portrai t of Lee and the title "This Man 
Apes the Fascis ts". It continued 
The Trade Union 1ovement in (name of city) a ppeals 
to you to have nothing whatever to do with J . A. Lee, 
the leader of the "Democratic" Soldier Labour Party . 
The path this man is followi ng leads to the very same 
goal as that of Hitler ' s Naz i Party , which started by 
promising the moon and finished with terror and per-
secution of the workers. 
Yet some German workers voted Hitler into power , be -
cause they believed his promises and fa i led to see 
the dangers . 
But Hitler ' s policy was framed to aid the business 
people , not the workers - so is Lee ' s . 
Hitler hated the Jews - Lee hates non-New Zeal anders. 
Ilitler attacked the Catholics - so does Lee . 
Hitler screamed agains t the Communists - so does Lee . 
(1 ) John A. Lee ' s Weekly , 6 October 1943 . 
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Hitler ' s poiitical gangsters used strong-arm 
methods aga inst opponents - a 73-year-old litera-
ture-seller at a Palmerston North meeting of Lee ' s 
this month was seized by the neck and ejected into 
the rain. 
Hitler slated the Trade Unions , the workers • only 
line of defence , and afterwards destroyed them -
Lee has been campaigning against trades unionism 
and would destroy it if he got the chance. 
It was crude propaganda , but it was effective. Lee ' s 
complaints about individual union leaders mi ght have had some 
foundation, but his indiscriminate attacks on "Industri al 
Bouncers" made it all too easy to accuse him of attacking the 
movement as a whole , and there were a number of heated meetings 
of the Auckland Trades Council at which Douglas was asked to 
specify charges of "bossism" and "corruption" appearing in 
"John A. Lee's Weekly", of vlhich he was editor. (1) 
Apart from the damage done by the attacks of the Labour 
Party and the F . O. L., the D. L. P. had already proved that it 
could achieve little even in the areas of its greatest stren-
gth - the city electorates. This was clear after the Christ-
church East by- election . Herring had polled 26 . 7 per cent of 
the vote, beating the National candidate, but Miss Howard still 
had a major ity of nearly 2 , 000 votes. Although Christchurch 
East was Democratic Labour' s finest hour , it was als o certain 
that it could not repeat the success , for even with a quarter 
of the votes cast it fa iled to break Labour's hold on the seat. 
Lee must have realised too, that at the general election the 
(1) Union Record, 1 ay 1943. 
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fate of the Government, and not just one seat, was at stake, 
and that electors would be much less prodigal with their pro-
test votes . No D.L.P. candidate came close to Lee's 23 per 
cent of the vote in Grey Lynn. Even there Hackett, the Lab-
our candidate, had a majority over 6,000 votes , the highest 
in New ~ealand . 
Some observers thought that Democratic Labour ' s efforts 
were spread too thinly, and that had Lee been less ambitious 
he could have saved his own seat and perhaps gained one or 
two others. ( 1 ) The party ' s financial resources were certainly 
too sparse to support 51 candidates, but this is not to say 
that Lee was wrong in putt i ng forward as full a 11 slate 11 of 
candidates as poss i ble . There were two good reasons for 
doing this. Wartime conditions meant that Governmental stab-
ility was an important preoccupation with electors, and for a 
party to gain any support it obviously had to have a chance of 
forming a Government . With Democratic Labour this was only an 
outside chance, but the psychological value of field i ng 51 can-
didates instead of only ten or 12 1vas important . Secondly, 
Lee had always maintained that his party was the true successor 
of the Labour Party , and the inheritor of its radical tradition. 
If this were to be proved true , Democratic Labour had to gather 
support in as many electorates as possible, not just in a few 
Labour strongholds. It is often said that Lee expected to 
hold his own seat on the strength of his pers onal following, 
(1) Cf. Democracy, 6 October 1943 . 
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and that he was surprised when he lost it. This is doing 
him an injustice both to his common sense and to his intentions. 
Lee knew very well that electors voted for the party, and that 
personal appea l would not be decisive. His comments after the 
election showed that he was not surprised at the loss of Grey 
Lynn; had he stayed in the electorate "campaigning on every 
corner 11 , he said, he could have added only another thousand 
votes at t he outside to his total. (1) Bot h before and after 
the election he always stressed that it was more important to 
"fight for New Zea land" than to hold his own seat. 
Anot her factor that should be mentioned , but which is 
tantalizingly elus i ve , is Lee's antipat hy to the Roman Catholic 
Church. This quarrel had its beginni ng in September 1941 when 
Lee attacked an article in 11Zealandia 11 which lauded Spain as 
the fulfillment of "Corporate State" ideals. (2 ) Lee responded 
with his usual vigour, and he was quite right in his charges 
that the attitude toward Fascism of contributed articles and 
some editorial comment i n "lealandia" was at bes t equivocal. 
Some of it, strange as it seems , was almost openly admiring , 
par ticularly toward the Franco government . This infuriated 
Lee . After September 1941 hardly a week went by without the 
issue bei ng raised i n "John A . Lee ' s Weekly 11 and sometimes it 
took up near l y the whole of a number.< 3) The controversy, like 
s o many i n 1.vhich Lee was involved , quickly broadened until he 
(1) John A. Lee's Weekly, 6 October 1943. 
(2) Ibid . , 3 September 1941. 
(3) Cf. 1 October 1941. 
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was involved in a running fight with "Zealandia" and "Tablet" 
and his charges gre11J steadily wider until they became indis-
criminate attacks on the Church on the theme that "the Vatican 
opposes Democracy". (1 ) He also committed an error of judgement 
in speaking on "Clerical Fascism" at meetings of the Orange 
Lodge chai red by Howard ·Elliott , the organiser of the notorious 
Protestant Political Association in 1 919. 
Lee ma i nta i ned at the time that the Catholic vote had been 
"regimented" aga i nst Democratic Labour , and that in some areas 
the Communists , who also bitterly opposed him , had distributed 
literature aimed at Catholic voters to Catholic homes, but not 
to others. <2) Obviously religious influence on voters is ext-
remely hard to measure. Labour Party official propaganda did 
not mention Lee ' s attitude , although the F . O.L . pamphlet already 
quoted did. Lee ' s charges that the Church was responsible for 
his defeat (3 )were probably made in the heat of the moment while 
his disappointment was still keen . Speaking to the author in 
1 961 , Lee said that he thought any loss in Catholic votes was 
amply compensated by "sympathy votes" from Protestants , many 
of whose clergy actively sympathised with him because of the 
Catholic attacks , and from Catholic intellectuals who disapp-
roved of "Zealandia 1stt outlook. Lee numbered the latter at 
about five per cent of Catholic voters throughout the country . 
( 1 ) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
John A. Lee ' s Weekly , 8 March 1944 . 
The author has been unable to find examples of this 
propaganda. 
John A. Lee ' s Weekly , 6 October 1943 et. seq . 
160 
What probably did more damage to t he party was the 
extent to which it was obviously dominated by Lee and the 
National Executive . Enough has been said about this already 
to shmv ho~Ar deep-seated dissatisfaction was at certain times, 
and branch withdrawals from the party had been embarrassingly 
frequent. Early in 1943 the party suffered its most serious 
blow for some time when \If . E. Barnard resigned and announced 
that he would stand as an Independent. Barnard was widely 
respected and a much less controversial political figure than 
Lee. His membership added prestige to the party. Barnard's 
ostensibl e reason for leaving was his opposition to a wartime 
election, but he also added, "there is a grmving dissatisfac -
tion with party politics". (1 ) Although he denied t hat he had · 
"altered (his) political principles", his rift with Lee had 
been obvious f or some time , partly be cause he favoured national 
unity i n wartime, and partly be cause he was a prominent member 
of the Campai gn for Christian Order. This body, compr ised of 
churchmen ru1d var ious leaders of social and youth movements, 
concentrated on social questions but avoided politica l contra-
versy. Its statements vmre generally unexceptionable and 
we ll-intentioned , and it had no noticeable effect on the Nevr 
Zealand scene. Lee ' s rift with Barnard probably dated from 
an article written by the former about the campaign in November 
1942, in which he almost openly appealed to the latter to stop 
wasting his time with it. 
(1) Democracy, 15 April 1943. 
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The (Campaign) • • •• excites as much enthusiasm as 
it does hostility, and so far the hostility has 
been nil •• • • 
Some of the speeches deliverd so far would sugg-
est t hat many have not thought too much about 
social quest ions apart from booze , betting and 
sex. Slums , debt, wages , the right of the wor-
ker to be more than a cog, the sermons come bold-
ly up to t he point gf action and then , with rare 
exce ptions , fizzle. ~ 1) 
Apart from Barnard, nearly half the party's executive 
resigned early in 1943. F . J . Temm , the National Treasurer, 
followed Barnard, and his Catholicism probably played a part 
in his resignation. At the s ame time E. B. Newton and P. Adds 
also left. The former, one of t he few union officials left 
i n t he party, told "Standard" that he had protested at Execu-
tive meetings agains:t a ttac ks on the unions in "John A. Lee's 
Weekly", and added 
"I was di ssatisfied wit h the par t y for other rea-
s ons a lso. I was dissatisfied with the fact t hat 
the candidates were be i ng selected by only one or 
two people, mai nly I~ . Lee himself. I considered 
the policy was not truly socialistic and could be 
construed to mean anything". ~ 2) . 
These resignat ions could not have come at a worse time, 
and were the clearest indication yet of the di ssat is fac tion 
with Lee ' s leadership and poli ci es. 
Lee mus t have realised that the Democratic Labour Party 
was dead as a result of the election , but he promised a gather -
ing of his supporters that he would carry on . (3 ) Litt l e was 
(1) John A. Lee ' s \1/eekly , 11 November 1942 . (2) Standard 20 May 1943. 
(3) John A. Lee's \1/eekly , 6 October 1943. 
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heard of the party for a time. Renewed activity was promised 
in 1945, (1)and Lee did, in fact , contest the Hamilton by-elec-
tion in May. He secured 1 , 095 votes after only eleven days 
campaigning in an area where Democratic Labour had no organis-
ation, not even a telephone.< 2 ) A conference was held (only 
the third in the party ' s life) in October "to consider when 
the party should move again 11 • The executive elect i ons showed 
that little fresh blood had been attracted. (3) The par t y fin-
ally decided not to contest the 1946 elect i ons, as there was a 
movement in the Labour Party to readmit Lee to membership at 
the time . Lee himself was not anxious to stand because of ill-
ness in his family. <4) He made a determined effort to win back 
Grey Lynn in 1949, and had strong assets in his opposition to 
peacetime conscription , and in a campaign fund collected from 
all over Ne'\v L. ealand. His vote was 2 , 627 -over 1 , 000 less 
than in 1 943. After this the party quietly faded away. 
"John A. Lee ' s Weekly" became a fortnightly in 1947 and a 
monthly in 1954. It died the next year , and with it the last 
vestige of Nevl Zealand ' s only rebel Labour party . 
ii. The Independent Group (The People ' s Movement)(B) 
The Independent Group betrayed in its very name the 
contradiction on which it was founded . 
(1 ) Evening Post , 2 January 1945 . 
(2) Ibid ., 28 May 1945 . 
Beg i nning as a non-
(3) Dominion , 23 October 1945 . 
(4 ) Dominion , 30 October 1946 . 
(5) A matter of terminology may be settled here . The People ' s 
Movement , founded in 1940 , sponsored a group of candidates 
in 1943 . These candidates were known as the Independent 
Group . 
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party body opposed to the holding of wartime elections , it 
contested the election as a virtual party whose main policy 
plank was opposition to the party system. Its history is an 
example of the impossibility of taking organised political 
action against "party politics". 
The People ' s 1ovement had its origin in a body known 
as the 1939 Committee , which in September of that year met in 
Auckland to organise, for unspecified aims, political action 
out side t he two main parties . The Committee launched the 
Eovement at a closed meeting in the \vellington Concert Chamber 
in November , but it was a llowed to lapse a s a result of the 
outbreak of war. Early in 1940, when the "political truce" 
began to break down , it was revived "to meet anticipated great-
er political activity by Leftists". The Movement stated in a 
supplied report that it was in favour of "Christian and British 
Democracy", and opposed to'' Bureaucratic Government, Party Poli-
tics and the subordination of the individual to the State" . (1) 
The f irst real interest in the 1ovement was created by the 
announcement that A. E. Davy had been appointed its organiser. 
The Movement ' s president dismissed t he news \vith the comment 
"Mr. Davy has been appointed outside organiser. That is all . 
He has been wit h us only very recently", (2 ) but it neverthe les s 
created a sensation. Davy was still well knovm as the politi-
cal organis er with something of a golden touch. He had first 
(1) N. 6 . Herald, 13 April 1940. See also Evening Post, 30 
1arch 1 943 . 
(2 ) Evening Post , 30 April 1940. 
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organised for the Reform Party in 1925, and repeated his 
success for the United Party in 1928. This was apparently 
f orgiven by oates , the Reform Leader, for Davy was appointed 
organiser for the Coalition in 1931. In 1935 he organised, 
and was one of the founders of, the Democrat Party , which des-
pite Davy's organisational and fund-raising abilities(1)failed 
to win any seats. He then disappeared from the political 
scene for some years , and his sudden return in 1940 attracted 
great interest. 
The ovement's first public meeting was held in the 
Wellington Town Hall on 30 pril 1940. The president, E. R. 
Toop, a ellington tea importer, opened by saying that he was 
"not here to give "hell 11 to anybody, but by a 
constructive and commonsense approach to our 
problems to save us from the hell of bureau-
cratic socialism and the suffering that it 
\vill entail. 11 
Toop made no bones about the political position of the 
Movement. 
''We are not satisfied with the Socialistic 
record of either the Government or the Nat-
ional Party.n 
On specifics of policy he was extremely vague; the 
11ovement did not believe in "isms". 
He advocated as few 11 controls and restrictions as poss-
ible 11 • The financial policy of the l ovement, though vaguely 
phrased, was clear enough in intention 
(1) See C. G. Rollo, the Election of 1935 in New Zealand. 
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1. Restore the balance between state and pri-
vate expenditure 
2. Return men from state employment to private 
employment 
3. Curtail expenditure on non-productive and 
luxury schemes 
Other proposals called for "efficiency" in Government 
departments and the encouragement of private investment for 
national development. However , the most important part of 
Toop •s speech was his threat that the Iovement would take 
political action if its demands were not met. 
"If we are convinced that these changes can best 
be made , or can be made only by our own direct 
action , we shall not hesitate (to pu~ a political 
party in the field to do so." 1J 
The speech might have been vague, but its challenge to 
the National Party was clear, and was taken up at once. Most 
of the newspapers which usually supported the National Party 
praised the Movement •s views, but warned against any vote-
splitting by third parties .<2) Actually, negotiations were 
proceeding secretly between the 1ovement and the National Party 
but they had no success until after Holland was elected leader. 
The People 1 s Movement amplified its financial ideas irr 
its comments on the 1940 Budget , and incidentally gave the 
clearest indication to date of its conservative character. 
The root of the trouble, said the Dominion Execut ive, was the 
high rate of "non-war expenditure 11 , which was forcing the 
Government to invade the field of private enterprise and levy 
(1) Evening Post, 1 (2) See Dominion, 2 1940. 1940 and Evening Post, 1 May 1940. 
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high taxes. The wages and sales tax increases were too 
large, and would lead only to wage demands. These taxes, 
said the statement, should be replaced by (a) restricting 
social security "to those actually in need" (b) a twenty per 
cent increase in income tax rates for single people and ten 
per cent for married couples (c) cuts in public works and 
housing expenditure, and (d) the setting up of a War Council 
"empowered to investigate departmental expenditure with a view 
to effecting economics where possible". (1) 
This War Council, -vrhich the 1 ovement advocated consis-
tently, was to include representatives of farming, manufac tur-
ing, trade union, and "other" interests, to "advise" the Gov-
ernment on all phases of the war effort. (2) 
The ovement 1 s negotiations with the National Party 
broke down toward the end of 1940(3)and it sprang to life 
again at a meet ing in the Auckland Town Hall held on 14 Novem -
ber to announce a full manifesto and programme.(4) At the same 
time the ovement published its manifesto as a pamphlet v.r ith 
the title 11A Lead for Ne1.v 6ealand 11 • Toop began his speech at 
uckland by stating that negotiations with the National Party 
had failed because of lack of goodwill on the part of Hami lton 
and other M. P.s which , in view of the Movement•s demands for 
(1) Dominion, 2 July 1940. 
(2) Evening Post, 16 May 1940. 
(3) See Chapter 3, pp. qq.t0'.2 . 
(4) Dominion, 15 November 1940. 
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"a completely new party with a new name, a new leader, a 
ne'i.>T personnel and a new policy", was not at all surprising . 
Much of his speech, accordingly, was devoted to an attack 
on the party and threats to ''end party politics once and for 
all" by putting up candidates at the next election. These 
threats could well have been a deciding factor in prompting 
..... ,tt,. 
the National organisation to move against Rellaa~ and the 
"old gang". 
The Iovement ' s policy , as outlined by Toop in his 
Auckland speech and in "A Lead. for Ne\v Zealand" , was a strange 
mixture of vague talk , calls for retrenchment in State activ-
ities, and a few sweeping proposals for change. 
points .were ( 1) 
The important 
Establ ishment of outside advisory councils to 
"examine all policy and legislation in the 
light of technical, scientific and practical 
knowledge" ; this would "remove the curse of 
party-ridden Government" . 
Approval of "the pr inciple of credit and mone-
tary reform •••• the exact methods cannot be 
precisely defined". 
Reduc tions in State expenditure; "greater eff-
iciency at lower cost in the administrative 
system 11 • 
"Efficiency" to the Movement , meant reductions 
in staff. This , it was promised, \vould lead 
to lower taxes and "increased national produc-
tion without increasing national costs". 
Encouragement of i mmigration, the aim be ing the 
five mil lion i mmigrants from Great Br itain in 
the next twenty years. 
(1) The following points are condensed from 11A Lead for New 
Zea land". 
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Incentives to increase natural population grow-
th, including basic family wages , tax remissions 
for large famili es and the reduction or aboli-
tion of Social Security Tax and the National Sec-
ur ity Tax. 
For farmers, '~e pro pose to extend credit facil-
ities or commonsense tax adjustments which will 
meet the main difficulties of cheap rural fin-
ance". lso (a f ores hadowing of future wr ang -
les) the introduction of cost control as a "cor-
ollary" to price control. 
The abol ition of Soc i a l Security Tax and of all 
universal benefits, with payments only to "those 
unable to he lp themselves". Universal maternity 
benefits v.rere , however , propos ed as part of the 
popul at ion programme . 
Curtailment of state housing , and the right for 
stat e tenants to buy their houses. 
The industrial policy was of specia l interest. The 
amount of attention given to it left no doubt that the Move-
ment 1 s main supporters vTere city manufacturers or, like Toop, 
importers. It als o reflected the lack of attention pai d to 
t he su bject in the past by t he National Par t y. Democratic 
La bour's concentration on its industrial policy was also a 
symptom of the fact that National had , under the leadership 
of the rural-centred "old gang" , completely lost the confid -
ence of manufacturing interests. The l-fovement 1 s policy, hovT -
ever , differed fundamentally in outlook fr om Democratic Labour 1 s. 
It pro posed self-extinguishing credits for new industries, but 
was careful to say that this should not lead to infla tion. Re-
~.n oval of t axation 11 and all restrictions" was aimed at . 
nee we remove the present barriers to investment 
t he 'i.•Theels of industry vTill turn as never before. 
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Specific ment ion was made of a New Zealand iron and 
steel industry and much space was taken in " Lead for New 
Zealand" to prove its feasibility. 
These proposals were yoked awkwardly to a vague demand 
for a "change" in import policy aimed at the eventual removal 
of controls, which the Movement did not attempt to reconcile 
with its industrial development policies. Finally , ominous 
hints were made about the need for "flexibility" in Arbitra-
tion Court awards, and for the abolition of compulsory union-
ism. 
The most significant thing about the ovement ' s policy 
was , however , its attitude to party politics . In this it 
echoed closely the New ~ealand Legion of the nineteen-thirties, 
but its criticisms were more strident and basically more irr-
ational. This was partly due to vTartime conditions. Efforts 
to achieve co-operation between the Labour and Nat ional parties 
had proved unfruitful , yet many people felt that "party polit-
ics" should cease , or be curtailed, while the country was at 
war. Another reason for the dislike expr essed by some conser-
vatives was that , for them , the party system had virtually 
stopped working . The National Party could, up to 1940, have 
taken one of t1vo courses. It could have pr oceeded as it had 
done since 1935, ruled by the Coalition leaders and making no 
attempt to improve its image by changes in policy and personnel. 
his vrould have left the party \vith little chance of winning an 
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election in the foreseeable future . Alternatively, it could 
have discarded its old leaders, liberalised its pol icy and 
accepted '\vithout demur the changes of the Labour era. Neither 
of these alternatives was very attractive to the less realistic 
of Labour's opponents , for even the limited state interference 
\"lith the economy dur i ng the depression left the Nat i onal Party 
indelibly branded as 11 Socialist 11 in the eyes of the supporters 
of the People ' s Movement. 
1Jhat for them vras the solution? The 11 old principles 11 of 
individualism, free enterprise and limited state activity still 
held good. Therefore the f.ault '\·las in a political system which 
denied them expression; 11modern tools to meet modern conditior\~1, 
were needed to restore them to their place . 
destruction of the party system, 
This meant the 
(Par t y Government) may mean that one large section 
of the community is governed by another section of 
the community •••• This form of government in New 
6ealand h~s ) br ought about most of our present 
troubles. ~ 2 
Thes e included 11 cl ass legislation 11 the putting
0}party before 
country , and 11 bidding and out-bidding of parties f or public fav-
our " 
e believe that the old party idea of cajoling 
the electors with fa lse or extravagant promises 
is dead •••• Today the people want the truth, 
and all they as k in the way of policy is honesty , 
commQn$ense and economi c and soc i a l justice for 
all. ~ 3 J 
(1) A Lead for New Zealand, p .1 2 . ( 2) Ibid • , p • 21 • 
(3) Ibid ., p . 12. 
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Davy , once one of the most prominent figures in "party 
politics" , evidently saw the tide flowing agai nst it. t 
a We llington meeting in November 1940 he sa i d "I venture to 
say t hat the most unpopular thing in polit i cs today is party 
po litics" , and referred to the "credulity" of the audience 
listening to Lee expounding Democratic Labour•s policy . "To 
him that poli cy was a cruel one because of the impossibility 
of i ts i mplementation." (1) Davy 1 s repentance of his political 
s i ns was the occasion of great wonder and some amusement . 
Referr i ng to him as "the most washed - up Hess i ah i n New 
L. ealand politics" , Lee wrote 
The eople 1 s arty (sic) is merely a nursery- rhyme 
and baby- fed congregation of nitwits prepared to 
achieve vicarious i mportance by paying an or ganiser . 
The great political Levante persuades folk wi th 
-spare cash that he can perform a pol itical rope 
tr ick. The infant ile eople 1s arty is to climb 
to heaven by a mythical rope , but before they climb 
the conjurer goes around and collects the organising 
fee from aillong he performers , rather than the aud-
ience. (2 ) 
Nevertheless , Davy usua lly kept in the background and was 
not seen to be so obvi ously one of the leadi ng figures as he 
had been in the United and Deu10crat art ies. 
s its cure for party politics , the Novement promised 
11 entirely nevJ met hods i n overnment" , \vhich would "return dem-
ocracy to its ri~htful place and br i ng , i n realit , mor e bus i-
ness in government and less government in bus i ness . 11 ( 3) The 
(1) Dominion, 27 November 1940. ( 2) John A • .Lee 1 s eekly , 14 day 1 941. 
(3) A Lead o ~ ew L.ealana , p. 22 . 
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proposals were not very spectacular, however , although they 
vTere quite interesting. There were to be 
non-political advisory councils •••• to co-operate 
with arliamentary committees in considering legis-
lation, and to present ~ndependent and impartial 
reports to the House. \1) 
These councils were to be purely advisory and it was to 
be left to arliament to actually legislate. They were to 
have a corporate basis , with representatives from economic 
interests and the churches. The a i m of this system was to 
free the Government from "the system of bureaucracy which has 
grown up as a bad substitute for the system we propose". In 
accordance with this all administrat i ve tribunals were to be 
abolished and the public service made "efficient and business-
like". The end result of these reforms was to be an end to 
"wild election promises .... and class legislation" and "the 
restoration of confidence in Government". The People's Move -
ment's i mmediate demand , which it repeated regularly until 1943, 
was for a War Council. \'-!ha t its composition and powers \vere to 
be was never stated in detail, but the Movement obviously had in 
mind a body with executive powers, that would have entirely sup-
erseded Cabinet. 
le need a War Council that has real powers - a War 
Council embracing Manpower, Production, Supplies , 
Finance, and Fighting forces and the Civil Servicei. 
This Council should have power to diver t money from 
(say) public works to war needs. It should have 
power to suspend polic~~s which stand in the road 
of a full war effort.~ J 
( 1 ) Ibid. , p . 23. 
(2) Ibid., P. 17. 
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It is safe to say that the War Council's sponsors never 
really thought out the implications of this proposal, but 
even as outlined it showed a complete lack of understanding 
of the system they sought to improve. 
The Movement ' s new proposals were greeted with much less 
enthusiasm than had been shown earlier in the year. Among 
conservative newspapers, the react i on of the "Otago Daily 
Times" was fairly typical , though more outspoken than most . 
So contemptuous is the People ' s Movement of the 
present , as it considers , debased form of party 
politics that it has decided to put itself forward 
as a new party to end all parties. It is an un-
fortunate failing of human nature that when the 
people are allowed to speak they do not customarily 
speak with one voice on questions that come within 
the sphere of party politics •• • • National politics 
in this country are in need of many things , but not 
of the intervention of new parties with vague and 
delusive strings of promises and cliches. If those 
who are pledging thems elves to the People ' s Movement 
\vish to render service to the nation they have the 
opportunity to do so within the present party align-
ment , for with deference to the ardent Mr . Toop it 
must be suggested that the people of New Zealand 
already have voices, and are quite capable without 
his interferenc~ Qf making themselves heard at the 
appoi nted time. \ 1J 
The National Party under Holland apparently made more 
serious efforts to absorb the Movement than it had under Ham-
ilton . Neg otiations began again, Toop being given authority 
by the Dominion Executive to represent the People ' s Movement.<2) 
A merger was announced jointly by Holland and Toop on 19 February 
1941S3) However , ten days later, J . Crisp , the President of the 
(1) Otago Daily Times , 18 November 1940. 
(2) Evening Post , 1 1arch 1941. 
(3) Dominion , 19 February 1941. 
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Movement 's Auckland Division, denied that any such amalgama-
tion had taken place. 
"Mr. Toop was never given authority to make an uncon-
ditional surrender of our movement to the National 
Party. The position is t hat the National Party has (1) 
merged only \vi th Hr . Toop and a \vellington committee ••• 11 
Crisp was right on both scores. Toop has secured no prom-
ises from Holland except that members of the ovement would be 
given representation on National Party branch committees and on 
the Dominion Council; no changes in policy were forecast and 
Toop was able to use only the change in Leadership as evidence 
of a change of heart in the National Party. (2 ) The "merger" was 
repudiated by a meeting of the Iovement at which every committee 
except the ellington one was represented. Crisp was elected 
Dominion chairman, and Davy remained as organiser. (3) This 
made Toop look very foolish and although he probably took some 
other members of the ovement into the National Party, his sta-
tus was that of an individual member rather than the leader of 
a movement. Davy was probably a ma jor force behind the repud-
iation of the merger . He was on record as favouring a unifi-
cation of anti -government forces in principle, (4) but if, as 
"Standard"(B)reported, National had refused to have him associ-
ated with the party , it was not surprising that he should have 
changed his mind. 
(1) Evening Post, 1 ·arch 1941. 
(2) Dominion, 19 February 1941. 
(3) Evening Post, 17 arch 1941. 
(4) Dominion, 27 November 1940. 
(5) 27 March , 1941. 
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press statement by Crisp, the ovement's new chairman, 
placed great emphasis on the need for a national government. 
''We of the People ' s Hovement ," said Hr . Crisp, 
"state quite definitely that party strife should 
cease at once. There should be a Nat iona l Govern-
ment formed. There should be an immediate announ-
cement that the elections are to be postponed. The 
People are not concerned at this time with "ins" 
and "outs", and their nerves and war efforts are up-
set by the uncertainties of party warfare and rival 
domestic policies. The people want unity and "win 
the war" action •••• 
"The present industrial and political unrest and the 
apparent war apathy have been bro~Tht about by party 
polit ics and lack of leadership." \ J 
Crisp ' s statement showed a marked difference in emphasis 
fr om previous ones by the •Iovement . The postponement of 
elections was ment ioned for the first time, and the stress on 
the need for a coalition was new . This was, in fact , the line 
that the Hovement was to take over the next three years , with 
increasing focus on the insidious role of the partys ' extra-
Parliamentary organisations. The absence of any abuse direc-
ted solely at the National Party suggests that those who left 
the Movement were more concerned with forcing a revitalisation 
of the party than vrith promoting national unity. The Mov em en t 
never again attracted the same attention as under Toop ' s energ-
etic leadership and although after 1941 its motives may have 
been purer , its influence \vas less. 
In April 1941 the •1ovement published the results of what 
must have been the most unscientific public opinion poll ever 
conducted. A questionnaire had been distr i buted in twenty-
( 1) Evening Post , 17 Har ch 1 941. 
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eight electorates asking whether a coalition government 
should be formed and the elections postponed , whether a War 
Council should be set up, with what powers, and who should 
lead it. Those in favour of the first proposition were 
65 .57 per cent of those polled, with 93 . 22 per cent in fav-
our of the second. 87 . 20 per cent thought it should have 
"executive powers . If On the question of leadership, the 
voting was 
Coates 71 . 40 per cent 
Holland 9 . 03 per cent 
Fraser 5 . 09 per cent 
Lee 3 . 49 per cent( 1 ) 
Holv many people voted in the poll, and how it vras organ-
ised , was never revealed, but the results were apparently pub -
lished in all seriousness . 
Dur i ng 1941 the Movement kept up an incessant fire of 
press statements calling for a coalition government and post-
ponement of the elections , but it made no hints about putting 
up its own candidates. 11-pparently Davy considered that until 
it was better organised the Movement would make sufficient pol-
itical capital from its denunciations of party politics . 
Nothing was heard of it during 1942 , but shortly after 
Parli ament decided to hold elections in 1943 the Hovement 
announced that unless they were again postponed it would contest 
seats . From then on it follmved a policy of ensur ing peace by 
(1) N. 6 . Herald, 24 april 1941. 
preparing for war - in this case calling for a postponement 
of the elections while preparing f or them. t the same 
time , it set out to prove that it was , as the "Otago Daily 
Times" had called it in 1940, "a party t ha t was not a party". 
In announcing its participation in the election , Crisp stated 
"To avoid t his movement lapsing into a party 
machine, no party machine, no party organisation, 
as it is known at present will be set up. Can-
didates committees will be personal committees, 
and not branches of a party machine •••• The 
parliamentary group will meet in due course to 
choose a leader and to outline a case for the 
people , and this will become its platform.nU) 
Shortly after this the Movement sent a letter to all 
1-· . P.' s and Labour Conference delegates saying that unless an-
other attempt were made at a coalition the electors would make 
an issue of it whatever t he politicians did. 
In June Crisp announced that "a Dominion-wide representa-
tion (of candidates) will be comp lete in the near future . 11 ( 2) 
Ho\-Tever, of the first list of candidates announced (3)nearly 
half were not heard of aga i n . Nevertheless, in July the Move-
ment had enough prospective candidates to hold meetings of them 
in Palmerston North and Chr istchurch , "to decide on a common 
course of action and consider a policy which would be mutually 
a cceptable '' · The pol icy( 4 )was much the same as t hat of 1940. 
Added to it, however , was a proposal whose authorship was obv-
ious - the raising of a post -\var loan of one hundred million 
( 1) Dominion , 17 .L iarch 1 943. 
( 2 ) Dominion, 10 June 1943. 
( 3) Domi nion , 22 June 1 943 . 
( 4 ) Dominion, 24 July 1943 . 
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pounds for national development and rehabilitation. Davy 
obviously expected this to work the same magic as his seventy 
million pound loan in 1928 for the United Party , for he sev-
eral times referred to the People ' s Hovement 's pr oposal as 
"the seventy million" l <1) Other points \vere 
"The tapering off of war taxation after the war , 
with the surplus goi ng to national reconstruction 
schemes." 
A fifty pound muft~ a llowance f or returned service-
men , \vith maintenance on "full standards of living 
pay" until \·TOrk was found. 
The encouragement of the principle of co-operation 
in industry. 
twenty-five per cent reduction of the membership 
of the House of Representatives. 
The 1940 proposals for a " cost-of-living" base for wage 
rates and benefits, family wages , and Parliamentary advisory 
councils were also included. The candidates did not , despite 
the earlier promise , elect a leader, but dec ided to adopt the 
name "Independent Group" . 
As promised in this policy announcement, Independent 
Group candidates concentrated on attacking the party system, 
and did their best to make it a major issue in the election. 
Their attitude was best summed up by C.D. Drummond, the cand-
idate for 'N"ellington \vest, who saw the parties as a social 
divider "to blame for most of the people 's troubles", and 
manipulated by unscrupulous hidden interests. 
(1) Dominion, 17 September 1943 . 
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11 1embers of both the Labour and National parties are 
inescapably tied by •• •• pledges and their party con-
stitutions to obey the dictates of organisations out -
side Parliament. That is why these organisations 
pour out tens, and even hundreds of thousands of 
pounds to publicise and support their parties. They 
want this control for their own selfish purposes -
to grab money and power, to smash opposing interests. 
They have accordingly carried their party warfare in-
to everything, embroiling all the people, with the 
result that we have poverty, social and economic in-
justices , industrial unrest and fear , and a constant 
struggle between costs and income. Good government 
is impossible under party rule as practised i~ this 
country. ".Je urge you to smash this system." \ 1 J 
lvlany candidates directed their fire at Parliament . The 
following passage from a speech by R.E . Crawford (Otaki) shows 
the nature of such criticism (as well as a cavalier attitude 
to the Group's policy). Crawford proposed cutting the number 
of M. P. ' s by half (not twenty-five per cent as the policy stated) 
and an elective rime Minister , something which the People ' s 
Movement had favoured in 1940, but had not officially adopted 
in 1943 . 
"I contend that half the present number (of 1•1 . P. 's) 
provided they were good sound business people , would 
do twice as much work, twice as well and with one 
tenth of the haggling as at present goes on. This 
would cut out the "runaround" type of politician and 
would attract only men of real ability and national 
outlook. ·[e would also cut out seventy-five per 
cent of the present Government departments, Boards, 
Commissions, Controllers , etc. \'le would have an 
elected Prime- 1inister - that is to say the Prime 
finister would be elected by the vote of the whole 
Dominion instead of being elected by a handful of 
fellow Parliamentarians. tie would reduce to a min-
imum all legislation by order - in-council and reg -
ulation, the amazing growth of \vhich has been resp-
onsible for a lot o~)un-British statutes being 
placed on record . " " 
( 1) Otago Daily Times, 24 September 1943 . 
(2) Levin Chronicles, 18 September 1943 . 
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The Group 1 s social and economic policies were left to 
the candidates themselves to amplify, and this they did, 
though with marked differences on some points. lthough all 
candidates attacked "throttling" controls on small businesses 
and promised to abolish the Internal 1arketing Division, some 
envisaged quite extensive state interference with the economic 
system. G •• Cuttriss (Oamaru) said that the Group 1 s policy 
meant that the Court of rbitration would set wage levels acc-
ording to the cost of livi ng , with a sliding scale to increase 
the wages of the workers with large families. To avoid pref -
erence in employment being gi ven to s i ngle people , the Court 
woul d allocate a fixed wage bill to each employer, and State 
subsidies would if necessary be paid if he could not mee t this 
out of returns. (1) 
lost candidates professed a radical attitude to the mone -
tary system , although only with general statements t hat "money 
should be the servant of the people, and not the master". Some 
did , however , emphasise that self-extinguishing credits would 
be made available to establish new industries, provided the 
result was not inflationary. The main change from the 1940 
policy was a promise to extend social security benefits , and 
.not to virtually dismantle the scheme as had been proposed 
prev iously . 
(1) Oamaru fa il, 16 September 1943 . 
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The occupations and social class of the candidates bore 
out the Group's conservative character.C 1) high proportion 
(six out of 25) were owners of substantial bus inesses. There 
were two small businessmen , two farmers and a number of prof-
essional men of various kinds. Only four had stood for Parl-
iament previously. W. C. Hewitt (Wa itemata) was the only one 
to have represented any of the main political parties. His 
previous contests were -
1 91 9: 
1928: 
1 931 : 
Independent (Rotorua) 





Hewitt polled the lowest vote of his career - 204 - in 
1943. W. J . Crawford (Otaki) had stood a s a Democrat in 
Rangitike i in 1935, polling 167 9 votes. J. H. Penniket (Waik-
ato) had contest ed Waitomo as .an Independent Country Party 
candidate i n 1935. He had the support of the Social Credit 
Movement and the local Farmers' Union on that occasion, and 
polled 2341 votes, nearly a quarter of t he total. In 1943 
he ran on much the same platform - greater use of Reserve Bank 
credit and a compensated price for dairy produce - but his vote 
was only 472. The only other Independent Grou p candidate to 
have contested a previous election was H. T. Head (Hauraki) who 
was the candidate of a so-called "Pan-New Zealand Political 
Union" for t he Waitemata by-election in 1941 , when he polled 
a scant 88 votes. A number of candidates had previously held 
office in the National Party. Only one had had any connections 
with Labour. This was L. R. \'l ilkinson (Tauranga) who , as Mayor 
(1) See Appendix B. 
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of the town, had "always been considered locally as a Labour 
supporter and was at one time a member of the Party". (1) The 
most interesting case was that of Rugby ~1alcolm (Wellington 
North) who had been a member of the Democratic Labour Party 1 s 
National Executive (2 ) and had been approved as a candidate in 
1941.(3) Halcolm seems to have been merely a political adven-
turer , however . 
As the election approached the Independent Group began an 
undignified scramble to appear as much like a party as possible -
a rather difficult task considering its much-publicised mission 
to end party politics. Shortly after the candidates 1 confer-
ences, Harper, the Dominion Secretary , said that the Group had 
"a broad, common policy and could thus, if elected, form a 
Goverrunent 11 , out that 11 each member should be free at all times 
to act and vote according to dictates of his or her conscienc~=~ 
J. N. Power (vJairarapa) emphasised that the Group was "not opposed 
to the party system within Parliament, but to the domination of 
the party from outside 11 ( 5)and in a final message to electors 
C.D. Drummond (Wellington North) said that there were 11 suffic -
ient Independents of the right sort standing to form a Govern-
ment with a substantial majority . 11 ( 6 ) The Group had not been 
able to persuade more than 25 Independents to stand in its name, 
but it tried to make up for this by 11 endorsing 11 several others. (7) 
(1) Standard, 19 August 1943. 
(2) John A . Lee 1 s Vfeekly, 25 June 1941. 
(3) Dominion, 30 l•Iay 1 941. 
(4) Dominion, 3 August 1943. 
(5) Dominion~ 6 September 1943. (6) Otago Da~ly Times, 24 September 1943. 
(7) See advt. in Truth , 22 September 1943. These candidates are 
marked with an asterisk in the li~t. in Annondix B. 
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Some of these seemed to regard it as a mixed blessing. 
A. E. Hansford (Palmerston North) denied that he had any 
connection with the Group after Drummond , in his radio br oad-
cast , had urged electors to vote for him, (1)and P. J. HcMullan 
(Wa llace) was so ungrateful as to describe it as., run by the 
Federation of Labour 11 • ( 2) 
The Nat ional Party was far more worried about the Indep-
endent Group than it need have been . In Iay "Freedom" gloom-
ily listed fourteen seats which in 1935 Labour had won through 
the intervention of the Democrats - another "Davy party" . (3 ) 
Holland gave a heated reply to demands that the election should 
again be postponed, saying that 
The organisation was shrouded in mystery and it sniped 
at all and sundry from behind cover. But when the 
shroud fell the people would find that some old polit-
ical characters who had been forming political parties 
in the Dominion for the last twenty years had turned 
up with a nevT name on ly .(4J 
~ho had organised the Movement was certainly a mystery, and 
apart from Davy , Crisp and Harper, its leading members 1vere 
never named. t the National Party Conference in July, Gordon, 
the arty ' s President spent nearly ha lfhLs address in attacking 
the Gr oup and defending the party system. ( B) During the camp-
aign Gordon took exception to the Independent Group ' s radio 
br oadcast given by Drunnond in '\vhich the latter alleged that 
( 1 ) 
( 2 ) 
(3) 
~ g~ 
Dominion 17 September 1943 . 
Southland Daily News, 18 September 
Freedom, 1•Iay 1943. 
Dominion, 30 pril 1943 . 
Dominion, 27 July 1943. 
1943 . 
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Nationa l meet i ngs vTere "packed" with ticket - holders. Gordon 
denied the charge and this drew a reply from an unexpe cted 
quarter when Davy chal lenged him to a public debate on par t y 
polit i cs. This was the first occasion that the ol d master 
had spoken about his change of heart on party politics , and 
what he said was very interesting . 
VIT . Davy sa i d that he had advised and helped the 
Independent Group be cause he had seen so much of 
party politics that he considered it the duty of 
every citizen to put an end to this system whi ch 
was rui ning t he country •••• 
"I knoH wha t I am talking about vJhen it comes to 
par ty politics •••• 
"It ' s sheer nonsense to say that meetings are not 
packed and pre-arranged. This cheering and sing-
ing (s ometimes with mus ica l accompani ment ) is not 
spontaneous . Surely Hr . Gordon should realise 
that I knmv this technique backwards and I have 
no difficulty in recognising it. It was all right 
once when politics meant just the difference bet-
vJeen the "ins" and the "outs" but today the world 
needs a n w)order and the old order of politics 
must go . 11 1 
Davy a l so fa cetious l y reminded Gordon that he should be 
careful about attacki ng the Gr oup ' s poli cy of raising a large 
loan , as "that vias the policy of many members of the now -named 
Nat i onal arty who got in on the seventy mi llion" , a reference 
to the United Party l andsli de of 1928. Gordon did not rep l y 
t o the cha l lenge , and Davy had the l ast word i n the ar gument . 
Apart f rom Drummond's radio broadcast, the Group did no 
national campaigning. Drummond was a well-known r adio announ-
cer with an excellent voice and delivery , but his speech was 
(1) Domi ni on , 17 September 1943. 
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mar ed by the vi ulen attac on the National arty which 
drevl from Gordon the protest mentioned above . There was 
li tle evidence in the roup's propaganda of the vast camp-
aign funds that Dav was rumoured to have cajoled from afflu-
ent reactionaries. Each candidate prepared and paid for his 
own campaign literature to the best of his financial ability, 
and the results varied in scope an quantity. Some appear 
to have had no material printed , and did very little campaign-
ing , he result be i ng that ten o them polled less than vro 
hundred votes, and three less than one hundred. number of 
candidates als o with rew before nominat io s closed and two, 
Clayton ( atea) an Kyle (Riccarton) id so too late f or their 
names to be removed from the ballot papers. 
108 and 272 votes respectively. 
They received 
he Group received a serious setback two days before the 
electio \vhen • .L.. Brady , allegedly the "chairman of the ell-
ington North Branch" , sent a telegram to all can idates urging 
them to withdraw from the election in order not to split the 
anti-Labour vote . Davy replied in the same day ' s newspapers 
that Brady had no o ficial standing, and had sent the tele-
gram on his own behalf. Drlli!lillond, an ' Halcol , two of the 
Group's candidates in ellington alleged that Brady was acting 
for the ~ational arty, and had arranged with Hislop, the at -
ional caJdidate for Wellington r~rth, to send the telegram.C 1) 
(1) Dominic , 24 September 1943. 
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Despite these denials , the telegram was a well-t imed piece 
of sabotage and may have taken many votes fro:n Independent 
Grou p candidates . 
The results of the election were a compl ete debacle for 
the Group. The 25 candidates polled together only 7358 
votes. The highest vote vlas Drummond ' s 1050. Only one 
other polled over 500 votes , and fifteen ran last i n their 
electorates . There were three electorates , however , i n vlhich 





Democratic Labour 730 
Real Democracy vfovement 301 
Independent Group 201 
Oamaru 
Labour 
Na t i onal 
Democrat ic ~abour 














Of course , had there been no Democratic Labour Candidates 
in these seats, Labour lvould probably still have held them by 
small majorities . The eal Democracy Hovement's votes in city 
seats were pr obably taken most l y fr om Labour, al though it is 
hard to be def i nit e about thi s. 
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The Independent Gr oup failed because its candidates 
were neither completely independent nor the members of a 
properly organised group. Taking either alternative they 
might have done be tter. Genuinely "non party" Independents 
did in some cases poll high votes in 1943 but the Independent 
ai).d 
Group drew so much attention to their "common policy/outlook" 
that the public could not be blamed for dismissing them as 
11 just another party 11 • Yet the Group had forsworn the advan-
tages of a centralised party organisation and therefore could 
not very well adopt one . The Group ' s attacks on "party poli-
tics" and its insistence that this was the only barrier to 
social unity seemed, during the Second World War, uncomfort-
ab l y reminiscent of the language of Fascism in the nineteen-
twenties and thirties , and its contemptuous attitude to Parl-
iament and liking for corporate political institutiorts rein-
forced this impression. Finally , stripped of its anti-party 
elements , the Gr oup ' s poli cy \vas too obvi ously a conservative 
reaction from National Party "socialism" to have a very wide 
appeal. 
iii. Social Credit olitical Action: The eal 
Democracy Hovement 
The Real Democracy ovement holds the distinction of be i ng 
the first national political movement organised to promote Soc-
ial Credit principles in New Zealand. lthough the R.D • • it-
self was not organised until February 1942, there had been stir-
rings of activity in the New Zealand social Credit Movement for 
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some years before . As explained in Chapter 2, this was bas-
ically due to the rapid disillusionment of Soc i a l Credit supp-
orters \vith the Labour Government. ~any of them had actively 
supported the Labour Party during the 1935 elect ion campaign, 
and a number of Labour candidates were members of the Social 
Credit •Iovement . However , the movement and the party began 
to drift apart very quickly. A report of a meet i ng in 1936 
between a delegation of Social Crediters and H. T. rmstrong , 
the Hinister of Labour , shovred hmv little fundamental agree-
ment there was between the two . 
Their spokesman, ~ . F . Whiley , said that they felt 
uneasy at present , part icularly regarding the taxa -
tion policy of the Government . Dur i ng the election 
campaign the use of the slogans "The country's credit" 
and ",1onetary reform'' had caused some people to think 
that the Labour Party would reform the monetary syst -
em of the country, but an orthodox system was still 
be ing used , he said. s a result, people who had 
supported the Labour Party had the feeling that they 
had been "left in the a ir ". "It would he lp us 
greatly if you would tell us what is the ultimate 
aim of the Labour Government , " lv~ . Whiley concluded . 
The 1inister , after hear ing the other speakers, said 
"The object of the Labour Party is Socialism. Is 
it yours?" 
The d~putation in chorus said , "No . 11 ( 1 ) 
Later in the meeting members of the deputation tried to 
induce the Mi nister to make a favourable declarat i on on the 
subject of debt-free credit , but rmstrong urged the deputat i on 
"not to make a fetish of that idea . " The deputation ' s attitude 
gave an i mportant indication of the future complexion of the 
Social Credit Movement. It was essentially conservative; 
(1) Dominion , 22 September 1936 . 
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opposed to high taxation, indifferent to Labour's social 
legislation and highly individualistic. This, however , is 
not a fair judgement if applied to all those who were disapp -
ointed with Labour's failure to reform the financial system. 
~any Labour supporters who would have denied any Soci al Credit 
leanings still believed that the State should "control the 
nat ion 's credit " and make greater use of the Reserve Bank. 
1any of these later left to join the Democratic Labour Party. 
Lee himself made it clear in an interview with the author in 
1961 that he had never had much time for doctrinaire Social 
Crediters, and regarded their refusal to press for nationalis-
ation of the trading banks as an indication of their essential 
conservatism. 
The Social Credit Movement up until 1940 had no thoughts 
of politica l act ion , and considered its role as that of an 
educator of public opinion. Hence even in 1939 its confer-
ence contented itself with a resolution urging the Labour 
Party "to fulfil the promises of monetary reform made at the 
1935 election''· ( 1) The war, however , brought back some of the 
conditions which had produced the wave of Social Credit enthus-
iasm in the early thirties - namely high taxation and increased 
State borrowing. In pril 1940 Social redit Movement's presi-
dent, R. O. C. arks, said that as an educatiobal organisation it 
oppose high taxation and advocate state credit control and the 
(1) Dominion, 14 pril 1939. 
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abolition of the "debt system". He also gave the first hint 
that the movement was about to enter the political field. 
"At the next election it ~>Till give its official 
support to Social Credit candidates who stand indep-
endenc of Party , but pledged to obey the \vill of 
their mm particular electors , whenever that will 
is clearly expressed. The Hovement intends in 
t his way to take action in many , if not all, cons-
tituencies.11l1) 
The movement was prepared to make a good shm..ring at the 
1941 elections, and showed signs of contesting them as a fully-
fledged party despite 1ar ks 1 earlier denials. In June a mani-
festo entitled "The New Order for New lea land" was issued. The 
"basic demands" set out were along classic Social Credit lines. 
All nevT issues of credit 11 to increase the employment of the 
Dominion 1 s resources 11 vTere to be made by the Reserve Bank free 
of debt, trading banks were to use t he increased liquidity thus 
gained only at Government direction, and prices \vere to be sub-
sidised by the issue of currency. Although the movement also 
called for full employment and industrial development, many of 
its proposals had a definitely anti-Labour ring. 
under the head ing "We demand that", were 
11Bureaucratic control be reduced to a minimum" 
Some of them, 
"Trade unionism to be allowed to develop \vithout 
compulsion" 
"Private enterprise be given the first opportunity 
to provide goods and services in the interests of 
the COilli11Uni ty- 11 
The Social Credit campaign did not get under way , hmvever , 
until the movement decided to engage John Hogan as its Dominion 
( 1) vening Post, 15 pril 1 94 0 . 
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rganiser. This i more than anythin else to force Social 
Credit into the poli ical limelight . Hogan , although onl 
24, already had a reputation on both sides of the Tasman as a 
brilliant orator and propagan ist. Born in London, he came 
to ~ustralia with his parents at the age of ten. He began 
platform speaking at fifteen , and by the age of eighteen 
claimed to have addre ssed over one thousand Social Credit 
mee tings in the Eastern states. After his marriage in 1938 
he and his wi e continue touring Australi a in a caravan named 
t he "Spirit of regress", broadcast i ng , writing pamphlets and 
articles and organsing the election campaigns of several Ind-
ependent can i ates. In 1940 he himself stood as a can idate 
for the River i na (I ew South ales) seat , '!,vhere his advocacy of 
State assistance o· wheat rowers won ,iw over 7000 votes. His 
second preference votes e1sured a Labour victory over the sitting 
member, t he Han . H. C. Nock.( 1) 
apart fr om the news of these achievement s , Hogan's arrival 
and his openi ng meeting i n the Auckland Tovm Hall on 12 August 
were preceded by weeks o cine a and nevrs paper advertising. 
The meeting attracted an audience of 3000 and Hogan set off on 
a tour of Soc i a l Credit rviovement branches throughout New leal-
and. (2 ) Hogan obviously galvanised t he dovement. a smail 
f ortnightly newspaper, 11 New Zealand Social Credit News" began 
publicat ion on 4 September 1941, and Hogan t s whirlwind tour of 
the branches set a pace which, as Dorothy Graham , the l~ational 
( 1) Hutt News t 25 August 1 943 and Sydney 1orning Herald, 3 
October 1~40 . 
(2) l~ . l . Social Credit rews, 4 September 1941. 
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Secretary , remarked "many will not find it easy to mainta in. " (1) 
t the end of the year Hogan claimed that since June £4,000 had 
been rais ed and spent and that five full -t ime organisers were 
operating in the cities. The last claim seems very dubious, 
and lvould have been envied even by the National Party. There 
was , however , a def i nite record of a \!el lington committee app-
oint in§, a full-time organiser for the period before the 1941 
elections were due.< 2) 
Granted that the movement was extraordinarily active in 
1940, it was by no means obvious lvhat Hogan meant vrhen he said, 
Iany Social Crediters vlould (had the election been 
he ld) have welcomed the opportunity to take action 
against the Government uhich has let them dmrn so 
badly , and hoped t hat -vri th our renevied strength and 
nation-1vide activity vie would be able to make our 
presence felt at an election this year more effect-
ively than since 1ve sold o~ birthright for a mess 
of Labour pottage in 1935. \ 3 ) 
The movement made no moves to nominate its own candidates, 
and Hogan usually spoke vaguely of "holding the power of public 
opinion in reserve", saying that he did not plan to use the 
~n ove,nent ' s political polJer in an all-out election bi d, but 
rather to bring pressure to bear on the existing parties. <4 ) 
How this 1vas to be done \vas not made very clear, but the most 
likely course would have been to give the movement ' s backing 
to suitable Independents who appeared . However , even in 
ugust 1941 Social Credit did not appear as an i mmediate·polit-
(1) Ibid . 
(2) I bid . 
(3) Ibid., 30 October 1941. 
(4) J . H. Hogan, 11There shall be no slump" (1941). 
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ical threat , for Hogan in that month addressed a meet ing of 
National Party candidates and electorate executive officers 
at Auckland . (1) 
However, Hogan \vas an ambitious man , and he started a 
wave of activity which he and the movement had no intention 
of allowi ng to die. Thus early in 1942, when other political 
part ies were lapsing into inactivity as a result of the elec-
tion postponement , t he movement set up a semi-independent 
political wing , the Real Democracy Novement. This was done 
at the Annual Conference of the Social Credit Hovement, held 
at Paraparaumu Beach between 23 and 26 January 1942. Hogan 
admitted that the war had hampered the movement 1 s activities. 
It is a far cry back to the first gatheri ng of 
Social Crediters at Pakenae, Hokianga , in 1932; 
we had not the exultant i ns pirat ion of pioneer-
ing, not t he uplifting thrill of several hund-
red delegates as qt Ashurst in 1934, or in 
Taur anga in 1935.~2) 
The most i mportant outcome of the Conference was the res-
olution on "Political Act i on". It was decided 
that as the bes t way to provide the ma chinery to 
make the growing demand for Socia l Credit results 
politically effective, a separate po litical organ-
isat ion be set up apart from the Social Credit 
l•.iovement, provided t hat all candidates and Hembers 
of ar liament be held res ponsible to their own 
electors. 
It was made clear that nembers could organise such a 
party '1with the .L<Iovement 1 s bless ing", and the first step to 
form the ... eal Democracy Hovement were taken at the Paraparaumu 
(1) N. w. Social Credit Nelvs , 4 September 1941. 
(2) Ibid ., 13 February 1942. 
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Conference . (1) The R.D . :I . 1 s stated object shmvs that Social 
Crediters were as much concerned about the evils of par ty 
polit ic s as they 'ivere about finance. 
The eal Democracy Novement is convinced that the 
continued frustration of Democracy is due to a 
faulty economic systew. To overcome this frust-
ration the Hovement \vill develop a political means 
of providi ng economic t~yurity and freedom to the 
people of New ~ealand . 
This linking of party politics and orthodox finance 1vas 
a persistent theme of the Social Crediters. l'/Ios t R.D . 1. 
candidates in 1943 emphasised that the first could not be 
changed until the second had been dealt with. 
H. J . Angus (T auranga) said that 
For instance 
arty government was just what its name i mplied -
government for one section in order that it might 
enjoy the spoils. .lhichever party was in, the 
other half of the country lvas dissatisfied and 
until the system was broken up in favour of one 
that took in the interests of all , 'ive could get 
novrhere. That posit ion could only be attained 
by taking back the control of credit and using ) 
it in the interests of the people as a whole.{3 
The R.D . M. 1 s constitution throws an interesting light on 
the Social Credit approach to party politics, for along with 
explicit statements that candidates were to support Social 
Credit measures if elected ·there vlas also a requirement that 
candidates should sign a pledge to resign if asked to do so by 
a major ity of their electors. 
( 1) Ibid . 
(2) Real Democracy Movement . Constitution, Section 1 (b). 
(3) Bay of Plenty Times , 6 July 1943. 
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The constitution first laid down t1.vo classes of members; 
11Democratic 11 members and a smaller group of "Te chnical" mem-
bers, the latter an elite of those thoroughly versed in Social 
Credit. The relevant section shows that the R.D . lvJ: . was seek-
ing to extend its membership beyond the hard core in the Social 
Credit 1-lovement. 
hembership in the "Real Democracy Hovement" shall be 
open to two separate classes of members: Democrat i c 
members at a fee of 2 . 6d. Technical members at an 
annual fee of £1 . 
Democratic membership shall be open to all electors 
who agree with the object of the Real Democracy Move-
ment , and are willing to give support politically 
and , if possible , financially or otherwise. 
Technical membership shall be open to all electors 
who agree with and will support the object of the 
Real Democracy Hovement and who have the addition-
a l qualifications of a good working knmvledge of 
the Social Credit principles.C1) 
Technical members had to submit to a written test set up 
by a National Examiner, and an oral examination by the govern-
ing body of the electorate. The constitution made it quite 
clear that the Technical members would form an elite group in 
control of the movement at all levels. Only they could rep-
resent branches at mee tings of the Governing Body (the control-
ling body of each electorate) and only technical members could 
be elected to the Electorate Execut i ve. The Governing Body 
was made up of one representative from each branch in the elec-
torate, and each Governing Body elected a representative to a 
National Council. 
(1 ) Real Democracy ovement. Constitution, Section 3 (b). 
Body . 
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Effective power in the movement lay wit h the Governing 
Branches in each electorate were obliged to send a 
percentage of fees and donat ions collected to the Governing 
Body, which had power to declare what the per centage would be . 
On the other hand , all the Constitution had to say about "Nat -
ional Fi nance" was that " t he financing of the Nat iona l >fovement 
shall be dec i ded f rom time to time by t he Nationa l Council. " 
The Governi ng Body had power to endorse candidates, expel mem-
bers and a ppoint pai d organisers. (1) Nothing was said about 
the powers of the Nat ional Gounc il and Nationa l Executive , and 
national organisation was practically non- existent in 1943. 
In fact , one candidate made a virtue of this, writ i ng that bran-
ches were "autonomous bodi es within each elect orate , but worki ng 
in co-ordination with each other" and add i ng that "there is no 
centra lised control".C2) There was no mention of any local 
organisers in 1943 , although R. G. Young , a farmer in the Wa i kato 
and candidate for Hauraki , did organising vJork throughout Nevi 
~ealand for eight months after November 1942. (3 ) There was no 
suggest ion , however , that Young had been paid for this. 
It cannot be said that the R. D •• was very successful 
eit her i n publicising its ideas or in attracting votes. Its 
f oundat ion attracted little notice in the newspapers . "S tand-
ard" , however, greeted the new polit ica l group with such hostil-
ity that it was clear that Labour now defi nitely regarded Social 
(1) Ibid., Sect ions 7-13 . 
(2) Democra cy , 11 August 1943. 
(3) Thames Star , 14 July 1943. 
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Crediters as political enemies. In an article headed "Social 
Crediters Bai-ting the Trap", the paper warned that the creation 
of a new political organisation shovred that the Social Credit 
!ovement was trying to "hoodwink" the electors. It also admit-
ted that the .D. 'l • could pose a threat to Labour. 
The history of the Social Credit ovement has shown 
that it thrives best during a depression , or when 
it necessary , as in wart· e , to impose high taxes. 
"Standard", hmvever , ma i ntained that Social Credit was 
"bitterly ant i-Labour" and was a conservative movement . That 
it was "remarkably silent concerning social evils" was quite 
true, but the article went on to defend Labour 's financial pol-
icies and ended vrith the words "The Government has complete and 
absolute control of the financial machine in this country. 11 ( 1) 
Publicity of a most unwelcome kind soon came. Hogan 1 s 
restlessness with the slow progress made by the Social Credit 
ovement had been obvious . Early in 1942 he set out to revit-
alise "New L.ealand Social Credit News" and reach a wider public . 
With the issue of 10 April the .name was changed to "Democracy" 
and a new format adopted. The same issue contained the article 
which shortly afterward caused the suspension of the journal. 
Entitled 11Bomber Bonds Swi ndle - Gigantic Hoax on New Zealand 
Public", it attacked the recently-closed Liberty Loan in scath-
ing terms as a needless sacrifice for the sake of orthodox f i n-
ance . The passage that caused the suspension read 
(1) Standard , 12 February 1942. 
198 
Has the Axis a fifth column in New Zealand? If 
so , it was flat-out "~:Triting Bonds for Bombers 
advertisements and newspaper editorials, encour-
ag i ng people to believe that all this appalling 
waste of time and energy , all this antediluvian 
humbug was helping the war effort. 
Actually it was, and is hindering the war effort, 
hindering industry, wasiing resources, weakening 
the morale of the people. A first -class fifth-
column job. 
Hogan obviously thought that this attack would dramatise 
Social Credit 1 s case, and a desire for personal martyrdom can 
perhaps be seen in his editorial . 
Somet i mes a small army , uncertain of its strength, 
uncertain of the correct strategy to defeat its 
powerful opponent, will waver and di scuss •••• 
until a man leaps to the crest of the rise and 
shouts "To hell 1vith argument - I 1m at 1 em 11 and 
charges singlehanded at a foe . With such an ins-
piration the whole of his men will u~it)e in one 
historic thrust that spells success.~1 
vJhatever else it may have done, such talk spelt certain 
doom for 11Democracy 11 • After one further issue it was suppre-
ssed by the Hinister of Justice under the Emergency Regulations. 
This was a serious blow f or the Social Credit Movement and the 
R. D. H. It had lost its newspaper , which under Hogan 1 s lively 
editorship had been a success . ~oreover, the suppression was 
a slur on a movement that had hitherto been eminently respect-
able . The R. D. N. received a severe fright, and Hogan had no 
connection with it after 1942. \'lhen "Democracy 11 was allowed 
to resume publication in April 1943 it was clearly under Hogan 1 s 
persona l control and had no ties either with the R. D •• or the 
(1) Democracy, 10 April 1942. 
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Social Credit Movement . Hogan himself stood as an Independent 
in Hutt and was phenomenally successful . 
Social Credit lost a brilliant political propagandist 
in Hogan , and its programme in 1943 was unskilfully presented. 
The R. D. l • ' s election preparations were meagre and late in beg-
inning . The policy , issued in July , said that the Movement 
would "stress two ma i n principles" - monetary reform and the 
responsibility of M. P.' s to their -electors. The economic part 
of the policy differed little from that of 1941 . The R. D. M. 
proposed a Nat ional Credit Authority "free from political con-
trol , like the Supreme Court" to br i ng purchasing power up to 
a level equalling the supply of goods and 
to apply , step by step , the principle that all 
money required by the State and Local Bodies for 
the general development of the Dominion •••• 
should be issued debt-free and interest-free by 
the Reserve Bank .~ 1 J . 
The R. D. l• . a lso promised to abolish sales tax , and to 
reduce other taxation drastically , with the aim of eliminating 
it altogether. Free educat i on at all levels was promised , with 
a pension on the scale of the basic wage payable at the . ag e of 
50. .D . ,I . candidates concentrated their criticism on the high 
taxat ion which they sa id the Labour Government had imposed , and 
held that Social Security benefits were of little value since 
they could only be paid for out of this taxation. The R. D •• 
was certainly unique in its Socia l Credit tenets (for instance, 
(1) Press, 24 July 1943 . 
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it held to the idea of a "gap" between purchasing pmver and 
available goods) but in its practical criticism of Labour ' s 
policies it said nothing that either Nationa l or Democratic 
Labour had not been saying louder and longer. 
The most interesting aspec t of the R. D. lle was its atti-
tude to Parliamentary candidates. The movement criticised the 
party system on the grounds that it was controlled by financial 
interests . As F. \'Jhiley , candidate for Christ church East , said, 
The present political "Party" system is in dis-
repute , it has failed and buried you and your 
children in devastating Nationa l Debt and tax 
slavery •••• Financia l control directing the 
party and economic syst~m~ are the caus es of 
Jars , Booms and Slumps .l1J 
The remedy for this had been stated in the R.D. M. ' s cons-
titution. 
Every candidate endorsed by the .D . l·'I . shall be 
required to sign a pledge to work and vote for 
the results desired by the Iajority of his or 
her electors ,( ~} expressed to the candidate fr om 
time to time. 
The wording of the pledge made it quite clear that cand-
idates would be e l ected to carry out Soci al Credit reforms . 
I believe that in a Democracy the people should 
be provided with results they desire , therefore 
I pledge myself to work and vote for results as 
the demand for them is expressed to me from time 
to t i me by my electors . 
Further I believe that the continued frustration 
of Democracy is due to a faulty economic system, 
and that to achieve the results desired by the 
people the following fundamental changes are 
necessary. 
(1) Press, 12 July 1943 . 
(2 ) real Democracy l\1ovement. Constitution, Sect ion ?a . 
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1. Reform the financial system to make what is 
phys ically poss i bl e and des irabl e within New 
Zealand f i nancial l y poss i ble . 
2 . The equation of purchasing power with the 
retail selling pr i ce of consumabl e goods and 
services . 
3 . All money required for rehabilitation by the 
Government and local bodies for the genera l dev-
elopment of the Dominion in accordance lvith our 
physical resources will be issued debt and int-
erest free by the eserve Bank of Nevr Zealand 
only . 
4 . To forestall any pos sible act ion by tradi ng 
banks to thwart the wi ll of the people, power 
should be taken to vary t he legal reserves of 
the Tradi ng Banks with the eserve Bank. 
5 . That the right of recall be introduced forth-
vr i th • 
••.• I pledge myself to work and vote for the 
economi c reforms set out above. (1) 
There was some confusion about ,,rhat sort of instructions 
M •• 1 s should accept from constituents . The wordi ng of the 
constitutional clause quoted above would make it a ppear that a 
member was obliged to obey instructions even if they were cont-
rary to Soc i al Credit principles . Another clause stated that 
a member was to work and vote for these pr inciples "unless oth-
er1.v is e instructed". However , the candidate ' s pledge bound him 
to 11work and vote '' for the Socia l Credit e conomic reforms. 
resumab l y the · . D. f. . expected that since electors knew that 
they -vrere voting for Social Credit pr i nci ples , it -vras unlikely 
that they -vrould later instruct their member to vote aga i nst 
them. ·{ .. c . 1-.i:arl-;:s , the . D. ll . candidate for \/anganui, prom-
ised to res i gn if called upon by a majority of his e lectors, 
but only if it was because he had broken his elect i on pr omises~ 2 ) 
(1) N. l . Hera ld, 10 September 1943. 
(2 ) ominio , 8 September 1943 . 
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~ndorsement by the R. D. M. was no empty formality. Can-
didates had to sign the pledge quoted above , and a lso pas s a 
\lri tten test on the 11 Ne\v Economics 11 • ( 1) Once t his had been 
done the only confirmation required was that of the e lectora te 
governi ng body. Ei ghteen candidates were endorsed after go-
i ng through t his proces s . (2 ) However , t here was in the end 
s ome doubt about the affiliation of a few candidates. C. P. 
Belton ( os kill) and J . . Govan (Grey Lynn) were a lso endorsed 
by an embryo body called the New ~ealand Fight i ng Forces Leag~e 
(Political) and appeared in some newspapers' lists of candidates 
as simply "F. ~ . L . " The "Herald 11 ( 3) compromised with " .D . H.-
F . ; . L. 11 , but the . D . Ivi . ' s advertisement quoted above makes it 
clear t hat they had signed the pledge and passed t he written 
examination. Belton was spons ored on ly after the original 
. D. Ivi . candidate , A. J . Danks , withdrew because of illness , but 
he campaigned on the .D . M. platform and addressed meetings 
jointly with l'irs . Gertrude .Drooks (Eden).(4 ) Both Be lton and 
Govan are therefore counted as R.D . M. candidates i n this study. 
A list of candidates in a supp l ement to "Democracy 11 ( 5) i n cluded 
six more Independents among the R.D . M. group, but ncr.e of t hem 
was included i n the official list. In fa ct two, R. Day (Thames) 
and J . H. Penniket ( a i kato) wer e off icia l Independent Group can-
didates. 
( 1) N. L. . Herald, 10 September 
(2 ) I bid . , 22 September 1943: 
(3) Ibid ., 10 September 1943 . 
(4) Ibid ., 16 September 1943 . 
(5) 22 September 1943. 
1 943: advt. 
advt . 
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. D . ~ . cand idates showed no significant connection with 
established part ies. F . Allen (Roskill) had stood as an 
Independent in Auckland Suburbs in 1938 and F . C. Jordan ( uck-
land East) as a self-styled "liberal" in Parnell in 1935. 
Allen had polled 238 votes and Jordan 507 in these attempts. 
J.A. Govan (Grey Lynn) was the only candidate whose political 
background was at all interesting. His previous contests were 
1935 Democrat (Auckland West) 792 votes 
1938 National (Grey Lynn) 2977 votes 
-Govan 's vote in 1943 was only 11 0, or 0.65 per cent of the 
total. Four of the eighteen candidates were later candidates 
of the New Zealand Socia l Credit Politica l League. These were 
F. C. Jordan (Auckland East) , R. 0 . C. Ivlarks (Wanganui) , T. E. Som-
erville (Onehunga) and R.G . Young (Hauraki). Somerville stood 
in 1954, Jordan i n 1954 and 1957, and the other two in 1954, 
1957 and 1960. 
The R.D. M. attracted the least attent ion of any of the new 
political groups , and its candidates polled very low votes . The 
one exce ption was Harks, whose 1722 votes in Wanganui was far 
ahead of the other candidates , none of whom managed to poll more 
than 500 votes. The total f or New Zealand was 6196 - an aver-
age of only 359 per electorate. 
Theoretically , the R. D. H. should have had a chance of poll-
ing an impressive vote. Soci a l Credit voters had supported 
Labour i n 1935 and 1938, and it was generally assumed that there 
would be a large number of them. 
/ 
It was clear that many would 
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not vote for Labour again, and the R.D . M. was an attempt to 
organise support for genuine Social Credit candidates before 
these voters were lost to the Nat ional Party. The R. D. M. was 
not only critical of high taxation, but promised to reduce it 
by making radical changes in the economic system. Candidates 
were vague as to what these changes were to be , but at least 
its criticisms wer e based on a positive economic theory , how-
ever fallacious . In addition, its criticisms of the financial 
system were integrated with an attack on party politics , for 
Social Credit theory stressed the manipulation of the parties 
by financial interests. The .D. l • was the only party to link 
finance and the party system in t his way . 
Against these positive points the .D. M. was faced with 
serious and ultimately fatal disadvantages. It received no 
publicity in the daily press until the election campaign began 
and its election policy was pr inted in only one city daily, the 
Christchurch Press. (1) The policy itself was not well presented 
by the movement ' s candidates. No national propaganda was issued 
and candidates' material varied greatly in scope and content. 
The intellectual level of many candidates does not seem to have 
been very high , and generally they presented their policy far 
less articulately and effectively than Democratic Labour or Ind-
ependent Group speakers. In anganui , the only electorate where 
the R.D. II . polled over 500 votes, R.o.c. Marks was both a good 
campaigner and a Social Crediter able to present his policy as a 
lively contribution to solving current problems. 
(1) 24 July 1943. 
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The R. n • • • also worked under the psychological disadvan-
tage of having too few candidates (18) to claim to be a nat i on-
al group. This was the reason for the Government ' s refusal to 
allow the group a radio broadcast during the campaign, although 
one candidate claimed that Fraser had promised it one some mon-
ths before. ( 1 ) Like the Independent Group, the R.D . M. never 
really resolved the contradiction between its clai ms to be a 
group with a common policy , and its insistence that its candid-
ates were completely independent and responsible only to their 
electors. This contradiction was obvious in the R. D. M. , which 
pledged its candidates both to ''work and vote" for Social Credit 
measures and to accept instructions from a majority of their 
electors . 
The main reas on for the R. D. M. ' s lack of success was that 
it simply did not gather even a majority of the Social Cr edit 
vote. Most of this went instead to Democratic Labour. There 
is no need to re-emphasise here the Social Credit elements in 
D. L. P. policy , particular l y Lee ' s emphasis on debt-free finance 
and extended State control of the monetary system. In fact , 
Lee ' s approach was more radical than the R. D. M. 's in that it 
involved nationalisation of at least one trading bank. Some 
Democratic Labour candidates called for the nationalisat i on of 
the whole banking system. This , and the rest of the Democratic 
Labour programme , appealed to those Social Crediters who had 
left the Labour Party far more than did the R. D •• Many of 
( 1) Bay of Plenty Times, 8 September 1943. 
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Lee 's staunchest supporters and candidates were also members 
of the Social Credit Hovement. 
The R.D . H. on the other hand , was clearly anti -Labour i n 
philosophy . Underlying the superficially radical phrases of 
propagandists such as Hogan was the traditional Social Credit 
opposition to 11Bureaucracy11 and 11 centralisation11 • As Hogan 
himse lf wrote 
(Socia l Credit) means economic Individualism. It 
starts with the i ndividual and views with less fav-
our each larger unit, every tendency to(increasing 
centralisation of decision and control. 1J 
This attitude seemed to colour R. D. 11. thinking. Labour's 
social welfare legislation was accepted, but increas i ng State 
power and "trade union domina tion 11 were constantly criticised. 
Put simply , the R.D . l' . attracted the right-wing minority of 
Social Crediters and Democratic Labour the left-wing major ity. 
It is hard to say how many voters National attracted by its 
proposal f or an independent National Credit Authority, but since 
this was identical with the R.D . M. 1 s pol icy, it too could have 
taken votes from it. 
Since most .D. M. candidates polled less than three per 
cent of the v ote, it is almost impossible to tell from which of 
the main parties these votes \vere taken. However, the result 
in Wanganui , where -arks polled 12.8 per cent of the vote gives 
an important clue. The f igures were 












% of total 
49 . 57 
31 . 51 
12.76 
6 .1 6 
% gain or loss 
since 1938 
- 15.12 
3 . 80 
Here both mai n parties ' share of the total decreased from 
1938, a most unusual result , for National usually registered 
at least a small gain . Mar ks obviously drew votes fr om both 
National and Labour. This pattern was probably repeated in 
other electorates , although in every case the R. D. M. 's vote 
was too small , and the result too complicated by other small-
party candidates , for any def i nite conclusion to be drawn. 
CHAPI'ER 5 
INDEPENDENT CA~ID IDATES 
Of the 269 candidates (1)appearing on the ballot papers 
at the election , only 30 were not attached to any of the 
parties or groups contesting it . However , t his small group 
included some of the most i mportant candidates outside the 
two mai n parties , as the following list of the ten most succ -
essful candidates among the three nevT parties and the Indepen-
dents shows. 
H. Atmore (Nelson) 
. E. ansford ( almerston Nth . ) 
J •• Lee (Grey Lynn) 
E. W. Nicolaus (Buller) 
J . H. Hogan (Hutt) 
W. E. Barnard (Napier) 
P. rv! . Stewart (Ka i para) 
Independent 605 1 (50 . 80%) 







3951 (23 . 29%) 
2137 (22 . 99%) 
3563 (22 . 49%) 
2784 (22 . 05%) 
1611 (1 8 . 33%) 
C. G. Scrimgeour ( ~·Jellington Central) Independent 2253 (15 . 23%) 
. o.c. l1arks (\vanganui) 
D •. Creswell (Timaru) 
R.D . N. 
Democratic 
Labour 
1722 (12 . 76%) 
1504 (11 . 97%) 
The appeal of the genuinely unattached candidate is obvious. 
Many people felt that party politics should not be carried on in 
wartime, and many of the Independents called for an end to them 
and bl amed both Nat ional and Labour for the failure to form a 
Nat ional Government and pursue an "all-in" war effort. It is 
impoBsible, however , to generalise about a group which included 
(1 ) These figures apply to European seats only . 
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candidates as different as dansford and Scrimgeour , except 
to say that the most outstanding of the Independents did much 
better t han the most successful candidates of the new part ies. 
n examinat ion of each of the Inde pendents who polled over 
1 , 000 votes may make the reasons for this clearer. This div-
iding line may seem arbitrary , but it in fact includes all the 
Independents who had an important effect on the vote in their 
electorates. 
H. AT 10RE (Nelson) 
The only Independent to win a seat, Atmore had been a con-
sistent supporter of the Labour Party since 1935, except for a 
brief flirtation with Lee in 1940. Although he refused to be-
come associated with Democratic Labour, his financial ideas 
would have put him in the left wing of the Labour Party. Atmore 
was the last survivor of a race of Independents who had held 
their seats solely by their strenuous advocacy of local interests · 
the equivalent of the French "notable". This is well illustra-
ted by Atmore 1 s 11policy statement 11 published in Forces 1 newspapers 
overseas . 
Vote for Harry tmore, the Independent Member for 
Ne lson , who has faithfully served you over twenty 
years and now offers his services for a further 
term. His first loyalty has a lways been to you, 
not to any party . His long experience on local 
bodies , such as City Council, Hospital Board and 
Licensing Committee, in Educat ional circles on 
School Committee Education Board , College Council, 
and as Minister for Education , should be valuable 
to you. He is chairman of t he Nelson Rehabili-
tation Committee. Soldiers today will be returned 
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men tomorrow see l1·~g equitable rehabilitation. Vote for tmore. ) 
Atmore held the seat by only 190 votes and vTas actually 
100 votes behind before the Forces ' votes arrived , so his 
final word to servicemen paid him handsomely . 
W. E. , RNARD (Na pier) 
Barnard announced t hat he would contest Napier as an 
Independent as early as pril 1943, just after arliament had 
dec ided to hold the election. 
Barnard ' s initial reason for leaving the Democratic Labour 
Party was his opposition to a war time election, but it was 
clear t hat he had also come to oppose party politics on 'l.vider 
grounds. In an election pamphlet he wrote -
NevT Zealand requires . . . . 
N 
The clash of opposing interests , of conflicting 
political part ies , each playing the game for its 
ovm side , with the welfare of the country a secon-
dary considerat ion, 
BUT 
the bi ndi ng of all people together into a whole 
wor king unitedly for a common purpose - the greater 
prosperity of New Zealand and the increasing welfare 
and happiness of ALL its citizens. Then political 
ma chines , as we have them, may be scrapped , to be 
replaced by free ass ociations of men and wom~n)ins ­
pired by the common ideal of mutual service. ~ 2 
There was more than a trace of the statesman in Barnard 
and his valt dictory address to t he House at the end of the 1943 
session was a dignified and moving reminder that party politics 
were unimportant at a time when the country was fighting for 
(1) N . ~ . News Supp lement, 14 September 1943. 
(2) W. E. Barnard, Election pamphlet, 1943. 
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its ideals. (1 ) He put the same opinion more directly at 
~apier during the campaign. 
"The soldiers are not really interested in a general 
election, and they are right. Victory and peace 
are the real issues for us , as for the world, and we 
ought to maintain at home the same unity and drive in 
our war efforts that New Zealand servicemen are dis-
playing so splendidly overseas.n(2) 
Barnard ' s main emphasis , then, was on "putting the war 
first" and, as an Independent , on his own political record and 
his services to Napier. However , he had , as he said , not 
"altered his political principles" , and he severely criticised 
the size of the National Debt and the failure to use more Res-
erve Bank credit. He followed Lee in saying that the country's 
manpower was greatly over-committed , pointing out that they had 
realised this a good two years before the National Party took up 
the issue. He also called for a coalition government and an 
end to "party squabbling". (3 ) Barnard was the Secretary of the 
Campaign for Christian Order , and his speeches usually drew att-
ent i on to the Campaign ' s solutions to social problems . 
Barnard lost his seat , running third after the Labour and 
National candidates , but he polled 2784 votes - 22 per cent of 
the total. Hi s non-party stand attracted some National voters, 
as the final results shovr -
(1) NZPD. 7 Vol . 263, pp.1119-20 . (2) Domin1on, 7 September 1943 . 
(3) I bid . 
212 
Candidate 
A. E. Armstr ong (Labour ) 
•I. S . Spence (Nat ional) 






44 . 02 
33.93 
22 . 05 
% gain or loss 
since 1938. C:D 
- 22 . 04 
0 . 01 
Thus Na tional , which might have been expected to follow 
the almost universal trend and make a slight gai n , stood exactly 
vlhere it had in 1938. Certai nly Barnard 1 s votes vrere mostly 
taken from Labour , but some came from those that would have gone 
to Nat ional, had he not been standing . 
Barnard retired from politics after his defeat and returned 
to his law practice. He died in 1'958. 
J . II . HOGAN ( Hutt) 
Hogan returned to the political scene when "Democracy" was 
allowed to resume publication in April 1943. This time he was 
not tied to any polit ical gr oup, and the periodical was under 
his complete control. Hogan made it clear, hovrever , that it 
vT ould provide publicity for organisations unable to get it else-
where, and during the campaign the Real Democracy Movement and 
a number of Independents used it as their newspaper . Hogan 
himself refused to join any of the new groups, but his policy 
was very similar to that of the R.D . 1 . His presentation of it, 
however , was far better than t ha t of the iovement ' s candidates. 
In his campaigning Hogan attacked the "debt system" and 
high taxation with slashing effectiveness . He took his stand 
with the right-wing Social Crediters , however , by saying that 
(1) Figures in this column refer to the votes of parties, not 
candidates. 
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he did not favour nationalisation of the banks and referred 
to this as a 11red herring" - an obvious difference with his 
one-time friend, J. A. Lee . 
It is doubtful, hmvever , if Hogan 1 s policy alone could 
have accounted for his high vote. He made far more impress-
ion by his emphasis on the necessity for an I' . P . to be the 
servant of his electors and responsive to their wishes . Urg-
ing an audience to vote for an a ble candidate rather than an 
attractive policy, he said, 
"You cannot make effective decisions on details of 
policy on election day, but you can decide who is 
going to be youg representative in the next Parlia-
ment and whether or not he is going to be qualified, 
willing , and free to represent you pr operly. The 
electors have been cheated again and again by be ing 
asked to vote 9n long programmes , or else just on 
party labels. 11 \1) 
Hogan constantly reminded his audiences of Nash 1 s long 
absences from New Zealand and the consequent 11disfranchisement" 
of Lower Hutt. His promises t hat he would represent Hutt 1 s 
interests better were given spectacular practical effect just 
before the campaign. Hogan pushed himself forward as a medi -
ator in a dispute between the Valley 1s bus drivers and the 
Lmver Hutt City Council and helped to arrange a settlement at 
the official arbitration conference , which Nash did not even 
bother to attend. (2 ) Hogan used this achievement in his camp-
a i gn s logan , "Ask the Bus Drivers". In other ways, too, his 
(1) Dominion, 8 September 1943 . 
(2) N. Z. Observer, 29 September 1943. 
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campaign was brilliant. He collected £215 from all over 
Ne\v Zealand by an appeal for funds in "Democracy", ( 1) and 
could easily have spent this amount on newspaper advertising 
alone . He used slogans in a shrewd attempt to narrovr the 
contest dovm to one between Nash and himself, beg inning with 
"Hogan is the Only One Who Can Beat Nash" and changing two 
weeks before the election to "Hogan is Beat ing Nash!" Hogan 
probably used more newspaper advertis ing than any other cand-
idate in the Wellington district. part from this, however , 
his meetings -v:ere well reported , for he was an excellent 
speaker who attracted large audiences . His only mistake was 
the use of his photograph in his advertisements, for he was 
anything but handsome and his youthful, bespectacled face was 
certainly not a campaign asset. 
Hogan's "inspired" campaign, as the "New Zealand Observer~2 ) 
called it, pushed N. P. Croft, the National candidate, completely 
into the backgr ound. He was a poor speaker and his campaign 
received little newspaper coverage. He made so little impres-
sion, in fact , that dur ing the v:eek before the election there 
\vere persistent rumours that he had withdrawn . These had be -
come so strong by the end of the week that Croft's committee 
received permiss ion on election day to broadcast a denial over 
a We llington radio station.<3) This was widely criticised as 
(1) Democracy, 6 October 1943. 
(2) 29 September 1943 . 
(3) Dominion, 27 September 1943. 
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contravening the spirit if not the letter of the law, and 
Hogan complained bitterly about it. (1) 
The result in Hutt showed a decline in the votes of both 
parties , and the complete eclipse of Democratic Labour -
Candidate Vote % of Total ~ gain or loss since 1938. 
w. Nash (Labour) 8823 55 .70 - 17.70 
J . H. Hogan (Independent) 3563 22 . 49 G'u88 
N. • Croft (National) 3017 19.05 1·>5 
. Connors (Democratic 437 2 .76 
Labour) 
The decline in National ' s vote was the largest in New 
Zealand, and shows cle~rly that a Social Credit candidate 
could take votes from both parties . Hogan ' s appeal , however, 
went beyond his Social Credit ideas. Starting out as a com-
plete stranger he built himself up as a familiar personality 
in a matter of weeks , and he more than any other Independent 
owed his votes to this factor. 
A. E. MANSFORD (Palmerston North) 
Mansford was virtually the National candidate in Palmer-
stan North, but his case was interesting because it showed that 
it was still poss i ble for a strong candidate to stand as an Ind-
ependent and force a party to stand idly by without nominat ing 
a candidate of its own. 
Mansford had been mayor of Palmerst on North since 1931 and 
had first stood for Parliament a t the 1935 election. He had 
(1) Democracy, 6 October 1943. 
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come second in a close three-cornered contest in which Labour 
had won the seat with only 34 . 46 per cent of the vote. This 
made him a force too strong to be disregarded , and in 1938 a 
deputation from the local Nat ional Party persuaded him to 
withdraw his candidature as an Independent and enter a Nat ion-
al selection ballot . He did this "reluctantly" , and lost to 
J . A. Nash , the Coalition member who had lost the seat in 1 935 . 
hansford said later -
"It taught me a lesson I am not likely to forget , 
and that was to be guided by my mvn judgement . " (1) 
Barely a month after t he election was decided on in 1943 
he announced that he 'l.vould stand as an Independent "pledged to 
concentrate all the country's resources on winning the vTar . "(2 ) 
This meant , as he later made clear , that he disapproved of party 
politics and thought that a wartime coalition should have been 
formed. In 1 943 l\1ansford was determined to remain an Inde pen-
dent , and this posed a problem for the National Party. Late 
in July a party meeting decided not to nominate a candidate , 
and it was decided to hold a postal ballot of party members on 
the question. hile the ballot was in progress an extraordin-
ary advertisement appeared in the 11 vianawa tu Times" (3 ) over the 
signatures of a number of prominent Palmerston North bus ines s 
and professional men , all members of the National arty . It 
read -
( 1) Nanavmtu Evening Standard, 18 September 1 943 . 
( 2) Dominion, 29 ·arch 1943. 
( 3) 4 August 1943. 
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Members of t he Nat iona l Party 
(Pa l rnerston Nort h Branch) 
{e , the undersigned , are of opi n i on that the national 
interests will be bes t served by a Nat ional Party can-
didate NOT bei ng selected for t he coming election. 
The ob j ect is to wi n the local seat from Labour . 
If we split the ant i-Labour vote, by putt ing up 
an Official Nat iona l Candidate , Labour will be 
returned. 
Therefor e , after carefully considering every 
aspe ct of the mat t er , we have de91ded to op pose 
a candidate be i ng selected • •• • l J 
The result of the ba llot was decidedly against selecting 
a candida te . (2 ) iansford began his campaign immediately the 
result 1.vas knovm . (3 ) lthough he said that 11 the party system 
has outlived it s use.fulness 11 and called for a coa lition govern-
ment, (4 )his policy followed that of t he National Party very 
closely . rle b l amed Labour for the failure to form a coali-
tion , criticised the servicemen ' s' Set tlement and Land Sales 
ct and the Government ' s rehabilita tion pol i cies . t his 
first meeting he promised, in reply to a question , to vote with 
the Nat i ona l Party on a no -confidence motion .(5 ) The day before 
the election Holland ca lled on Iationalist s t o sup port ansf~~~ . 
•ansfor d came ver y near to wi nni ng the seat , and had the 
Democrat i c Labour vote been a l i tt l e l arger he would probab l y 
have done s o. The result was 
(1 ) See a ls o Standar d , 12 August 1943: editorial. 
(2 ) Domi nion , 11 August 1943 . 
( 3) l'.iana\-ratu Evening Standard , 12 August 1 943 . 
( 4 ) I bid ., 18 September 1943 . (5 ) Ibid . 
( 6 ) I bid., 24 September 1943 . 
Candidate 




. E . iansford (Independent) 7134 
S . Hindmarsh (Democratic 613 
Labour ) 
~~ of otal 
48 . 67 
47 . 27 
4 . 06 
~~ gain or los s 
since 1938. 
8 . 86 
Commenting after the election , the "•Iana'\vatu Eveni ng Stan-
dard11 (1) said that "had it been possible for ( 1ansford) to have 
stood as the Nat i onal arty ' s nominee his election must have 
been assured . " Ironical ly enough , Mansford was right in his 
decision to stand as an Independent. When he ac ce pted the 
National nomination in 1946, a year vrhen the party increased 
its vote near ly ever~vhere, he polled 0 . 70 per cent less than 
in 1943 . 
E. H. 1HCOL11.US (Buller) 
Although Nicolaus \vas the only candidate oppos ing P. C. 
webb in Buller , he was not connected with the Nat ional Party 
or supported by it. 
E. ·J . Nicolaus was well-knmvn as an exponent of Henry 
George ' s Social ent policies . In fact , his v ie\-I that the 
State should immedi ately a cquire all land placed him in the 
"revolutionary" vring of the Georgists , the "evolut i onary" 
1Jajority preferr i ng the gradual acquisition offreeholds by 
the State. 
1~icolaus had had a colourful career. Born in London 
in 1887 and educated at Suffolk Agricultural College , he came 
(1) 27 September 1 943 . 
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to New Zea l and in 1901 as a cadet to a sheep breeder. He 
went to atag oni a as a buyer for a f reezing company in 1905, 
later becomi ng as sistant manager on a large sheep station . 
He farmed in ~es tern Australia aft er 1913, serving in the 
Australian cavalry in World :Jar I and returned to New Zealand 
a s an orc har dist in 1922. Later he became a company secretary 
in /e lling ton. He stood a s an Independent for !ellington 
Central in 1931 and as the cand i date of the Commonwealth Land 
arty for Welling ton Eas t in 1935 , polling 688 votes on the 
first occasion and 433 on the second. 
He decided only a few weeks befor e the 1943 election to 
c ontest the Buller seat , \vhere National had not nominated a 
candidate , and began his campaign during the second week in 
Se ptember. (1) Nicolaus s a i d t ha t t he main ob ject of his camp-
aign was to publicise his be lief in t he socia l ownership of 
l and . His criticism of the ecbnomic system was from the trad-
itional Georgist standpoint , and he particularly stressed the 
evils of inflation. Labour policies, he s a id , decreased the 
value of money and this was made even worse by pour i ng "fictit-
ious note issues" into the currency system. The worker was 
therefore entitled to a greater share of nationa l wealth , not 
merely to more money . Although he was critical of the Labour 
arty , his critique of the economic system had a broad sweeping 
thoroughness that must have been attractive to his radical list-
eners in the mining tovrnships . 
(1) Westport News, 16 September 1943. 
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Labour had forsa ken a ll its old planks and polic ies 
that the old stalwarts of the movement had advocated 
on the coast years ago. Old supporters still voted 
Labour in the belief that it would release them from 
exploitation, but t hey were comparing the Labour 
Government with the Labour Ivlovement , vThich. were ent-
irely different •.•• He considered the vwr king man 
had been let down by the Labour Government just as 
British Labour had been let down by Ramsay cDonald. 
Some day pe ople '\vould awaken to this and would have 
to start all over aga i n , with men who would fight 
for t he change in the economic system. Private 
ownership of the land must go , the land must be owned 
by the pe ople as a whole. The rent received from 
land would be spent in providing the social services 
and in building the roads and railways , and these 
necessary services were the only justification for 
rent •••• He didn 1 t I•Tant to pull the Labour ovement 
to pieces, but the Labour Party, for it had forgotten 
its pledges to the working ma~i) He wanted to work 
up the old spirit of Labour. 
~ctually Nicolaus' ideas vTere very different from "the 
old spirit of Labour", but t hey were t he most novel heard on 
the coast in years . He toured all the mining tmvnships, and 
received good hearings , his meeting a t •Iillerton being described 
as one of the best ever held there.<2) After the election, he 
wrote a letter to the electors t hanking them for the friendli-
ness he had received at meetings and in their homes. (3) In 
spite of his short and rather relaxed campaign , Nicolaus pciUBd 
2 , 137 votes . This vTas an improvement of 5. 31 per cent on the 
National vote in 1938. Opponents of Labour seem to have voted 
for Nicolaus regardless of his politics , for his votes usually 
came from the same polling booths, and in the same proportions 
a s those of Ivaddison , the National candidate, in 1938. The 
(1) Ibid., 20 September 1943. 
(2) Ibid ., 16 September 1943. (3) Ibid., 27 September 1943. 
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booths where his vote increased over Maddis on's were , however, 
in the mining towns hips , \<There Nicolaus had spent most of his 
campaign. 
C.G . SCRIMGEOUR (Wellington Central) 
Vlhen Scrimgeour announced on 7 July that he would cont-
est Fraser 's seat, ellington Central, as an Independent, he 
had already been involved in a spectacular feud with the Govern-
ment for months .< 1) He decided to contest the Prime Minister's 
seat, he said, 
"because I intend to demonstrate that the differences 
between the Government and myself are more deep-
seated than arguments about broadcasting policy •••• 
I am standing as an Independent because that is the 
only alternative to accepting the bureaucratic party 
machine wherein lead~r~ are concerned only with 
power and position. 11 \2J 
Scrimge,our campaigned on two main themes; the failure 
of Labour to carry on "where Savage left off" and the necessity 
to remove Fraser who , Scrimgeour said, was the main obstacle to 
radical policies. His policies were simply those of the Demo-
cratic Labour Party, and apart from his attitude to the party 
system he agreed with Lee on all points. What gave his campaign 
its special interest was his pers onal vendetta against Fraser 
who , he said, had tried to remove him from his post in the Broad-
casting Service ever since 1936. 
Fraser would not have had so much to worry about had any-
one but Scr i mgeour been opposing him. 
See Chapter II. 
Dominion, 7 July 1943. 
"Scrim" was already a 
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household word in thousands of homes where his radi o broad-
casts had been heard every Sunday, and the circumstances of 
his dismissal had been given wide publicity. His campaign 
equalled Hogan 's in br illiance. He relied mai nly on news-
paper advertisements, mos t of these be i ng cartoons and limer-
icks , and these were extremely effective if not a lways on a 
high leve l . Mos t of them were directed at Fraser. The imp-
ortation of Ministers to campaign in the Pr i me Minister's own 
seat shows how seri ously Scrimgeour was regarded. t his 
first meetings he completely filled the De Luxe Theatre, the 
largest in We llington, and later addressed an overflow meet-
ing in a smaller theatre. (1) Several of his meetings attracted 
audiences of over 1,000 .(2 ) At the first meetings the "Dominion" 
reported that audiences were "in a neutral vein" , and simply 
wanted to hear what the candidate had to say, but as the weeks 
went by and Scrimgeour ' s campaign continued to attract great 
attention, Fraser , a\vay touring New lea land , might well have 
felt concerned . He did not speak in Wellington Central until 
23 September, two days before the election , when he held a large 
meet ing , with several other Cabinet Iinist ers present , at the 
~'[e llington Town Ha l l. (3) 
The result of the contest showed that Fraser had been 
harder hit than any other Cabinet Minister. 
(1) Ibid., 5 August 1943. 
(2) Ibid ., 30 August 1943. 
(3) Ibid ., 24 September 1943. 
His vote declined 
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sharply and his majority dropped to a mere 1,214. Scrimgeour 
polled 2 , 253 votes. In many ways this was due as much to 
Fr aser himself as to Scrimgeour . As Prime Minister, he had 
accepted responsibility for Scrimgeour 1 s dismissal, and had 
made a poor job of explaining the reasons for it to the House. 
On a wider plane it was inevitable that he should have borne 
the brunt of discontent with Labour's mistakes and failings 
since 1940, and particularly with the burdens and restrictions 
of wart· e. Fraser was never the popular figure that Savage 
was , and he preferred to justify his policies as well as poss -
ible rat her than to try t o divert attention from the main issues. 
P. N. STEW T (Kaipara) 
As the chairman at one of Stewart's meetings remarked, "it 
was t he first time for many years that the Rt. Hon . J.G. Coates 
was not engaged in the conflict and it seemed strange. 11 ( 1) It 
is no exaggeration to say that Coates ' shadow still dominated 
his old electorate, for the Independent stand he had taken early 
in the year was the most important factor in the Kaipara elec-
tion. It explai ns not only the candidacy of Stewart , who had 
opposed Coates in 1938, but also the strange position in which 
both the National and Labour parties in Kaipara found themselves, 
for Coates' stand on national unity had won him wide support in 
both. Only a detailed examination of events in Kaipara after 
Coates ' death will make this clear. In no other electorate did 
(1) North Auckland Times, 27 August 1943. 
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the question of national unity alter traditional party align-
ments to t he same extent. What happened in Kai para after 
Coates ' death was actually the process of a community coming 
to grips in its mvn mind with the conflict between party polit-
ics and national unity . 
As explained in Chapter III above , Coates secured complete 
backing for his Independent stand from his electorate commi ttees. 
Events fo l lowed only slmvl y after his death . On 12 June the 
committees met again at Paparoa , but,despite pleas by a National 
Party deputation headed by Smith, the President of the Auckland 
Division, and Wilkes , the National Secretary , no decision on 
what action to take was reached. It was res olved that deleg-
ates should meet and consult their committees again and report 
back at another meeting on 3 Ju~y. < 1 ) lready , however, there 
was talk of nominating an Independent to succeed Coates , and 
his brother odney was mentioned as a possible candidate .< 2 ) 
There were s i gns that this course was favoured in the northern 
parts of the electorate . (3 ) 
By the time the Paparoa meeting was held on 3 July, a 
division between those who wished to nominate a Nationalist 
and those who favoured an Independent had become clear. The 
meet i ng decided aga inst the latter course , and set up a selec-
tion committee to nominate an "Independent National" candidate. (4 ) 
( 1 ) 
~ ~~ 
( 4) 
Ibid ., 14 June 1943, and 22 June 1943. 
Ibid ., 11 June 1943 . 
Ibid., 24 June 1 943 .' 
Ibid ., 15 July 1943 . 
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It was obvious that a majority of Coates ' former supporters 
favoured a Nationa list, but still could not quite br i ng the ,-
selves to repudiate his stand . The tag "Independent" was , 
however, only a means of sweetening the pill, for the nominee, 
T.C . Webb , soon dropped any pretence that he was other than an 
official Nat ional candidate . 
The minority nt the Paparoa meeting did not wait for the 
selection of the "Independent Nat ionalist" (s et dovm for 17 
July) but immediately set about finding an Independent candid-
ate . Two names had been mentioned . One was odney Coates, 
the brother of the late member . The other was Percy Stewart, 
who had been the Labour candidate for Kaipara in 1938. Ste'l:rart 
had been re-elected to the Ka ipara L. R.C. as recently as 3 June 
1943( 1 ) but had decided not to stand against Coates after the 
latter had announced his Independent stand. (2 ) After Coates' 
death he was asked to stand as the Labour candidate, but refused 
to sigp the usual pledg e to vote with the party on a no-confid-
ence motion , and resigned shortly afterwards . (3 ) 
The meet i ng to select the Independent candidate was held 
at Dargavi lle on 14 July. Over 100 v1ere present. The open-
ing discussion revealed that there \vas little desire to co-op-
erate vrith the "Independent Na tional" faction , several speakers 
(1) Standard, 1 July 1943. 
( 2 ) North Auckland Times , 27 ugust 1943. 
( 3 ) Ibid., 29 July 1943. 
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pouring scorn on the idea of "an Independent with a party tag 
attached". One delegate said, pleading for the widest support 
for the nominee, 
"There are supporters of Labour here who may possibly 
support an Independent, but if they have no voice in 
setting up the committee it is possible their influ-
ence will be lost . It is possible that Labour will 
not put up a candidate in Kaipara and the Independent 
chosen may have Labour views." 
Two nominations were received - Coates and Stewart - and 
each addressed the meet i ng for fifteen minutes. Stewart was 
then nominated, receiving 43 votes to Coates• 23. (1) By nomin-
ating their candidate before the Paparoa meeting the Dargaville 
faction probably hoped to dissuade the "Independent National 11 
group from doing the same. It is more likely that their action 
had the opposite effect. It had called the bluff of the other 
group, which could not then drop its plans. Furthermore, it 
was highly unlikely that the Paparoa Nat ionalists would support 
Coates• Labour opponent of five years before . 
The Paparoa meeting on 17 July had five nominees to choose 
from - three farmers and a solicitor living in the electorate, 
and an .nuckland lavTyer who had left Dargaville sixteen years 
before . The last of these, T.C . webb , was chosen by a prefer-
ential vote. (2 ) The deciding factor in Webb ' s selection as the 
"Independent National'' candidate seems in fact to have been his 
active membership in the Nationa l Party. 
(1) Ibid ., 15 July 1943. 
(2) Ibid., 19 July 1943. 
He had been chairman 
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of the emuer a electorate executive, and had taken the lead in 
the attempt to force W. P. Endean to retire in 1941 .<1) 
hroughout these moves the Labour Party in the electorate 
had been silent, and it was clear that Stewart had such a foll-
ovling in it that there was much opposition to nominating a 
Labour candidate at all. On 4 ugust, James Roberts , the 
National President of the party travelled to Dargaville and 
met the I~ipara L. R. C. On leaving he said that the name of 
the party 1 s candidate would be announced the following week .(2) 
Two weeks later, however, the 11 North Auckland Times" reported 
that 
Notwithstanding two visits to Dargaville by Mr . 
J . Roberts, in recent weeks , and also one by the 
Member for Bay of Islands , Nr. C.W. Boswell, and 
the fact that Mr . Roberts took the names of two 
prospective candidates to Wellington, the Rev. 
H. Thornley and Col. Volkner, on August 4, no 
selection of a candidat~ to contest the I~ipara 
seat has yet been made .~ 3) 
It was also reported that Thornley was unable to stand for 
family reasons , and the "Times 11 correspondent considered that 
attempts were being made to induce Stewart to return to the 
fold. On 26 August , however , the president of the Kaipara 
L •• C. announced that J . S . Stevlart of Auckland had been 11 selec-
ted11. C4) Stewart was a naval architect who had lived in uck-
land since his arrival from Scotland in 1923, and he had no 
(1) See above, pp.~b-~-
(2) Northern Advocate, 4 August 1943. 
(3) North Auckland Times , 20 August 1943. 
(4) Ibid., 26 August 1943. 
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relatives or connections in Kaipara. The fact that no Labour 
candidate could be found in Kai para was a humiliation for the 
Labour Party and a sign of P . i:.f. Stev-rart ' s support among members 
there. J . S . Stewart himself admitted that he was only chosen 
after local possibilities had all been canvassed. ( 1 ) His pos-
ition was made even more embarrassing when the president of 
the Iillipara L. R. C. denied that he had been responsible for 
inviting Roberts to Dargaville and "imposing 11 Stewart on the 
electorate. He a lso denied that Stewart would withdraw in 
favour of his Independent namesake.<2 ) 
J.S . Stewart and Webb both campaigned strictly on the 
policies of their respective parties , and Webb soon made it 
clear that he regarded himself as a National candidate pure 
and simple. The title "Independent National" had , he said, 
been chosen by the selection committee . (3) He had given a 
pledge to the committee to vote against the Government on a 
no-confidence motion, and said that he identified himself with 
Nat ional policy and would attend the party ' s caucus.<4) It is 
thus obvious that the "Independent" tag had little meaning and 
was only a perfunctory tribute to Coates , perhaps to persuade 
electors that 1ebb was a fitting successor to the late member. 
Since \ebb made his position clear to his supporters and to 
his meetings in Kaipara, he is regarded as a National candidate 
for the purposes of this study. 
(1) Ibid., 23 September 1943. 
( 2) Northern Advocate , 27 September 1943 . 
( 3) Ibid., 10 September 1943. 
( 4) North Auckland Times , 1 September 1943. 
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P . H. Ste\vart 1 s stand attracted the most interest. He 
fully supported Coates ' attitude to political unity , and sai d 
that he would not have stood against him as a Labour candidate. 
Stewart gave general support to Labour policies , but was crit-
ical of the Government on some points . He approved of the 
principle of the Guaranteed Price , but thought that the Labour 
attitude to it was "mean". He approved of State housing , but 
said that it should be extended to rural areas, and he fully 
supported the Servicemen's Settlement and Land Sales Act. 
Stewart 1 s ma jor difference vTith the Government was over mone-
tary policy. He accused it of "ultra-conservatism" , saying 
that 11 in the creation of credit the government had failed, 
especial ly in rural areas. 11 ( 1) Stewart also gave as one of 
his main reasons for leaving the party as "domination by 
Trade Union leaders 11 • ( 2 ) He promised to support whichever 
party won the election . (3 ) 
Coates ' memory dominated the election campaign. P. M. 
Stewart clai med to be his logical successor , and he was support-
ed by a number of Coates ' former associates , notably A.V . Page, 
who organised for both Coates and Stewart, and Rodney Coates. (4 ) 
Both vJebb and J .s . Stewart also claimed to be Coates 1 true succ-
essors, although all the candidates indignantly condemned such 
tactics when speaking about their opponents . Obviously P. M. 
Stewart was at a heavy disadvantage in wooing Coates' supporters. 
( 1) Ibid . , 27 August 1943. (2l Ibid . (3 Ibid ., 13 September 1943. (4 Ibid •. 1 SAnt.AmhA~ ~nn 1~ 8Pnromho~ 
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He was a former Labour candidate \vho still supported the mai n 
lines of Labour policy . Besides , Coates had held the confi-
dence of his supporters as only an M. P. of long standing could . 
As P. J . Sundberg, a member of Coates' Commit t ee s i nce 1911, put 
it , at the last meeting the committee held with Coates 
he said he was going to contest this election as an 
Independent , and at that meeting we gave him a b l ank 
cheque , but I do not think that any e l ector in Kai-
para wi ll give an unknown and untried man a blank 
cheque. ~ . Coates has ( sic) represented us for (1) 32 years and we trusted him , hence the blank cheque. 
Ada Coates, s i ster of the late Member , said that Coates 
and Stewart were not comparable for the former ' s allegiance 
was clear; he had never dissociated himself from "the Conser-
vative group 11 . ( 2 ) 
The election result shows t hat Stevlart was not completely 
successful in overcoming this prejudice aga i nst his former 
Labour affiliation. 
Candidate Vote % of Total % gain or l oss s ~nce 1938 . 
T. C. ~febb ( Independent 4988 56 . 77 - 0 .95 
Nat i ona l ) 
J . S. Stewart (Labour) 2188 24 . 90 -1 4 . 74 
P. M. Stewart ( Independent ) 1611 18 . 33 
Mos t of his votes were gained at the expense of J . S. 
Stewart , although the sli ght decline in the Nat i ona l vote shows 
that he also took some from Webb . The latter, a Nat ional ist 
who had be en one of the loudest in his condemnation of the 11 old 
(1 ) Ibid ., 20 September 1943. 
(2 ) Ibid. 
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gang 11 , held most of Coates 1 1938 vote, and won the seat. The 
Dargaville group vlho nominated P. r-i . Stewart had miscalculated 
in thinking that their candidate would find wide support in 
bot h part ies. He certainly found some in the Labour Party, 
but little among Nat ionalists. Vlhat effect Webb 's title of 
"Independent Nat ional 11 had is hard to say, but it may have 
influenced many vlho would otherwise have baulked at voting for 
a candidate of the party which Coates had broken from. 
OTHER INDEPE1TDENT S 
part from these fevr Independents of major i mportance, 
there were a few others who polled well enough to have some 
effect on the result in their electorates. 
S. J . E. CLOSEY ( 1anawatu) was, like J. H. Penniket, Independent 
Group candidate in Wa ikato, a proponent of the Compensated 
Price, a system by which dairy producers were paid a we ighted 
price to cover cost increases. Closey had led a campaign 
for this during the depression and it was adopted by the Farm-
ers ' Union in 1936 and the Nat ional Party in 1938. The latter, 
however , dropped it from its 1938 election policy and Closey 
regarded this as proof that National had fallen under the domin-
at ion of 11 city interests". He campaigned on a platform of 
compensated prices and Social Credit, and polled 675 votes, 
mainly in the rural areas of Manawatu. 
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H. V. HcCREADY (Ne\v Plymouth) polled 689 votes in a closely 
fought contest. The result 1-ras 
Candidate ~ % of Total % gain or loss s1nce 1938. 
E. P. derman (Nat ional) 6608 46 .71 plus 0.04 
F . L. Frost (Labour) 6550 46 . 30 7.03 
~I . V. HcCready (Independent) 689 4 . 87 
L. A. Jury (Democratic 
Labour) 
299 2 .1 2 
1cCready 1 s vote is obviously important in deciding whether 
or not Labour would have held the seat had it not been for the 
intervention of the Democratic Labour candidate. His policy 
was vague , but he was opposed to the party system and to both 
Labour and Nat ional policies. His criticism of Labour was , 
however , much more vitriolic (1)and his approva l by the Indep-
endent Group (2 )places him among the right-wing Independents. 
His votes were probably mostly taken from National . 
P. J . J . l':icHUI..LAN ( allace) ~<Tas the most interesting of this 
group of candidates . He was a customs officer at Gore who 
had just returned from service overseas as a pilot in the 
1-l . l~ . 6 • i~ • F • Only 25 years old, he had a University degree and 
was an excellent debater. His policy followed that of the 
Independent Group very closely, with changes to appeal to rural 
audiences. For instance, he demanded that the State housing 
scheme be tailored mainly to meet the demands of rural elector-
ates, and paid much attention to stabilisation of the costs of 
primary producers .<3) 
(1) Dominion, 18 September 1943. (2 ) N. Z. Truth, September 1943 . 
(3 ) Sout hland Daily News , 27 August and 9 September 1943 . 
-·---------
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,fc v!ullan ' s vigorous and articulate conservatism was in 
marked contrast to Hamilton ' s lack-lustre campaign and his 
meetings , accor ding to newspaper reports , were larger than 
either of the other two candidates ' . 
Lynch , the Labour candidate , was a well-known farmer i n 
the electorate and a member of the Labour Party National Exec-
utive , but he could not prevent the universal swing from Labour 
in rural seats from occurring in VJ'a llace. The intervention of 
1-Icivlullan, hovlever , prevented Hamilton from adding these lost 
Labour votes to his own , for his percentage of the total incr-
ea ed only slightly over his 1938 figures. The result was -
Candidate 
A. Hamilton (Nat ional) 
J . J . Lynch (Labour) 





% of Total 
55 . 45 
36 . 65 
7 . 90 
% ga i n or loss 
since 1938. 
plus 1 . 17 
9 . 07 
Hci.·iullan stood as a Social Credit candidate in Dunedin 
North in 1954 and 1957. 
A. G. I-..1];\vLAND (Central Otago ) a storekeeper at Roxburgh , was a 
Social Crediter. (1 ) His votes were taken from Labour , for 
Bodkin , unlike many lat ional candidates faced with an Indepen-
dent, increased his vote substantially. 
L. C. ~vALKE (Christchurch North) was interesting mainly as a 
potential th.-reat to the Leader of the Opposition in his own 
seat. In 1931 Walker had , as an Independent , polled 26.73 
per cent of the vote lilhen standing against Holland 1 s father 
(1) Dunstan Times, 13 September 1943. 
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and a Labour candidate in the same electorate. In 1935, 
again as an Independent , he was t he only candidate opposing 
D. G. Sullivan , the Labour member for von, and polled a resp-
ectable 3 7545 votes. On the strength of this record , Labour 
hoped that Walker might split the anti-Labour vote sufficiently 
to dislodge Holland , and that the latter would be too concerned 
about this possibility to leave his own electorate for long . 
Since his majority in 1938 had been only 492 he might well 
have been concerned. However , Holland was neither unseated 
nor prevented from tour i ng extensively . 
Walker polled only 459 votes. 
In the final count 
Thi s is not to say that his campaign was a poor one . His 
cry that 11 Ne\v ~ealand wants shaking from top to toe! 11 , his 
proposals for State- a i ded development of agriculture and indus-
try and for immigr ation (1)made him one of the most interesting 
Independents in the campaign. However, Holland ' s prestige 
and status had increased considerably since 1938 and he was 
able to poll an absolut e majority of the vote. 
There were also a number of miscellaneous Independents, 
none of them polling more than 3 per cent of the vote , and 
nearly all standing in city electorates . The most important 
of these were the four pacifist candidates, 
(1) Press, 7 September 1943. 
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A. C. Barrington (Wellington East) 252 (1 . 58% ) 
A. H. Carman ( ie llington North) 298 (2 . 04%) 
L. A. Efford (Christchurch South) 260 (1.77%) 
C.R. Howell (Auckland East) 127 (0 .85%) 
All these called for i mmediate peace negotiations , and 
wer e concerned about the restriction of civil liberties in New 
Zea land. Carman and Barr i ngton vrere both prominent members 
of the Nationa l Peace Council. Carman and Efford had been 
Labour Party members, the former hav i ng been one of the paci-
f i sts who joined the Democratic Labour Party briefly in 1940. 
1any of the others in t his miscellaneous group are quite 
unclassifiable , and a number were simply crackpots of various 
types. Only one had previously contested a seat. He was 
T. 0 . Naddison (tvellington Sout h) who had been Jational candid-
ate for Buller in 1938, polling only 19 per cent of the vote. 
He was a Social Crediter, and had organised for the Social 
Credit hovement in 1941. I n 1954 he was the Social Credit 
candidate for Ifutt. Only one of these minor Inde pendents 
made any attempt to form a movement . H. G. Kendal (Remuera) 
was the candidate of an embryo body called t he New Zealand 
Fight i ng Forces League (Political). (1) Two other candidates, 
C. P. Belton (Roskill) and J . . Govan (Grey Lynn) 1..rere endorsed 
by the League , but they wer e closely associat ed with the eal 
Democracy l.lov ement, and have been included here as R.D. M. 
candidates. 
(1) N. l . Observer, 7 pril 1943. 
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he Independents as a body clearly fall into two groups. 
First , the majority who ob jected to some aspe~t of one or 
other of the two major parties. These included Labour "left-
lvingers", notably Scrimgeour, Socia l Crediters, most of them 
former Labour supporters , and right-wing Nat ionalists who found 
the Nat ional Party too "socialist". The reason for the emer-
gence of these Independents can be found in the internal devel-
opment of the parties. The other group of Independents - the 
minority - represented dissatisfaction with the relations between 
the parties - namely the failure to achieve political unity and 
a cessation of party politics during the war. (This gr oup ' s 
most prominent members were Barnard, Mansford and Stewart, a 
trio representing widely differing political outlooks.) This 
widespread, if inchoate feeling lay at the root of an evident 
revulsion from "party politics" during the war. One statement 
which received \vide attention during the campaign was made hy 
Archdeacon Bullock of Wellington in a Sunday evening sermon. 
Bullock said t hat New Zealand politics were producing too many 
"yes-men", and warned that 
the electors should wat ch , vrithout condemning politi-
cians, •••• that party allegiance might be too string -
ent, and might not be allowi ng proper freedom of 
thought and expression to members. That was the 
reason , he felt , why the parties were breaking under 
their own weight. What was required today was more 
character a~d)le ss party - men who would express 
themselves. ~ 1 
This feeling that parties had smothered dissident opinion 
in their ranks, and had thus encouraged "yes-men", was well -
(1) Dominion, 13 September 1943. 
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founded, particularly in the case of the Labour Party. 
Labour 1 s 11 left-\vingers 11 had been intimidated by Lee 1 s expul-
sion . National ' s "old gang", too, had been pushed unceremon-
iously into the background and two of their leaders read out 
of the party after the War Administration breakdown . This 
necessity to preserve rigid party att itudes was seen as the 
reason for the fa ilure to form a national government . 
Many electors probab ly voted for Independents as a protest 
aga i nst the party system , Hithout looking too closely at \vhat 
these candidates• policies , if any , were. Thus "anti-party" 
votes may have been more vTides pread than the number of avowedly 
anti-party candidates would indicate. 
Both Labour and National defended the party system. 
Holland called it "the only alternative to totalitarianism 11 ( 1) 
and the President of the National Party , at the annua l confer-
ence, feared that anti - party feeling was being "fostered and 
capita lised by an organised campaign" by the People 1 s Movement.<2 ) 
Lee, too , vigorously defended the party system, but showed that 
he was worried about the extent of dissatisfaction with it , 
when he wrote 
This non-party l abel worn by some as a cloak of virtue 
is only an atavism or an excuse for rail-sitting. It 
is t he new l abel of the unsuccessful reactionary. (3) 
(1) Ibid., 7 April 1943. 
(2) Ibid., 27 July 1943. 
(3) John A. Lee ' s Weekly, 9 June 1943. 
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Although this was perhaps true in the case of the Indep-
endent Group and some of the unattached Independents , it was 
not fair as applied to the whole group. The existence of 
progressive Independents , such as Barnard and P. H. Stewart, 
who were op posed on principle to "party politics" in wartime, 
was an unpleasant to Lee as it was to both major parties . 
Nevertheless , this opposition, among the public, was expressed 
rather in abstention from voting, which increased sharply in 
1943, than in voting for Independents. It was clear that 
strong and stable government vras necessary in 'vartime , and 
this , as the parties thems elves often repeated, meant party 
government . 
It is likely then , that much of the voting for Independents 
was due to dissatisfaction with the policies of one or other of 
the parties , rather than with the party system in general. This 
is borne out by the fact , evident in the results quoted in this 
chapter , that few Independents t oo~ votes from both parties . 
Most were , to the electors, all too obviously either disgruntled 
Labourites or disgruntled Nat iona lists. 
C PrER 6 
THE ISSUES 
The national mood in 1943 was one of relief and anti -
cli max after the tensions generated by the emergency in the 
Pacific the previous year . This did not mean , of course , 
that the danger was over , but the atmosphere of 1942 could 
not be sustained , and the election year saw the inevitable 
return to bitter disputes over domestic problems , and the 
beginnings of the debate on post -war rehabilitation and recon-
struct i on. The Prime Minister recognised the danger of this . 
In Hay 1943 he warned the Returned Services• Association Confer-
ence that 
"It would be wrong to feel that , because a succession 
of reverses has been turned into a glorious victory 
and the immediate menace in the Pac i fic has been 
removed somewhat - I emphasise the word somewhat -
from our shores the danger is over •••• We must pay 
attention to all the problems of rehabilitation -
because if vle don 1 t do that now it wi ll be too late -
but we must not spread the conception abroad that 
the only -vrork is rehabilitat i on and reconstruction . 
Our main work is still in the war. Long months, 
indeed years, lie ahead when the country ' s manpower 
and economic resources will be strai ned to the utmost, 
and it is necessary that we face those years with the 
same courage and the same sense of ultimate vicrory 
-vrith which we have faced the last four years • 11 ~ J 
Nevertheless , the parties had been assiduously working 
to encourage the feeling that , as Holland put it , "things 
vTould be better" in 1943. He went on to say , in his New Year 
message , that 
( 1) Dominion , 27 1' ay 1 943 . 
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'lVJe in Nevi Zea l and can justifiably look at the 
coming year with quiet confidence and optimism. 
The limitless resources of the United Stat es are 
already making themselves felt in the great 
struggle, and our own security here in New Zea -
land has been i mmeasurably strengthened •••• 
11 1 feel •••• that we can look forward conf:i,.d~ntly 
to 1943 as a year of hope and fulfilment."l1J 
The annual conferences of both parties saw remarkably 
little discussion of the war effort . The address of the 
President of the National Party concentrated on the party 's 
acceptance of the duty of the State to guarantee its citizens 
11 a secure future, secure employment and freedom from the anx-
ieties and hardships caused by circumstances over which they 
have no control", and emphasised the part y • s vlelfare policies. 
He also attacked wartime regulations as unduly restrictive, a 
sure sign that the crisis which created the need for them had 
lessened. (2) The Labour Conference was held in a similar atmos-
phere. The National Executive 's report concentrated on Labour's 
post-war aims, and mentioned the war only as the reason why these 
aims could not be put into effect. (3 ) Fraser himself spent most 
of this time, when presenting the Parliamentary Labour Party 's 
report , in outlining his reconstruction proposals, but he di d 
remind his listeners that considerations of national defence 
still came first in Government policy . The theme repeated by 
him, however , and the keynote of the Conference, was that 
(1) Ibid., 28 December 1942. 
(2) Ibid., 27 July 1943. 
(3) Standard, 29 pril 1943. 
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"It is the government 1 s intention to carry on \vhere 
it left off in the days before the war and to a chieve 
what is no idle dream - the abol ition of wa~t)and the 
achievement of even-handed social justice."l1 
The 1 943 Budget was in keeping vlith this policy. Its 
main provisions were for a raising of Social Security benefits . 
Family benefits were raised from 6/- to 7/6, and age and widows ' 
benefits raised accordingly . The most important single change 
was the increase of 50 per cent in Disablement War Pensions. 
This had been urged by the R.S •• for some years, and political 
implications aside , was long overdue. There were no increases 
in taxation. The Budget took some of the wind out of the sails 
of Labour's oponents , for they welcomed the increased benefits 
and had no tax increases to point to as a result of them. 
There was some prelL~inary skirmishing over who had made 
the election necessary , and Labour had the best of this. The 
official party line was laid down in the Parliamentary Labour 
Party report to the 1943 conference; this-\vas that the National 
Party had made the election inevitable by \ATithdra.~Aring its :t-1ini-
sters from the ~var Administration because of differences over 
the handling of the vJaikato miners ' strike. (2 ) Fraser had often 
said that he would not be a party to extending Parliament ' s life 
if the only res.ult vras to keep his Government in power. He too 
blamed the Nat iona l Party for the election , and said that it had 
"" I 
shown, by his actions in 1942, that a national government was 
( 1 ) Ibid. , 6 1 ay 1 943. (2) Ibid. 
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impossible because the Opposition refused to a ccept major ity 
rule in the VJar Administration . It is wor th nothing that 
some of Fraser ' s assoc iates were much more enthusiastic about 
the election. Nash , who was said to have opposed previ ous 
election postponements , said at Tauranga during the campaign 
that 
To have an election four years after a war has started 
gave the answer to the fact (sic) that 1ve were a demo-
cracy. It was good that the country was to have an 
election at this time. He -yrould not apolog ise for not 
having one sooner, elements of security making such an 
action unwise.C1J 
Host Nat ional speakers agreed lvith Nash that the election 
was desirable, although some , like S.W. Smith (Bay of Islands) 
said that it could have been avo ided had Labour been willing 
to form a 11fair dinkum coalition BOVernment". (2 ) Holland him-
self displayed an extraordinary sensitivity over the \'Jar Admin-
istration episode. In 1943 he dropped completely his previous 
contention that the Government ' s attitude to the miners' strike 
was the issue at stake , and his statements on the subject showed 
that he felt in retrospect t hat this had not been a sufficiently 
i mportant issue on which to break up the Administrat ion. In a 
speech at ~Jhangarei in April 1943 he dealt with the subject at 
some length, but scarcely ment ioned the strike. The reasons 
for his vlithdrawal, he said, were that "the treatment accorded 
him was not in keeping with the duties he was expected to per-
form and because he could not conscientiously acquiesce in many 
(1) Bay of lenty Timea , 15 September 1943. 
(2) Northern Advocate, 6 September 1943. 
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of t he decisions made by the War Cabinet". '9:e s a id t hat he 
had never been sworn in as a member of the \far Cabinet and 
had received no i nvitat ion to Executive Council meetings. Hi s 
sta tement about war expenditure had been suppressed by the 
cens or, and "a ii nister of the Crovm silenced by a civil ser-
vant. " 
"A voice: Hhy did 1·lr . Coates stay there? 
" ·1r . Holland : That is not for me to answer. They 
did not dare to suppress any statement of his , but 
t hey tried it with me. If they had tried it with 
him he lvQuld have 'l.valked out too, be ing a man of 
honour ." \ 1) 
There \vas a curious exchange on the sub ject between Holland 
and J . Hodgens , the La bour member for Pal merston North , during 
t he Budget debate in June . 
dr . Hodgens -
~ e undertaking was 
er a tion between the 
party. 
A \Jar Administration vTas set up ~ 
given that t here would be co - op-
Opposition and t he Government 
r~ . Holland - and no controversia l legisla tion . 
~1r . Hodgens - The Leader of the Opposition s ays 
"and no controversia l legislation". uite right . 
I 'l.vil l a cce pt that. \ hy did they wa lk out? 
1·1I' . Holland - Because the agreement was broken . 
·1r . Hodg ens - Because certa in miners i n the aika to 
vJere not gaoled . 
lr . Holland - They vra l ked out because t he agreement 
was broken. 
The Hon . Hr. Has on - \·Jha t agreement ? 
Hr . Holland - The agreement t hat t here -vrould be no 
controversia l legisla tion." t2J 
(1) N. l . Her a ld , 21 Apr i l 1943 . 
(2) NZPD., Vol . 262, p. 755. 
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Holland was presumably referring to the decision to 
institute State control of the mines as "controversial legis-
lation" , but he did not refer to the episode again in the 
debate. At any rate, as Hason pointed out later in the debate, 
the taking over of the mines was an administrative, not a legis-
lative act. 
National candidates hardly mentioned the War Administration 
during the campaign. The whole issue of national unity , in 
fact , was pushed into the background by the two main parties , 
and was left to the Independent candidates to debate. Nor was 
there any question that Labour would not oppose Hamilton , the 
remaining National member in the War Cabinet. H. G.R . :Hason , 
speaking in Kaipara , said that Labour "probably" vmuld not 
have opposed Coates, (1)but the latter had publicly announced 
that he would not stand as a National candidate , whereas Hamil-
ton had never dissociated himself from the party. Fraser and 
Hamilton agreed that Labour had every right to nominate a cand-
idate in Jallace for, as Hamilton said, 
11The conduct of the war is quite separate from the 
political side, and although I go into the War Cab-
inet and work with some members of the Labour Govern-
ment it does not compromise me in their politics . " 
Hamilton, however , defended strongly his decision to stay 
in the War Cabinet after October 1942. (2 ) 
(1) North Auckland Times, 10 September 1943. (2) Southland Daily News 11 September 1943. Cf . Fraser in 
Dominion, 24 Septemb~r 1943. 
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To a large extent the parties failed to come to grips 
on election issues because they were talking about different 
things. Labour leaned heavily on its past record - both in 
domestic legislation and in the war. National accepted the 
broad lines of the former and~art from the crucial question 
of manpower, fully backed the Government's war effort. Nat -
ional also, a s was shown in Chapter III, concentrated hard on 
creating a n ew image of itself and this naturally led to incr-
eased agreement with Labour on subjects such as Social Security . 
One of National ' s most important campaign points , however, was 
a general belief in 11 freedom 11 , expressed in the manifesto as 
the restoration to New ~ealanders of their fundam-
ental British right of freedom - freedom to live 
their own lives in their ovm way without bureau-
cratic dictation; to live in a system of compet-
itive free enter prise; to own their own homes; 
freedom for our returning servicemen to follow 
the occupa tions of their choice vri thou t having to 
go cap in hand to the Government for a licence to 
earn a livelihood. (1) 
Similar sentiments could be found in any National Party 
election manifesto , but vTar conditions gave them a special bite 
in 1943 . State regulation and inteference had spread into 
many fields since 1939, and they touched more people than ever 
before. Sometimes , as in the case of food marketing , teething 
troubles and bad planning had upset producers and consumers 
a like , and Nationa l drove home hard their argument that it was 
the result of a compulsive desire to impose restrictions wherever 
possible. It was a symptom of the relaxation of tensions in New 
( 1) Nat i onal arty, Election Manifesto, 1943 . 
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Zealand that at the 1943 ational Party Conference the Pres-
ident of .the Party launched a full - scale attack on wartime 
controls. 
1~hile everyone willingly submits to restrictions 
and controls made necessary by the exigencies of 
war , there can be no justification for using the 
circumstances of war to impose restrictions on the 
freedom of the person , which violates the democr -
atic ideal of social organisation and substitutes 
a system differing only in degree from that which 
the United Nations are pledged to destroy. 11 (1) 
However , the National Party did not usually go beyond this 
generalised criticism, and it was really effective only when 
related to specific examples. For instance, the attacks by 
at ional (and Democratic Labour), on the monopolistic results 
of transport licensing found a ready response among returned 
servicemen who had hoped to enter the industry. 
There were many other important issues on which there could 
be no debate dur i ng the campaign. As previously mentioned, 
National no longer quest ioned the principle of the Social Secur-
i ty scheme, and promised to 11extend benefits \vhere warranted". 
here was als o very little criticism of the Government 's rehab-
ilitation plans , and Labour was able to point to a fully planned 
seheme for education, loans for houses and farms and trade train-
ing . Democratic Labour complained that insufficient attent ion 
was being given to t he last point , but f or the rest the opposi-
tion parties could only promise that they would do equally well . 
Here, as in other fields , the Government had the advantage of 
(1) Dominion, 27 July 1943. 
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be ing able to point to the practical results of the scheme , 
and did not have to rely on avowals of good intentions. 
It might be thought that the campaign dealt exclusively 
with domestic issues and that , as the New ~ealand correspond-
ent of the 11 ound Table" put it , "on the great issue of the 
war all parties were at one". (1) This was true enough in the 
narrow sense that all parties stood for "a full war effort", 
but it overlooks the fact that one of the main issues in the 
election campaign had a direct bearing on the country's war 
effort. This issue was ho\<r far Nevi ~ealand 1 s manpower should 
be committed to overseas military serviqe . 
This question did not receive much political attention 
until Japan entered the war, but there had been criticisms 
from the Left. Lee had initially opposed conscription for 
overseas service , and even though he soon accepted this his 
op position to the \1editerranean commitment grew as war \vith 
Japan came closer. Throughout 1941 and 1942 he consistently 
attacked the Government's manpower commitments as being too 
high and impossible to maintain. Lee, however , was alone 
until late 1942, when the main body of 3 Division was moved 
into the Pacific. 
It is unnecessary here to go over the ground already cov-
ered by Wood (2)on this subject, but it must be remembered that 
at no time during 1943 (at least until September) was the Gov-
ernment quite sure about the future disposition of 2 Division 
and that up to the time of the arch 1943 manpower debate Fraser 
was still (1~ (2 Round Table, December 1943. 
.L.w. Wood , the People at I ar , Chapters 18 and 19. 
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seriously considering \·lithdravring it from the liddle East . 
In late 1942 the I.I ithdral-lal of the last Australian division 
had made pressure in New Zealand very hard t o resist. The 
pressure took two different forms. Lee called for a big 
reduction in commitments , and clearly favoured 2 Division 
being returned to the Pacific. He was the first politician 
to make open and detailed criticism of Government manpo1.ver 
po licy. In his speech in the House on 19th October he sai d 
"An overwhelming major ity of the members of this 
House are conscious that our manpm·1er targets are 
too vast. He do not knmv what is proposed for 
1943; for 1 944; for 1 945. vle are a lready cal-
ling up married men - and at an age at which I do 
not believe many of them wil l be able to withstand 
the circumstances of hazardous soldiering •••• vJe 
all know that if we go ahead at the present rate 
we \·rill be out of the war very rapidly . 11 ( 1) 
In the heightened poli tical atmosphere followi ng the 
breakup of the Nar dministrat i on Nat iona l was losing no chance 
to embarrass the Government , and it obv i ously could not allow 
Lee to retain his monopoly of criticism on this i mportant sub-
ject. However , Nat ional could not eas ily criticise as vigor-
ously as Lee for the party had always supported the i ddle East 
commitment. Nevertheless , early in December Holland joined 
Lee in sayine;; that manpmver commitments were too high. t 
this time the Opposition, unlike Lee, still believed it poss-
ible to mai nta i n - and reinforce - t1.vo Divisions, (2) and neither 
it nor the Government was prepared to recommend that 2 Div i sion 
be withdravm from the 11 iddle East . 
(1) I~ D., Vol.26 1 , pp.757-760. (2 ) Ibid ., pp .956- 9. 
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The uestion of the return of the Division was a highly 
emotional and explosive political issue, as the furlough sch-
erne was later to prove . The ·larch 1943 manpower debate showed 
t?at many Labour members fav oured the return of the Division. 
Lee had a lways been outspoken on this question , but he did not 
make an issue of it in late 1942 because he recognised that 
shipping difficult i es ruled out any moving of the Middle East 
force. (1) Fraser seems to have stressed this point when the 
House met in secret session on 3 December, and the House deci-
ded that the Division should stay where it was. (2 ) There was 
still, hmvever , considerable feeling that it should return when 
the Nort h Africa Campaign was over . 
Unfortunately for the Government , the ques tion boiled over 
into an acrimonious public debate early in 1943, just at the 
time when the Americans l.vere urging the Government to equip 3 
Division as a combat force for the acific . (3) The occas i on 
was the Christchurch East by -elect ion campaign, which took 
place dur i ng late January and February. It provided the first 
thorough public a iring of the issue , at a time when the Govern-
ment was at a ser ious disadvantage . The decision to field a 
combat Division in the Pacific had not yet been announced , and 
Government speakers in the campaign preferred to stress the 
poss i bility that 2 Division might still be returned. 
(1) J . A. Lee, interview with the aut hor. 
(2) Wood, op . cit., p.249. 
(3 ) Ibid ., p. 252. 
There 
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There was no chance t hat the issue could be by-passed. Early 
in December Lee gave notice that the Democratic Labour candid-
ate would concentrate on the need for a rest in New Zealand for 
2 Division, 11 the i mpossibility of maintaining the present sized 
war establishment", and the "exaggeration" of Home Guard and 
f ire-watching schemes as the need for them receded. (1) During 
the campaign Herr ing also attacked the decision to call up the 
41-45 age group as showing complete disregard for small business-
men, and manufacturers. Lyons, the National candidate, a lso 
concentrated on the last point, out he was far less specific 
t han Herring in Hhat he said about manpovTer. 
-abel IImlfard, the Labour candidate, scarcely ment ioned the 
subject in her opening address, (2 )but it was thrown into the 
centre of the ring by Sullivan, the l inister of Supply, when he 
said 
11 I can only say to you that it is the desire and 
intent ion of the Government and of the War Cabinet 
to return our Division to New l ealand from the 
J:.1iddle East as soon as it is possible to do so." 
He deprecated any attempt by lembers of Parliament 
to win support by advocating the return of the 
division. 
"Parliament itself, as a whole made, without a dis-
sentient vote 1 the deGi$iOn that has been followed 
at the present time."\3) 
National speakers fell on Sullivan with cries of outrage. 
Doidg e called it "a most mischievous stat ement (which) has 
(1) John • Lee's Weekly, 9 December 1942. (2) Press, 21 January 1943. (3) Ibid. 
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has been vrelcomed with whoops of joy by the pacifists in our 
midst. It has caused anxiety and concern to the rest of the 
people of New Zealand 11 , (1) and Holland said 
"If Nr . Sullivan is correct in stating that the 
Government and the ar Cabinet want to have the 
division withdrawn as soon as possible, then in 
my opinion, they are hopelessly out of touch with 
public opinion. I cannot ~agine any greater 
injury to our vTar effort." (2; 
He als o emphasised that no vote on the matter was taken in 
secret session of the House on 3 December, and Sullivan later 
admitted that this was so. Despite his vehemence over 2 Div-
ision, Holland still criticised the "manpower muddle" , part ic-
ularly the training of the 41 to 45 age group, without seeming 
to realise that this was the inevitable result of trying to 
equip two combat divisions . Neither he nor any other National 
speaker denied that New Zealand had to take its full part in the 
acific war . 
On 28 January the Government , obviously worried about the 
effect of the latest call-up, announced that the 41 to 45 age 
group would not be called up for full-time military service and 
vrould be kept in camp for as short a time as possible. Consid-
eration was also to be given to releasing some of the 18 to 20 
age group from camp.(3 ) ~raser's final address in the campaign 
was almost apologetic on the subject of 2 Division, and shovred 
that he had still not made up his mind completely about its 
future . He promised that 
( 1l ~~ Ibid . , 29 January 1943. Ibid., 5 February 1943. Ibid., 28 January 1943. 
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"The government and the vlar Cabinet will do all t hey 
possibly can to replace the lads who have been there 
for three years. \ve vT i ll try to get them back as 
far as it is possible •••• 
"Certai nly \ve will raise t he question (of the return 
of 2 Division) again •••• We won •t take up the atti-
tude t hat i f they have to come back we are doing 
something grievously wrong . We won 't take u p the 
attitude of I~ . Doidge and others t hat they mustn't 
come back to fight in the jungle against the Japan-
ese.11(1) 
Holland ended the National campa ign with another attack 
on the "manpower bungle". 
"The matter becomes more serious \vhen it is remembered 
t hat we will have no more men to call up after the 
end of next month unless the 40 thousand single men 
who have been exempted from service are to be with-
drawn from industry. We have been so over-committed 
that we have run out of men at a time when we have just begun to win the war . 11 (2) 
Holland's words, hmvever, had little force , for in the 
debate in the House on 4 December no National speaker had said 
t ha t a force should not be sent to the Pac ific. (3 ) During the 
campai gn t he same speakers ve hemently opposed any decision to 
withdraw 2 Division from the Mi ddle East , yet Holland at the 
same time said it was impossible to maintain t wo divisions 
overseas. Herring and Lee had , in fact , put forward the only 
reasoned criticism of the Government's policy. They held that 
New 6ealand could equi p on ly one division and that it should be 
based i n the Pacific. Although t hey did not press for the imm-
ediate return of 2 N. l . E. F . they said that it should leave f or 
New Zealand when the North Africa campa ign was over. 
(1) Dominion , 4 February 1943. (2) Ibid., 5 ~ebruary 1943. 
(3 ) N6PD ., Vol . 261 , pp . 956 et.seq . 
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The Government was on the defensive dur i ng the campaign , 
and its half - hearted references to the return of 2 Divi sion 
only strengthened the attacks of its opponents . Nat i onal ' s 
belated (and incomplete) recognition of the "manpower bungle" 
failed, however, to win the party any votes. The criticisms 
made by Democratic Labour were much more thorough- going and 
effective , and Lee could say \vi th truth that the danger of 
over-commitment which he had been warning against for years 
had only just been realised by the Government and the Opposi-
tion. Herring's vote of 2 , 578, and his lead of 207 over Lyons, 
the National candidate , was a recognition of this . Labour ' s 
share of the vote dropped 28 . 47 per cent from 1938 , but Nation-
al ' s remained almost exactly the same . 
The frank di scussion during the campaign breached the barr- · 
ier of reticence on the manpower question . Late in February a 
very critical statement by C. V. Smith , the president of the New 
Zealand Manufacturers ' Federation , was given prominence in the 
press. Smith said that the manpower problem was becomi ng inc-
reas i ngly difficult as demands were made for increased produc -
tion, and went on t o say that 
There were literally thousands of men in the Army in 
New Zealand 'i.vho were s i mply wasting their time • •• • 
Nothing short of strong public opinion would bring 
about the release of men and a reduct i on of estab-
lishments , as any Government was heavily' influenced 
by its mili tary advisers . 
"As laymen, we are not supposed to knmv anything 
about military strategy , but one is tempted to guess 
at the strategy behind th~ apparent reluctance to 
reduce establlshments. 11 ( 1 J 
(1) Dominion , 25 February 1943 . 
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Smith 1 s call for public pressure on the Government, and 
the very fact that such a statement was passed by the censor , 
was a sign that the subject was to become a major election 
issue. On 17 Mar cn Parliament was invited to approve the 
addition of 27,000 men to the forces in the following year, 
and a debate on manpower (in open session) followed. The 
parties followed the lines they had taken in Christchurch 
East, except that the Government admitted that present commit-
ments could not be maintained indefinitely. Holland again 
called for a reduction in commitments , and said that the deci-
sion to equip 3 Division as a combat.force was 11 in defiance of 
the will of the House" (1) (presumably as expressed at the secret 
session on 3 December 1942.) However , under pressure from 
Sullivan, he refused to state his position on New Zealand •s part 
in the Pacific. (2 ) Coates went further than most inisters in 
defending the commitment to two divisions , and said that some 
domestic production would have to be cut. He also stressed 
that the type of work the Pacific division was doing lmvered 
morale and was bad for a fighting force .C 3) Nany Labour speakers 
on the other hand , were quite frank in their opinion that New 
Zealand should field only one division, and that it should return 
to the Pacific as soon as possible . 
Minister, admitted that 
(1) NZ D., Vol.262, p.421. 
(2 ) Ibid., pp.426 -7. 
(3) Ibid ., p.429. 
Even Sullivan, a senior 
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"the situation cannot be continued for very long . 
Individually, and not speaking on behalf of the 
Government , I viould say that it was not possible 
to maintain two forces beyond this year . " (1 ) 
Fraser , in a masterly speech at the end of the debate, 
did his best to prove that the whole House (except Lee) acknmv-
ledged that Te\v ~ealand had to fight on two fronts (2 ) and there-
fore accepted the increased commitments. 
However , nothing Fraser mi ght say could stop Labour ' s opp-
onents calling for a reduction in commitments, regardless of 
\•That they had said in Parliament. The positions of both 
Democratic Labour and National remained as they had before. 
Le e stated on 16 June that his general policy \vould be "one 
Division I·Iith that Division engaged in the Pacific", although 
he did not press for the immediate recall of 2 Division. (3 ) 
Nat ional's position was vaguely stated in its manifesto • 
•••• · complete overhaul of our manpower and produc -
tion commitments is an urgent necessity , for it is 
obvious to all that \v~ ~annot continue on the present 
scale of commitments.\4) 
Holland alleged that too many men were being kept in camp 
in New ~ealand , but he refused to say which force overseas 
should be -, "overhauled". As Lee remarked 
( 1 ) 
( 2 ) 
(3) 
~€~ 
11 ~o -one knmvs \vhich Division he intends to maintain . 
Democratic Labour is straightforw~rd. We would not 
send Ne\v 6ealanders on to Europe. \ 5) 
I bid . , p. 440. 
Ibid ., pp . 490-5 . 
John • Lee ' s leekly 16 June 1943. 
National arty, Elecfion 11anifesto; 
Dominion, 24 September 1943. 
1943. 
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The Government ' s position was defended strongly in the 
campaign by 1-IcLagan , the }finister of Eanpol·rer . He claimed 
that Parliament had "agreed that t he Government had done the 
only thing that could have been done" and that National had 
no right to talk about a 11 manpower muddle" . ( 1) Fr aser vias 
equally definite , but cla i med tha t "there 1vas not a commit-
ment t hat coul d not be revised at any stage in t he wa~' (2 ) 
However, many Labour candi dates , part icularly i n country dis t-
ricts, had to try to explain away some cases of real hardship 
caused by the call - up. t Hukerenui, in the Bay of Islands , 
for instance , the president of the Labour Party was faced with 
a barrage of complaints of cases where t he only man on a farm 
had been called up and his wi fe and chi l dren left to carry on . 
oberts admitted "there are too many \vomen and children for ced 
to do farm work; it is not right". He remar ked after the 
meeting that it was the most hectic he had ever addressed . (3 ) 
· t a meeting in Whangarei the Hi nister of griculture, answer-
i ng a uestion , revealed hoi:J di fficult it sometime s was to 
secure even a temporary a llevia tion . 
( 1 ~ ~ ~ ) 
( 4 ) 
Did lvfr . Barclay knmv that despit e recorrilnendat i ons from 
the Primary reduction CoLmcil and t he National Service 
Department in Whangarei for the release of men fr om t he 
ar my , they had not been released, he vias asked. The 
Hi nister said he was avmre of this pos ition. It was 
not a l ways possibl e to secure t he release of men from 
the arilly which had the last say. ~Jhen other efforts 
had fa iled he had a p ea l ed himself to Brigad i er Conway 
i n .Je llington and had rece i ved. excellent co-operation 
a large number of men be i ng released. he ar my, how-
ever, had ita viewpoint too. (4) 
I bi d ., 10 September 1943. 
I bid., 24 Se ptember 1943. 
Nort hern dvocate, 17 September 1943 . 
I bid ., 8 Sept ember 1943 . 
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Similar difficulties and indecision at the highest level 
were revealed when Jones, the Iinist er of Defence , said that 
no ~ore men could be released from camp for some time, only 
to be contradicted by Fr aser ' s public statement two days 
later that further releases were essential. (1) 
If anything further vlere needed to keep the manpower 
issue on the boil, it 1vas amply prov ided by t he furlough sch-
eme to give home leave to some of the 1:Jfiddle East force. The 
operation of this had been a condition of arliament•s approval 
of kee ping the Division in the 1•Ii ddle East , and the first draft 
of 6012 men returned in July. The Government (with good reason, 
as events were to prove ) vlas anxious about the effect lvhich 
three mont hs at home vias to have on the men , and on 5 August 
the Director of ublicity forbade ne1vs papers to ment ion any -
thing about the replacement of the men on furl ough . C2) The 
ban Has , hovrever , broken on 1 September when Holland 1 s opening 
campaign address was reported in the press , including the foll-
owing passage . 
\ ir . Holland sta ted 
on furlou h should 
untarily returning 
civil employ:1ent. 
New ~eala~d who had 
ace the11 . ~ 3) 
t hat after such long service men 
be given t he opportunity of vol-
ta the Division or returning to 
There were plenty of fit men in 
seen no service who could repl-
The cens orshi p directive was revoked after t his report , and 
until t he end of the campa i gn t he newspa pers contained reports 
(1) Domi nion, 7 and 9 Sept ember 1943 . (2) Wood , op. cit . , p.267. 
(3) Domi nion , 1 September 1943. 
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of National and Democratic Labour candidates making similar 
statements. Labour candidates were silent on the matter , but 
at the end of the campaign Fraser admitted that he thought the 
married men should be allowed to stay in New Zealand , but ref-
used to say any more . (1) The publicity given the question 
dur ing the campaign could have added to the defiant attitude 
of the men when the time came to return, but it is more likely 
that Holland and other candidates were merely echoing a publ ic 
feeling which was already very strong. 
The Government 1 s attitude to the manpower question had 
toughened considerably during the months since the March debate 
in the House , and the fundamental decision on 2 Division had 
been made. Sometime between March and August the Government 
had decided that the division would go on to Europe, and not 
return to New Zealand after the Nort h Africa campaign. This 
decision was not formally announced , and the first news of it 
that reached the public vias in "New lealand at War 11 , a pamphlet 
published by the Director of Publicity. This was ostensibly a 
summary of the country 1 s war effort , but it was also clearly 
intended as election propaganda and was in fact widely circula-
ted by the Labour Party. 
stated off - handedly 
The passage on "Han-power commitments" 
Our man - power commitments have been decided by Parlia-
ment. Our Division in the Middle East , proud of its 
membership in the famous 8th Army, will stay to fight 
(1) Ibid., 22 September 1943. 
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in Europe . Our Division in t he Pacific is ready 
to play its part .(1 J 
This method of informing the public about the disposition 
of 2 Division was assailed as underhand by Lee , and he and his 
candidates criticised the sending of t he division on to Europe. 
Fr aser, however , made no secret of t he Government ' s intention 
dur i ng t he campaign , and, in a speech at New Plymouth , even 
showed that it still regarded the European theatre as more 
i mportant than the Pacific. 
"1:Je have never claimed we could maintain a division 
in the lvliddle East or Europe, and also keep our men 
in the Pacific indefinitely . hen our Middle East 
division is in North Europe within a period of 
months, our troops in the Pacifi c will be used to 
strengthen t he first ( i.e. second) division . 11 (2) 
Fraser also accused Holland of promoting a "defeatist 
policy" about overseas commitments. What was the reason for 
t his new frankness on the subject? Probably the Government 
realised that its equivocations at Christchurch East had done 
it little good, and that it mi ht as well make it clear that 
the Division would not return. Fraser also seemed to want the 
public to know the broad lines of the Government's policy whether 
it was election t i me or not . Hm·rever , the dev i ous method used 
to convey the decision on 2 Division left an impression that the 
Government was still afraid of public reaction to the news . 
Generally , however , the Government ' s manpower policy was 
endorsed by the country. National probably won some votes by 
(1) Loc.cit . , p. 10. 
(2) Dominion, 2 September 1943 . 
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its general criticism of the "manpower bungle", particularly 
in country districts where labour was short, and by its call 
for a reduction of forces in Nevr Zealand. Democratic Labour's 
basic criticism of the decision to try to equip two Divisions 
was not accepted . s Lee admitted , 
The country voted and voted clearly for the Govern-
ment's manpower commitments which had only been opp-
osed by Democratic Labour which lost deposits every-
where. True, no one knevr wba t those corp.mi tments 
\vere , but the country voted. ( 1) 
The manpower issue provided some room for debate on the 
war effort, but in domestic politics there were few real issues. 
There were many points, of course, on which the Government was 
open to criticism. The most important of these were taxation 
and the operations of the Internal Harketing Division. The 
Government could only point out that the high level of taxation 
was primarily due to the war , but it preferre~ , of course , to 
leave the matter alone . Neither National nor Democratic Labour 
made any specific proposals to reduce taxation , but this did not 
prevent them from saying that the overall level \vas too high . 
There \vere some dark hints that the War Expenses ccount was 
being misused , but , perhaps wisely , no evidence -vras produced to 
give them substance. The operations of the Internal farketing 
Division were another matter. The Division had had control of 
the grading and packing of all New Liealand-grovrn fruit since 
August 1940 , and throughout the war control over prices of 
(1) John • Lee ' s ~eekly , 8 December 1943. 
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foodstuffs had gradually been extended, culminating in the 
fixation of maximum retail prices for many kinds of vegetables 
and fruit in 1943 . Soon reports began to circulate, sometimes 
in the newspapers, of fruit and vegetables being dumped because 
growers could not cover their costs , or because the I.H . D. could 
not distribute them. Numerous quest i ons were asked in Parlia-
ment , and Barclay , the l-finister of Harketing , led a harried exis-
tence from his appointment in 1941 until his defeat in 1943 . 
Often the reports of dumping were found to be exaggera.ted or un-
true , but it was obvi ous that there were delays in distribution 
and some needless shortages, although it is hard to tell how 
serious they were. The Division irritated both growers , who 
blamed it for their lovJ returns , and consumers , who blamed it 
for shortages. Barclay protested in vain that the Division 
had nothing to do with setting the prices of produce and that 
many of the vegetables in short supply were those that were not 
handled by it, but any shortages and retail price increases were 
inevitably blamed on the Division . It was condemned roundly by 
Democratic Labour and National candidates, the latter promising 
to abolish it altogether. In ielson, however, where the fruit-
growers had benefited from orderly marketing, Holland was care-
ful to say that no marketing machinery would be removed "without 
putting something better in its place. 11 ( 1) 
(1) Dominion, 13 September 1943. 
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Despite the efforts of the Social Credit candidates and 
the Democratic Labour Party , monetary control was only a minor 
issue i n the campaign. The Labour line had been laid down 
at the aster Conference, which had resolved 
That the controls now exercised by the Government 
over monetary and currency policy are nm.; so effec-
tive that the purchase of the Bank of New Zealand 
and/Qr)other trading banks is at present unnecess-
ary. ~ 1 
Nat ional pol icy provi ded for a "non-political" Currency 
Commission, but the party made strangely little use of the 
point , and no speaker enlarged on it in detail. Only Demo-
cratic Labour, which called for t he nationalisation of one or 
all trading banks (candidates ' ideas varied on this) presented 
a radical challenge to the Labour position . However, Lee 
seemed to have decided that the election would be fought on 
the manpower question, and monetary reform, -vrhich had been 
stressed in 1940, occupied only a subordinate place in the 
party 's policy in 1943. 
As might have been expected , the most contentious domestic 
issue in the campaign derived from the problem of rehabilitation. 
This was t he effort to secure land for servicemen and to stabil-
ise land prices t hrough the Servicemen ' s Settlement and Land 
Sales Act . This was passed in haste a t the end of the 1943 
session , but it provided by far the bitterest issue in the 
campaign. Pressure had been growing for some time for control 
(1) Ibid., 29 April 1943 . 
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of land values , which had risen spectacularly since 1939 , 
for memories of the failure of soldier settlement on the land 
after World War I were still keen, and this \vas mainly attrib-
uted to the high prices then paid for land. t the Labour 
Party conference Moohan , the chairman of the Rehabilitation 
Board , spoke of the difficulties already being faced by the 
Board in acquiring land for discharged servicemen owing to the 
high prices that were being asked , and added that "the only way 
is for the Government to take strong action and get land at a 
fair price for soldiers . 11 The Conference 1 s Land and gricul-
ture Committ ee presented a report calling for stabilisation of 
land prices and the right of the State to have first refusal in 
all land transfers. Barclay , the Minister of Agriculture, pro-
mised that measures to stop inflation and aggregation of land 
would be prepared. (1) 
The eturned Services 1 Association 1 s Dominion Council meet-
ing in May resolved that 11 this ssociation is strongly aga i nst 
the policy of land aggregation as permitted at present, 11 and 
also that returned s er vicemen shoul d be able to a cquire f r ee -
hold far m land "at its productive va l ue . 11 ( 2 ) The Far mer s 1 
Union , in a pol i cy stat ement at t he same time , s a i d that i t was 
11 anxious t o find a means of limiting t he inflation of values of 
l and sold to returned servicemen which will be fair t o l and -
owners and r et urned servicemen a like". However , the statement 
(1) Standar d , 6 May 1943 . 
(2 ) R. S. A. Review , July 1943 . 
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said nothing about compulsory acquisition of land . (1) The 
President of the Union , Mulholland , in his address to the 
Dominion Conference two months later, showed that he was opp-
osed completely to the Government ' s thinking on the subject . 
He urged caution in any subdivision of existing holdings , and 
said that the "productive value" was completely unrealistic 
as a basis on which to acquire land for settlement. At any 
rate, he said, most returned servicemen would acquire land 
through "the private acquisition of individual farms", so the 
main need would be for finance to enable them to do this. He 
recognised the need for preventing inflation of land values, 
but condemned any idea of "fixing the absolute value of land 
over a period of years . 11 ( 2) 
Nulholland had probably a good idea of what the Govern-
ment's proposals were , for his object i ons anticipated closely 
the Servicemen ' s Settlement and Land Sales Bill . The ma in 
provisions were announced on 5 August. It was described as 
-n act to provide for t he acquisition of land for the 
settlement of discharged servicemen; and to provide 
for the control of sa le s and leases of land in order 
to facilitate the settlement of discharged service ~ 
men, and to prevent undue increases in the prices of 
land , t he undue aggregation of land , and its use for 
speculative or uneconomic purposes. 
Part I of the Bill set up a Land Sales Court and local 
Land Sales Committees to set t he "basic price" of land chang-
ing hands. Part II gave the Government the right to take over 
(1) Dominion, 17 May 1943 . 
(2) Ibid., 15 July 1943. 
265 
for rehabilitation purposes, land subdivisible into two or 
three or more far ,ns , at 30 days 1 notice. Objections could 
be lodged with the Court. Part III, \vhich caused the controv-
ersy, dealt with the control of sales . A Land Sales Committee 
had to approve all sales under the provisions of the ct , and if 
the Committee concerned thought the land was suitable for soldier 
settlement it had to be offered to the State , which had one month 
in lvhich to acquire it, compulsorily if necessary. Bart IV 
def i ned the "basic price" , vlhich vTas to be the maximum price 
pai d by individuals and the compensation price paid by the State. 
This vras to be a capitalisation at four and a half per cent of 
the nett annual revenue "derivable from the land by an average 
efficient farmer". The revenue was to be calculated on produce 
prices at 15 December 1942. For urban land the "basic value" 
was to be the value at the same date , with such variations as the 
committee thought "fair ". (1) 
The objections were not long in coming , and their tone was 
bitterly antagonistic. The l•'armers 1 Union called it "entirely 
~nsatisfactory ••. • an attack on property , part icularly land, 
camouflaged as a measure for soldier settlement, 11 ( 2 )and the 
ssociated Chambers of Commerce protested that it used "the 
public demand for s oldier settlement to cloak an attempt on the 
part of the Government to promote its policy of land nat ionali-
sation . 11 (3) Similar protests came from the Real Estate Institute 
(1) Dominion , 5 August 1943. (2) Ibid ., 7 ugust 1943 . 
(3) Ibid ., 9 August 1943 . 
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the Sheepo1:mers • Federation and the Farmers • Federation. 
t1ore startling was the unprecedented intervention of the Law 
Society. The Society ' s main quarrel was with Part III of the 
Bill, \'lhich it warned would 11 lead to evasion on a large scale 11 • 
Attempts to carry out these provisions , , the Society warned, 
would produce "such delay and difficulties and costs •••• as to 
make the measure entirely unvTorkable 11 • ( 1 ) The Society 1 s other 
comments were far from impartial or unpolitical (as they were 
claimed to be) but its object i ons to Part III were serious and 
the Bill was later revised to meet some of them. 
The .S.A. seemed extremely embarrassed by the Bill. The 
Dominion Council acknowledged that it met its demands for action 
to 11 establish11 farm and house values . It also stated that prov-
isions for compulsory purchase of land seemed necessary , because 
the .s .. had arranged meet ings in farming districts to obtain 
land for subdivision but had found the results disappointing . 
However , the Association vlas not happy about the Bill 11 as pres-
ently drafted 11 and proposed that it be split into tvTO Bills, 
one for stabilisation of prices of land and the other for comp-
ulsory acquisition. (2 ) l1eanwhile protests from provincial and 
local Farmers• Union branches and Chambers of Commerce were well 
reported in the press every day. Fe"~1l paid any attention to the 
need to stop the inflation of land values or to settle servicemen , 
but concentrated on the interference 1vith property rights and the 
(1) Ibid ., 10 ugust 1943 . 
(2) Ibid ., 12 August 1943. 
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danger of "socialisation of the land". The main points of 
grievance vrere that compulsory acquisit ion under the Bill would 
be arbitrary and unfair, and t hat there was no right of appeal 
f rom the Land Sales Court 1 s decisions. 
The only a lternative proposals 1.1ere made by the Far mers 1 
Union on 20 August. Mortgage limitation, and transfer fees 
for land transactions were suggested with the Crown to have 
the right t o acquire land if it was offered for sale. cquis-
ition of land was to be made only through the 1925 Lands for 
Settlement ct. These proposals, as Nash pointed out· in Parli-
ament the next day, worked to the advantage of buyers who could 
pay cash for land (which most servicemen could not), were not 
sufficient to prevent inflation of values and provided no effec-
tive povrers of acquisition . The Government , as the tone of 
Nash 1 s remarks showed , did not even consider the proposals ser-
iously. (1 ) It was encour aged s hortly afterwards by a statement 
by C. O. Bell, the vice-president of the R. S . A. Bell said that 
"ther.e vTas as yet nothing (in the Bill) about \vhich the public 
should become unduly a l armed", and pointed out that calculations 
on the December 1942 values of land would give vendors 11 some 
very pleasant shocks 11 • ( 2 ) Sir William Perry, the president of 
t he~ . S.A., supported the Bill in the Legislative Council at 
the end of .1.1.ugust, because, he said, no a lternative had been 
produced except for the nextraordinaryn proposals of the Farm-
ers 1 Union • ( 3 ) 
(1) Ibid., 21 August 1943. 
(2) I bid., 2 September 1943. 
(3) NL:PD., Vol.263, p.966. 
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Certai nly no alternative was put forward by the National 
Party. 
tha t 
The day before the Bill was introduced Polson said 
The Opposition was just as anxious to see that the 
soldiers got a square deal as was the Government 
and would support any measure that would settle 
the soldiers on the land under conditions where 
they could be successful, 
and his statement was welcomed by the Government . (1 ) However, 
when the Bill was introduced the Opposition needed very little 
t i me to decide to oppose it. Holland admitted that the mist-
akes made after 1918, when "many men never had a chance", could 
not be repeated, and sai d that the Nat ional Party approved of 
compulsory acquisition of land. However , he objected to the 
Bill on the general ground of the complaints previously menti-
oned. 
"The Government sets out under this Bill, and under 
the cloak of reference to is as a servicemen ' s 
settlement Bill , to impose pure and unadulterated 
State control of all transactions in l and •••• al -
though the Bill is called a servicemen ' s settlement 
Bill, it is aimed deliberately at every owner of 
property . " 
His one positive proposal was startlingly frank; land 
should be given to servicemen at the productive value, but 
bought from the present o11ners at "a fair market price", "the 
difference to be carried by the community as a whole" . (2 ) Not 
even all Nat ional members agreed wi th this; Bodkin , in reply 
to a question from Nordmeyer, said that land should be bought 
( 1 ) I bid. , p. 503 . 
(2) Ibid ., pp. 675-682. 
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by the State at its productive value . (1) The Nat i onal Party 
fought the Bill bitterly in the House , and the problem of 
settling returned men on the land was generally lost sight of 
amid charges that the Bill denied the freehold and provided 
for socialisation of the land . Both these charges were wildly 
exaggerated , and references to socialisation of the land were 
made so often that the Speaker ruled them out of order as ted-
ious repetition in the second reading debate. (2 ) 
Unfortunately there were no Standing Orders on tedi ous rep-
etition in back-country election campaigns, where National cand-
idates painted a lurid picture of the effects of the ct . The 
legislation was complicated and difficult to understand , and 
probably many farmers had no clear idea of its provisions apart 
from the summaries given by Nat i onal speakers. Often these 
were completely distorted. A . J. Hurdoch claimed that it vlould 
result in "complete socialisation of the land" , (3)and S.1rJ . Smith 
(Bay of Islands) that "no freehold vlas to be allowed for any 
land acquired under the Bill" and that "the Labour Government 
has used the returned soldiers to interfere with your land and 
mine". (4) 
The Goverrunent was partly to blame for the misconceptions 
about the Act. It int roduced it on 4 August , only three weeks 
before the end of the session, and it was pushed through hurri-
(1) Ibid., p . 729. 
(2) Ibid ., p. 876. 
(3) Northern Advocate, 27 August 1943 . 
(4) Ibid . , 6 September 1943 . 
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i edly . The Bill showed s i gns of hasty pr eparation. Barclay , 
int r oducing it , did not seem very familiar with its terms . In 
the committee stages the Government itself introduced a number 
of amendments to rectify badly drafted and ambiguous cl auses . 
These provided th~t a maj~rity decision of the Land Sales 
Court had to include the Judge , the exclus i ve application of 
some sections to farm land was a larified , and the term of the 
ct was restricted to five years after the end of the vTar , 
instead of an indefinite per i od as orig i nally proposed . (1 ) 
The Government \vas taken aback at the strength of opposi-
t i on to the Bill , and had obviously expected that it vTould find 
general support because of its attempt to grapple with the re-
habilitation problem. Barclay ' s personal experience made him 
take this view , as an exchange with Polson showed . 
11lir . Barclay - As I have told this Ho use before , I am 
a returned serviceman from the 1914- 1918 war , and I 
sold · y farm for 25 an acre to go to the war . vlhen 
I came back ••• • the 1nan to \·Thom I sold the land had 
just refused £40 an acre for it. Are we going to 
allow that sort of thing to occur aga i n? 
Hr . Polson - The Hinister :1as never got over it. 
Hr . Barclay - No , I have not . I am going to see 
that t he returned soldiers of this war are not 
11 socked 11 in the "l:la I \vas 11 socked 11 as \vell as 
thousands of others \vho vlere at th~ 1 914 - 1 918 1var . " (2) 
ro -one questioned t hat land had to be made avai+able to 
serviceinen a t its product ive value , but the Government found 
that this did no t mean an end to controversy over the Bill . 
In fact, the Government added to t his controversy by failing 
(1) N~PD . , Vol . 263, pp . 900 - 5. 
(2) I bid ., p. 673 . 
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to realise the extent offeeling over the i s sue of the free-
hold. Although the . s.~ . had said that this should be 
given to all ulen settled on the land under the Bill, Fraser, 
when the Bill was fir st introduced , brushed aside t he problem 
by saying 
"I am not going to enter into an argument about f r ee -
hold or leasehold in connection with the settlement 
of s oldiers . If our proposals are put into effect 
the value will be there , whether it is a matter of 
leasehold or freehold , and that is what I am concerned 
about . 11 (1 ) 
Nevertheless , Fraser thought it prudent in his opening 
campaign speech to pledge that t he party would grant the free -
bald ''on cert a in l ands '' · 2 ) The final formula \vas arrived at 
in an interesting way . D. V; Bryant , a member of the Waikato 
Land Settlement Society , had campaigned with t he R.S • • in 
Hatlilton for t he right of servicemen to choose the tenure t hey 
desil ed . n 24 ugust lraser wrote to _ryant that t hey would 
be ~iven the ri~ht to the free~old on the pat t ern of the Soci-
et 1 s m·m scheme. This granted al l the incidence of freehold 
e~cept t he ri~ht of free a lienation , which required t he consent 
of the l.linister of Lands . (3) This agreement should have ended 
the controver sy , ~ut strange l y enough it was 0 iven little prom-
inence in the city nevis papers, and by September t he question of 
the free~old had be come hope lessly confused by National Party 
s tate1nents t ha t it 1vould not be r anted to any returned soldier. 
( 1) Ibid ., p . 719. 
( 2 ) Dominion, 31 ugust 1943 . 
(3 ) 1aikato Times, 31 August and 20 September , 1943 . 
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Labour speakers emphasised that those desiring it would get 
it , and on 16 September Jarclay revealed that out of 212 
a pplications for land, 100 had been settled and the applic-
ant had been granted the free hold in every cas e . Barclay 
also emphasised that t he Gover nment woul d take land on l y 
"from t ose vlho are not us i ng it". No houses would be taken, 
and no large holdi ng s which 'ivere fully productive . (1 ) Labour 
candidates tried to assure rural audiences that no land vlould 
be t aken from any farmer act ually working it fully , but Nation-
a l candidates po i nt ed out t hat t his was hot guaranteed by the 
1 ct and that t he Government had pmrer under it to acquire almost 
any l and so long as a farmer was l eft 'ivith an "economic holdi n ". 
There v.rere a lso misgi v ings about terms such as "fai r value" and 
"productive value", for t hese were no t defined i n the Act and 
there was only t he Government ' s word t hat these and the compul-
sory ac uisition provisions would be fairly administered. 
The Government was a ble , however, to prove its good faith 
on one point . The Oppos ition , dur i ng the debate in the House 
and the campaign, had said that t he ct was largely unne cessary 
as t her e 'ivas much second-class and Crmm l and that could be 
developed for soldier settlement. dan Nat ional candidates , 
in fact, derici..ed service .. 1en 1..-rho v1ere not pre ared to " o into 
t ~18 back- bl ocks 11 • Labour, hm,rever , he ld that second-class l and 
\vas not suitable for soldier settlement, and pledged that re turned 
(1) Northern Advocate, 17 September 1943 . 
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servicemen would be given first-class land and would not be 
put on isolated farms. Had the issue been conf ined to this 
uestion Labour's proposals might have appeared in a better 
lig~1t , but the party \·Tas all too often embroiled in pointless 
arguments about the freehold , and in assuring farmers that 
Sillall holdi ngs would not be taken . 
Since t he SvTing a1my fro:n Labour vias so marked in rural 
areas in 1943 s ohle consideration illisht be given to other Gov-
erntilellt policies and act ions concerning the farmers. Hos til-
ity tmvards Labour in the countryside vras marked. Barclay, 
the 1~inister of .At;riculture , \·Tho 1vas a far1ner himself and sym-
pathetic to farmers ' probleas , vras nonetheless given very rough 
treatment by audiences when he spoke in country districts. t 
Eltl1a1 , at the be i nnin of the election ca.npaign , a mot ion of 
no -confidence in him and the Governaent was carried with accla-
itlation. (1 ) Barclay vras unfairly made the butt of far~'lers' dis-
satisfaction vrith the Governlllent , and his defeat in ~Iarsden \vas 
\'lidely admit ted to be a poor re"llrard for his own efforts to amel-
iorate their vTartime difficulties . 
1Tevertheless, the Government did not make Barclay 1 s task 
any easier . Farmers naturally turned back to Nat ional as mem-
aries of the depression faded and overseas prices increased, but 
the Gover nm.en t itself accelerated this trend vrith a series of 
(1) Dominion , 2 September 1943 . 
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pinpricks which by 1943 resulted in universal resentment 
against Labour in rura l areas . The Land Sales Act was 
merely the last and most spectacular of these . Iuch bad 
feeling au1ong sheep farmers \vas caused by the Government 's 
attitude to the 15 per cent increase in 1942 -43 1vool prices . 
lhen this vras granted in 1942 by Great Britain, the Government 
decided that, since between £2,250 , 000 and £2 , 500,000 was inv-
olved , it would have an inflationary effect if distributed all 
at once. The vJoolgrowers , however , '"ere aga inst any part of 
the payment being deferred. (1 ) In January 1943 the Stabilisa-
tion Cotmnission recommended that six and one half per cent of 
the payment be vTithheld ·of Hhich five and one half per cent 
would go to a reserve stabilisation fund for the industry and 
one per cent towards stabilis i ng the Nevi lealand pr ice for vTOof~) 
The Government , hovrever , deci ed to withhold ten per cent of the 
amount , four per cent of which vJOuld be pa id to the growers at 
the end of the season and five per cent paid in non-negotiable 
Government bonds . One per cent, about £220,000, 1vas withheld 
f or stabilisation purposes . (3 ) There was an i mmediate outcry 
when this was announced, and it persisted unabated throughout 
the rest of the year. Far mers argued that they had been singled 
out for special treatment when the stabilisation policy was supp-
osed to apply to all. They also complained with justification 
that , by being issued with bonds , they were the only group in 
(1) Ibid ., 26 June 1 942 . 
( 2 ) Ibid ., 13 January 1943. 
(3) Ibid ., 30 January 1943 . 
275 
the community which was forced to contribute to a Government 
loan. The Nationa l Party follmied the Farmers 1 Union in 
demanding that the farmers be paid the whole amount \vithout 
qualification, and a number of Labour candidates in rural 
areas also condemned the Government 1 s attitude . Altogether 
the affair created much bad feeling, particular~y since the 
Government did not even accept the Stabilisation Commission ' s 
recommendations. 
Jartime stabilisation as it affected the dairy industry 
produced more deep-seated problems . Here stability of prices 
without stability of costs produced unforeseen results which 
the Government recognised only s lov1ly and unwillingly. 
reservoir of ill-,vill toward the Government had been established 
by the refusal to increase the guaranteed pr ice in 1938, and 
this built up during the war years. For four years after 1938 
the price remained unchanged at 14 .89d per pound for butter, 
and 8 . 42d per pound for cheese. During these years production 
costs skyrocketed on farms and in dairy factories (1)and there 
had been two general awards of the Arbitration Court increasing 
\vages - one in August 1 <140 and the other in pril 1942. 
It was not until August 1942 that any additional payment 
was made for increased costs, and this was a nwar Costs AllovT-
ancen, not .an increase in the guaranteed price . ith the 
advent of general price stabilisation in December 1942 it became 
(1) See A. J . Sinclair , Guaranteed Prices for Dairy Produce ( 1 946) p. 24. 
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clear that a further adjustment was necessary before the dairy 
industry would accept the proposals. A committee represent ing 
the industry and the Government was set up to cons i der how much 
production costs per pound of butter fat had risen since 1938, 
and in July 1943 it repor ted that an addit i onal far m costs 
allowance of 0 . 767d per pound and a factory costs allovTance of 
0 . 269d per pound would br i ng the relat i on between prices and 
costs back to the 1938 l evel. The Government a pproved these 
increases , whi ch Barc lay descr i bed as a just settlement of the 
industry ' s clai ms . (1) This was true in that the payout for the 
1943 - 44 season included an allowance for cost increases since 
1938 , but there was no back payment to cover the two previous 
years in which no cost allowance had been made . 
In addition, the industry itself was paying for i ts cost 
a l lowance, for it was made from the Dairy Industr y Stabi l i sa -
tion Account , whi ch was credited vrith proceeds f r om i ncreased 
prices for butter and cheese after the introduction of s t abil -
isation . Farm spokesmen were qui ck to point out that some 
other industries , particularly the mines , had rece i ved cost 
allowances from general revenue , even in some cases from the 
ar Expenses Account . Thus the Government had actual l y modi-
fied the whole pr i nciple of the guarant eed pr i ce by maki ng a 
belat ed cost allowance instead of realis i ng that , despite the 
introduction of stabilisation , circumstances required an incre-
ase in the price . 
(1) NZPD . , Vol . 263, pp . 375 - 6 . 
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There was no doubt that the Govermnent ' s attitude to 
cost increases caused a serious loss of confidence in its 
intent i ons toward the farmers , and the 1943 allowances came 
too late to offset this feeling. The swing to the National 
arty in dairying areas was due rather to this discont ent , 
and to the party ' s skilful exploitation of it, than to any 
proposals which it put forward. In fact , Nat i onal policy 
for the dairy industry was scarcely taken seriously by many 
of the industry ' s spokesmen. 
party ' s manifesto read 
The relevant passage in the 
Guaranteed minimum prices for farm produce , with 
ceiling prices determined by the producers them-
selves . 
How the producers would do this, and how the minimum pri ce 
would be financed , was never set out in deta i l , despite urging 
from farmers • spokesmen. At a meet i ng of the South uckland 
Dairy Association late in August 1943 the only delegate to try 
to interpret the policy was A. J. Sinclair, a well - known critic 
of the Guaranteed Price Scheme, who sai d that he took it to 
mean that the maximum price would be set by a represent ative 
committee similar to that whi ch had-determined the 1942 - 43 
cost allowances. This Committee , however, comprised represen-
tatives of the producers, the Government , and the Stabi lisation 
Commission , and not just of "the producers themselves". The 
a~rJa ikato Times" reported that 
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Others expressed uncertainty as to vlhat l'f.li' . Holland 
meant and asked how a ceiling price could be fixed 
when the sale price on the greater part of New Zea-
l and ' s d~iry output was subject to overseas influ-
ences .C 1J 
Actually , Nat i onal s pokesmen did not give their party ' s 
s cheme much attention . The tenor of t he ir campaign was rather 
that the Government had been excessively niggardly in i ts atti-
tude to the guaranteed price. Nat i onal policy must be seen as 
a reflection of the demand that t he pr i ce be raised rather than 
a desire to do away with the scheme . 
~arm labour shortages have already been mentioned as a 
seri ous difficulty in the war year s . It will be seen from 
Table 2 t hat t he shortage was at its worst between 1941 and 
1944 . It was evident f rom questions and complai nts voiced 
at meet i ngs in country .districts t hat labour shortages were a 
major topic , and the Government ' s man power policies had obvi-
ously antagonised farmers mor e than any other group . Labour 
speakers 1vere often confronted vJ ith cases of women and old 
people hav ing to work long hours \·Ther e t he mmer of a one -man 
farm had been called up. 
These difficulties , and the political effect they had , 
must be kept in their pro per perspective vrhen considering the 
swi ng aga inst Labour in farming districts. The wool rebate , 
the Servicemen ' s Sett l ement and Land Sales ct , and the belated 
adjustment of dairy industry costs , 1vere serious irritants, and 
(1) Wa i kato Times , 30 August 1943 . 
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they undoubtedly caused a sudden decrease in Labour's rural 
support in the 1940 ' s. Hovrever, these factors must be set 
against the background of the complete change in farmers ' 
circumstances since 1935. The difference in farm income 
and prosperity between then and 1943 needs no stressing here. 
War conditions gave Nevr lealand a more assured market in Great 
Britain than ever before , and despite the static guaranteed 
price these long-term contracts actually resulted in a sudden 
increase in farm produce income at the beginning of the war. 
A steady increase was maintained during the war years .<1) The 
success of Government policies for the dairy industry may be 
seen in the fact that there was no argument with the principle 
of the guaranteed price in 1943. National candidates disreg-
arded the vague wording of their manifesto , and instead pressed 
simply for an increase in the price , emphasising for good mea-
sure the general 1vage increases that had been granted during the 
war years . 
Viev.red in retrospect, Labour's success in rural seats in 
1935 and , to a lesser extent, in 1938 was the result of a temp-
orary departure from rural voting patterns. Labour's mistake 
in 1943 was in thinking that the i mprovement in farmers • circum-
stances since 1935 would accrue as additional Labour support in 
rural seats. \hat happened was that increased prosperity , and 
the fading of meQories of the depression years, resulted in a 
swing back to National, and t his vias accelerated by the Govern -
(1) New Zealand Official Year Book , 1946, p. 267. 
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ment 1 s bad hand ling of such mat t ers as the woo l rebate and 
the Land Sales legislation. The basic reason for the svTing 
away from Labour was 1.vell express ed by J.G . Barclay, the 
Minister of griculture from 1941 to 1943 and one of the 
casualties i n the election, i n a letter to the author i n 1961. 
The farmers turned aga i nst Labour for the same reason 
that they turned against the Liberals many years ago . 
~hey turned against the Li berals because t he Seddon-
Ballance Government brought in cheap money and made 
them prosperous and prosperour people vJill ahTays be-
come conservative ••.. The war condit ions and increa-
sed pr ic es for their products (for which the guarant -
eed price was only a minor consideration), turned t he 
farmers conservative and nothing on the face of the 
earth will turn them back until prices for their prod-
ucts recede again. 
T BLE 2 ( 1 ) 
Es timat e of Farm Labour Force 
1 2 
Permanent a les on All Farm Labour, Males 
Year Holdings 1 acre and and Females inc. Casuals 
over on a ll holdings. 
1000 persons . 1000 persons . 
1938-39 11 9 . 0 157 
1 939- 40 117 . 0 154 
1 940-41 102 . 0 140 
1 941 -42 87 . 0 125 
1942-43 87 .o 125 
1943 - 44 89 .0 127 
1 944-45 92.0 130 
1945 - 46 108.0 137 
1946-47 112.9 135 
(1) This table is taken from B. P. Philpott and J.D. Stewart, 
Income and Productivity in New Zealand Farming 1921-1956 ( 1 95 8) p . 21 • 
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THE ELECTION CAHP I GN 
The fact t hat the country was at \var i mpressed itself on 
the whole campaign. Candidates and part ies faced a number of 
difficult i es . John • Lee , recalling the campai gn in conver-
sation \vith the author , described it as a "blackout election" . 
len \vere either overseas , in camp , the :-rome Guard or fire-
watching , and women did not want to leave children at home 
alone in the evenings. Fuel shortages often made it difficult 
to heat a hall for a meet i ng , and petrol rationing , despite the 
special allowances for campaigning , cut dovln the use of cars. 
The us e of paper was also carefully controlled . Allocations 
to parties and to individua l Inde pendent candidates were strictly 
set , and each itew printed had to bear on it a "consent nwnber", 
to shmv that the use of the paper had been approved by the Dir-
ector of ublicity . 
The ne\v parties and the Independents complained bitterly 
about a llocations of rad i o time. Democratic Labour was allowed 
only one broadcast , and that over only two stations in the first 
week of September . Lee protested about this,C 1)and wit h reason , 
for an early broadcast meant that Government speakers had three 
weeks in which to answer the points he raised and to put Lab-
our 1 s case on the air every alternate night . The Independent 
Group v.ras allowed on studio broadcast , and this 1tras given by 
C. D. Drummond , a \vell -knmrn and effective radio announcer. The 
J.eal Democracy dovement , however , was not a llowed a broadcast , 
(1) Dominion, 31 ugust 1943 . 
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although it had 17 candidates and the Independent Group only 
six more. The Ninister of Broadcasting refused the R. D. 1 . 
request with the lame excuse , on 31 ugust , that all subse -
quent evenings had been allocated for broadcasts . (1) tmore, 
the Independent member for Nelson, was allowed a broadcast 
l.f•S 
meeting, but BarnardArefused this and offered only a half-hour 
studio broadcast from Napier. (2 ) 
Despite these handicaps many of the nmv- . party and Indepen-
dent candidates made effective campa igns. Some printed a sur-
prising amount of pamphlet material, and the best speakers att-
racted larger audiences than did Labour or Nat ional candidates 
in their electorates. Newspaper coverage of the campaign was 
usually scrupulously fair. In fact, some newspapers gave far 
more space to Independent and small party candidates, apparently 
be cause they made bet ter news and had something ne\v to say. Lee 
considered that newspapers \vere "very fair" in the amount of 
space given the Democratic Labour campaign . (3 ) 
Nevertheless, it is doubtful \vhether the press gave a true 
picture of the campaign. ne has only to remember that had a 
directive from the censor not been intentionally contravened 
early in September , t here would have been no mention of the 
hea ted discussion on the furlough scheme and the future dispos-
ition of New ~ealand forces. The newspapers, as Lee said, 
(1) Press, 1 September 1943. 
(2) Dominion, 6 Septembe~ 1943 . 
(3) J. • Lee, interview with the author. 
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"damped dovrn" the who l e campa ign. References to t he war and 
to manpov1er \vere kept to a minimum . This is particularly ev-
ident \•Then re ports in the city press are compared \vith those 
in some small-town and rural papers. i·Iany of t hese gave very 
full reports of meet ings , and therefore a much clearer idea of 
\·rha t t he candidates vrere saying a bout some of the really contro -
versial issues. It is only when such full reports were given 
t hat it is possib le to gauge t he relative i mportance of the 
issues . 
Forecasts of a "dirty election" vrere rea lised in some of 
the pamphlet material . By far t he worst example \vas the Feder-
at i on of Labour ' s pamphlet attacking Lee.< 1 ) Otherwise , the 
liveli est Labour-Democratic Labour ex changes seem to have been 
restricted to me etings. This aspect of t he campa ign was like-
vr ise kept out of most press re ports. >lost party propaganda was, 
however, restra i ned and not on a personal level . 
(1) See above , p. ISS"-f:. . 
7 
THE RESULTS 
National was the only party which gained anything from 
the elect ion, and in terms of seats won the result was very 
satisfactory for it . It lost Eastern Naori, but won eight 
others from Labour. No minor party or Independent candidate 
won a seat , apart from tmore , who held Ne lson with Labour 
support. Hm:ever , while there was a S\ving from Labour to 
Nat ional in terms of seats held , the gain was by no means as 
i mpressive as it seemed. Five of Nat ional's new seats were 
won with minority votes , and four of these would have remai ned 
in Labour's hands but for the intervention of Democratic Labour 
candidates . The actual vote for the National Party in 1943 
showed a smaller increase than in any other election between 
1935 and 1949, as Table III ma kes clear . Yet at the same 







T .DLE III (1) 
ercentage of vote polled by Labour and 
I~tional Parties , 1935-1949 
Labour Nat ional 
50 . 60 36 . 43 
57 . 09 42 . 63 
47 . 22 43 . 30 
50 . 83 48.98 
46 . 54 52 . 62 
thers 
12 . 97 
0 . 29 
9. 48 
0 .1 9 
0 .84 
This gap bet\veen the Labour loss and the Nat ional ga i n was 
filled by the votes for three ne\v parties and the Independent 
(1) All figures in tables in this chapter refer to the European 
electorates only . 
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candidates. These were distributed as follows , 
Democratic Labour . . • • 40 , 433 4 . 44% 
Independent Group 7 '1 86 0 .79% 
eal Democracy vfovement .. 6 , 096 0 . 67% 
Independent candidates . . . 32 ,704 3 .58% 
These candidates obvi ously played an important part in det -
ermining how many votes the major parties gai ned or lost . The 
most clear -cut case v;as the sp+it in the Labour vote caused by 
the intervention of Democratic Labour , and this \vill be examined 
later in t his chapter. Hmvever , intervention by minor party and 
Inde pendent candidates also had serious effects on the National 
vote . This is most clearly seen in the electorates where it 
showed a decrease s i nce 1938. This happened in 13 electorates. 
able IV shows t hat in no case was this decrease due to an 
increase in the Labour vote. In fact , this also decreased shar-
ply in most of the electorates listed. In a nwnber the Nat ional 
decrease was due to the intervention of candidates who would 
clearly be expected to split the party •s vote . In Riccarton 
Kyle•s name remained on the ballot papers although he withdrew 
before election day. He polled 272 votes , just enough to stop 
any increase in the Nat ional vote . In Hanawatu , S . J.E . Closey, 
a critic of Nat ional' s agricultural policies , polled 675 votes. 
The result in Remuera was more complicated. The .D.M. candid-
ate and one misce llaneous Independent (polling together 2 .1 3 per 
cent of the total) apparently combined vTith the Independent Group 
to siphon avTay. any possible increase in the Nat ional vote . 
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TABLE rv 
El ectorates showi ng decr eate)in Nat i onal 
Vote 1938 -1 943 1 
El ectorate N% L % D. L. I. G. Ot her s de crease decrease %age %age 
Na pier 0 . 01 22 . 04 22 . 05 
Ric carton 0 .11 8 . 41 6 . 67 1. 85 
I•Ianavla tu 0 .1 6 5 . 99 6 .1 5 
Hasterton 0 . 87 7 . 38 5 . 54 2 . 71 
Ka i para 0 . 95 14 . 74 18 .33 
Dunedi n North 1.07 6 . 72 1. 83 5 . 96 
Remuera 1 .53 4 .1 3 2 .11 1. 42 2 .1 3 
Wellington Subs . 1 . 57 9 . 86 11 . 33 
Auckland Centra l 2 . 20 8 . 01 7 .1 0 3 .11 
vJ anganui 3 . 80 15 .1 2 6 .1 6 12 .76 
Timaru 3 . 89 8 . 08 11 • 97 
Grey Lynn 3 . 93 20 . 54 23 . 29 0 . 53 0 .65 
Hutt 7 . 55 17 . 70 2 . 76 22 . 49 
In Wanganui the R. D. 1. candidate reduced the totals of both 
Labour and National , and J . H. Hogan •s high vote as an Indepen-
dent in Hutt obv i ously had even more drast i c effects on the votes 
of both major parties. The remaining cases are the most inter -
est i ng . D. M. McClure , the Independent candidate for Auckl and 
Central , advertised the fact that he was an original member of 
the New Zealand Soci a l ist Par t y , but his votes in 1943 were 
taken mainly from Nat i onal . In Napier and Ka i para , the Indep-
endents both favoured national uni ty and , desp i te their Labour 
(1) Abbreviat i ons used in this and subsequent tables: 
N ::;: National , L = Labour , D. L. =Democratic Labour , 
I. G. = Independent Gr oup , . D. :. = Real Democracy :Hovement . 
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view , took some votes from Nat ional . In Wellington Suburbs , 
Timaru and Grey Lynn , however , the decrease was due to the 
Democratic Labour candi dates . This throws an interesting 
light on the appeal of Democratic Labour. The party , in 
these three electorates at least , not only stopped a drift 
from Labour to National , but took s ome votes which had gone 
to the latter in 1 938 . This was probably due to Democratic 
Labour 1 s outlook on such questions as manpower and compulsory 
inionism , vrhere it and the Nat iona l Party pre sented similar 
criticisms of Labour policy , and its emphasis on private enter-
pr i se , part icularly in small bus i ness . The trend in these 
elector ates need not have been follmved elsevlhere . Lee , Frame 
and Cremvell , the Democratic Labour candi dates , "l.>~ere probably 
the best campaigners in the party , and none had a very effect-
ive Nat ional opponent. However , it is clear that at least the 
best of the Democratic Labour candidates could take votes from 
Nat ional as vrell as Labour . 
Labour 1 s vote showed~ decrease in all electorates , a lth-
ough the actual amount varied considerably . The largest losses 
of course , occurred lvhere the votes for other left -wing candid-
ates 1r1ere strongest , and they 1>1ere not allvays accompanied by 
National gains . In fact , in Napier , Grey Lynn and Hutt, vrhere 
Labour lost most votes , National 1 s share of the total als o dec-
reased . The same happened in Hanganui and Kaipara , both of 
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vlhich shmved heavy Labour and smaller National losses. There 
was , in fact , only one e l ectorate in which Labour lost more 
than ten per cent of its vote where National ga ined a compar -
able amount . This was Bay of Plenty , 1.vhere the swing was 
10 .1 6 per cent. There were 27 electorates in which Labour 
lost a higher propor tion than this, but in none of these was 
the Nat ional gain above eight per cent. 
Such large LaboL~ losses were usually caused by the inter-
vention of Democratic Labour candidates. tiowever , Table V, 
which lists the electorates in which Democratic Labour polled 
over seven per cent of t he vote, shows that fe\·T of these rela-
tively large votes seriously eillbarrassed Labour. They were 
al l gathered in the areas of the Goverrunent ' s greatest strength 
and i n nine out of the eleven electorates it was still able to 
poll absolute majorities. 
LVen in Grey Lynn, itrhere Lee polled nearly a quarter of 
the votes , Labour still won 59 per cent of the total. In 
Auckland Suburbs, Hhere the Deuocratic Labour vote , combined 
uith a three per cent Svling to Nat Lmal, caused a 15 . 55 per 
cent decrease in Labou ' s vote , l~son still had a ma jority of 
3 , 000 . De~ocratic Labour was not even responsible for the 
loss o Jay of Islands, 1:here the ::ational candidate won an 
absolute uajor ity. 
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TABL::::: v 
Effect of Democratic Labour Votes 
c-' ("' N. % Electorate D. L. 7; L . 1o L. 10 of total decrease of total of total 
Grey Lynn 23 . 29 20 . 54 59 . 01 16 . 52 
Timaru 11 • 7 6.08 50 . 78 37 . 25 
·~r ellington Suburbs 11 . 33 9 . 86 50 .96 37 . 71 
Auckland \'les t 9 . 77 13 . 82 62 . 56 26 .1 0 
~Je llin ton South 9 . 40 13.1 9 59.91 29 .1 4 
Christchurch East 9 . 23 9 . 35 64 . 39 24 . 38 
Auckland East . 1 0 10.99 47.76 41 . 35 
uckland Suburbs 8 . 56 15.55 54 . 20 31 . 25 
BaJT of Is l ands 7. 7 12.43 3 . 44 53 . 39 
Avon 7 . 76 10 . 69 62 . 06 30 .1 8 
uckland Central 7 . 10 8 . 01 63.88 25 . 91 
These results show why Democratic Labour had no hope of 
success. It could poll substantial votes only in electorates 
with a st ong Labour tradition and a high Labour vote. Thus 
its hi ghest votes 1vere those which did least damage to Labour. 
The Democratic Labour to als in the four seats where it split 
the vote sufficiently to allou a Nat ional victor 1vere actually 
compa atively small. hese vrere 
aite,na a 976 6 . 46% 
IIa~1ilton 885 5 . 64% 
l'las terton 5 1 5 . 54% 
•T lymouth 299 2 . 12% l\; 8 \'l . 
None of these votes vias an thin to feel proud of , nor 
~ere they a basis for possible future increases. The vote in 
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He1·r lymouth 1vas almost the lm·rest polled by the party . Such 
small votes l.!leant inevitabl that supporters were discouraged 
and electors convinced that it had no hope of success , so it 
can be concluded that Democratic Labour affected the result 
only in four electorates vlhere it could not even have hoped to 
hol its vote at anothe election . 
The votes for candidates of the two other new partie s , 
the Independent Group and the eal Democracy Movement , were 
usually too small to ive any clear indication of their effect 
on the major parties ' votes. 'he .D . 11 . vote in ~· anganui, the 
only electorate where the uover,1ent polled over four per cent of 
the total , l:l<J.S tal;:en from ooth Labour and Nat i onal , though prob-
a bl mo e fro,:o. the former. ( 1 ) Only six Independent Group cand-
ida tes polled :..1ore than three per cent of the vote. In f i ve of 
these electorates Nat i onal ' s vote increased by between 1 . 78 an 
u • 97 )er cent • n ~ost other cases, Independent Group candid-
ates probabl cut :~at ional ains by a fe1.v per cent , but they 
were responsible for a decrease in the Pational vote in only 
tHo electorates . Duned i n l';orth, F .A. reane received 5 . 96 
)er cent of the vote, and. ~;ational ' s share declined by 1 . 07 per 
cent. In llasterton, J- •• ~ . oHer ' s share was 2 . 71 per cent , and 
the Nat i onal vote dropped 0 . 87 per cent , although it won the 
seat through the intervention of a Deuocratic Labour candidate. 
Generally , hmvever , there -vras no constant Independent Group 
effect on the Hat ional vote . 
(1) Cf. p. zo7. 
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It is clear that , apart from Jemocrat ic Labour , none of 
the small parties ~layed a significant part in taking votes 
from any one par ty. Yet there 1.vas no Lmiform swi ng from Lab-
our to :'rational even in electorates lvhere there Here "straight 
fi h s" bet1.veen the t1.vo parties in 1 93 and 1 943. 
to Nat ional in these seats were 
Bay of lenty 
Ja i pawa 
I ang it ike i . 
Clutha 
-,Ja i taki 
uned i n . est 






1 0 . 16% 
9 . 31% 
7 . 07/~ 
5 . 25% 
4 . 681~ 
4 . 30f~ 
3 . 39% 
3 . 06% 
2. 7 97'; 
he swings 
Since there vras no intervention by third party or Indepen-
dent candidates here, some other explanation must be found f or 
the variat ions in swi ng . In the remainder of this chapter , an 
examination wi ll oe made of the variat ions in five classes of 
elector ates . The classification of each is determlned by its 
r oportion of "urban" to "rural" populat i on as defined by the 
epresentation co~ ~i ss ions . These proportions had to be.worked 
out by the successive Cornniss ions (rn1til the abolition of the 
country quota in 1945) so that the appropr i ate weighting could 
be given the rural populat i on . ( 1 ) 
he determinations of the 1927 and 1937 epresentation 
Commissions are of relevance to thi s chapter. See 
aJHR, H45 , 1927 and 1937. 
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Using the figures of the Commissions , the 76 European 
electorates have been divided into five classes for the 






Entirely rural or up to 15% urban population 
165o to 35% urban population 
36% to 65% urban population 
66% to 85% urban population 
Hore than 85% urban population 
This classification is fairly similar to Ch~pman 1 s ( 1 ) but 
the categories used here are more closely defined , although 
per haps more arbitrary. Lipson (2)divides electorates into 
f our classes , but without giving the criteria on which his 
classification is based. This detracts rather from its use-
fulness , for such terms as "ma i nly urban" and "mainly rural 11 
are by t hemselves too i mprecise to give much idea of the chara -
cter of an electorate . 
The classification advanced here , though precise , may be 
criticised as too rigid. It is true that the definition of 
11rural 11 population (resident over five miles from a post office) 
used by the epresentation Commissions was in itself arbitrary. 
However, any such classification must be arbitrary to a degree . 
Vlherever the line is drawn t here will a lways be electorates 
which do not fit readily into any class. Rural seats with a 
large mining population (for instance, Buller) are the obvious 
(1) hapman, The Significance of the 1928 General Election 
(T hesis, 1948) pp . 147 et . s eq . 
(2) L. Lipson, The Politics of Equa lity (1948) pp . 204 - 5 . 
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examples. However, any adjustment of categories to accommo-
date such problem cases would quickly call for proportionate 
adjustments for other electorates, and in the end no classif-
ication at all would be possible. Classification on occupa-
tional lines is the only practicable alternative, but requires 
considerable research. Categories would be harder than ever 
to define, and there would be many electorates which overlapped 
several "occupational" classes such as "farming", "mining", etc. 
The classification used here results in surprisingly satis-
factory groupings. Class 1 includes all the purely farming 
electorates, although no distinction can be made between the 
types of farming carried on. The only electorates in Class 1 
with a substantial population not engaged in farming were Otaki 
and Raglan, both of which Labour held by small margins. The 
only other electorate in t his class won by Labour in 1943 was 
Motueka. Class 2 includes a large proportion of dairying elec-
torates, such as Franklin, Waikato, Patea, Stratford and Tauranga. 
One electorate in this class, Otahuhu, was an Auckland suburban 
area, but much of the population was still technically "rural". 
Class 3 is the most interesting. It includes one suburban elec-
torate (Auckland Suburbs) with very little farming population. 
The rest were country towns, surrounded usually by a belt of 
farm land. These were Kaiapoi, Whangarei (Marsden), Masterton, 
Nelson, Oamaru, Thames and Greymouth (Westland). Class 4 com-
prises larger towns (Gisborne, Hamilton, Hastings (Hawkes Bay) 
294 
Napier, New Plymouth and Timaru) and some city suburban seats 
(Riccarton, Wellington Suburbs and Waitemata). The last of 
these still contained some dairy-farming population in 1943. 
Class 5 includes all the "city seats", that is, all the elec-
torates in the four main centres except for the few fringe-
area suburban seats in Class 4. Class 5 also includes the 
secondary cities of Invercargill, Palmerston North and Wanganui . 
Table VI shows the number of seats in the five classes 
after the redistributions of 1927 and 1937. Only the elections 
of 1935, 1938 and 1943 will be compared here. There was no 
equivalent of a Nat ional-Labour contest in 1931, for the fusion 
of Reform and United was not completed and candidates of both 
parties contested many electorates. Unfortunately, the comp-
arison cannot be extended forward to 1946, for after the abol-
ition of the country quota in 1945 no further determinations 
of rural and urban population were made by Representation 
Commissions. 
Although there were new parties in the field in 1935 and 
1943, the main interest at these three elections is in the 
varying fortunes of the Labour and Nat ional Parties in the 
different classes of electorates. These are shown in Tables 
VII and VIII. The percentages in Table VII refer to the com-
bined valid vote in all electorates in each class. 
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TABLE VI 
Numbers of Seats in Classes 1 -5 1 927 and 1 937 
Class 
1 2 3 4 5 
1927 (Affecting elections in 
1928, 1931 and 1935) 
16 18 10 7 25 
1937 (Affecting elections in 17 16 8 9 26 
1938 and 1943) 
TABLE VII 
Percentage of Votes obtained by Labour and National 
Parties in Classes 1-5 
Class 
1 2 3 4 5 
1935 ~ 34 . 93 38 . 54 47 . 88 50 . 47 56 . 21 39 . 70 41 . 41 32 . 59 33 . 95 25 . 94 
1938 ~ 47 . 71 50 . 33 51 . 31 58 . 25 63 . 46 48 . 98 48 . 69 41 . 71 41 . 75 32 . 88 
1943 ~ 39 .1 3 43 . 01 43 . 88 48 .1 2 52.51 56 . 40 50 . 86 43 . 79 42 . 59 35 . 39 
TABLE VIII 
Percentage of Vote gained or lost by Labour and National 
Parties in Classes 1-5 : 1938 and 1943 
Class 
1 2 3 4 5 
1938 ~ +12 . 78 +11 . 79 +3 . 43 + 7 .78 + 7 . 25 
+9 . 28 +7 . 28 t 9.1 2 + 7 . so + 6 . 94 
1943 i -8.58 -7.32 -7.43 -10.13 -10.95 +7 . 42 +2 . 17 +2 . 08 +0 . 64 4- 2 . 51 
296 
Labour was in a strong posit ion in every class of elec-
torate in 1935, and suddenly seemed able to challenge National 
in that party 1 s previously impregnable strongholds - the rural 
seats in Classes 1 and 2. Labour 1 s gains in seats here , as 
shown in Table IX, were, however , deceptive. They were partly 
due to the split National vote, and it should be noted that 
National still held a small lead in votes in Classes 1 and 2. 
1 
TABLE IX 





LN Others 1 N Others 1N Others 1N Others LN Others 
1 935: 5 9 2 11 4 2 9 1 5 2 23 2 1 
1938: 5 11 1 6 10 7 1 8 1 24 2 
1943: 3 14( 1 ) 5 11 5 2 1 5 4 23 3 
In all other classes, however, Labour won a substantial majority 
of votes as well as seats. Despite its almost identical lead 
over National in votes in Classes 3 and 4 , Labour was not able to 
achieve the same clean sweep of seats in the latter as in the 
former. This was because the split vote factor operated with 
greater force in Class 3 than in Class 4.( 2) National 1 s plight 
in the Class 5 seats in 1935 is clear enough. It polled only 
slightly more than a quarter of the votes and won only two seats, 
(1) National won the Bay of Plenty seat from Labour at a by-
election in 1941. 
(2) Atmore , the Independent member for Nelson (Class 3) was a 
consistent supporter of Labour after 1935. 
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although R.A. Wright , an Independent supporter of National, 
held Wellington Suburbs. 
The 1938 election saw a return to the two-party pattern, 
and the disappearance of five of the six Independents elected 
in 1935. In Class 1 H. M. Rushworth retired from Bay Of 
Islands and Labour won the seat. In Class 2, A.C.A. Sexton, 
the Independent Country Party member, lost Franklin to the 
former National member in a three-cornered contest and D. 
McDougall, returned as an Independent in Matama in 1935, lost 
the seat when he joined the Labour Party in 1938. Atmore held 
Nels on (Class 3) with Labour support, but in Class 5 Wright 
lost Wellington West to the Labour candidate. 
National gained ten seats from Labour in 1938. These 
were all in rural areas, where the National vote had been badly 
split in 1935; Labour had then won seven of these ten seats 
with minority votes. However , Table VII shows that Labour's 
vote in Class 1 and 2 increased by a higher percentage than 
did National 's. This fact is generally lost sight of because 
of the loss of seats by Labour, but many Labour members who 
lost rural seats in 1938 increased their votes by a higher per-
centage than did their National opponents. The latter, however, 
had less ground to make up once the split vote factor operating 
in 1935 was eliminated, but the very small majorities of many 
new National M. P. •s left the party with little room for compla-
cency. National 's gain in seats in the Class 2 electorates 
------------- - -
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was made in spite of a Labour lead of 1.64 per cent in votes. 
National won no seats in Class 3 in 1938, although its 
vote increased substantially. In Class 4 Labour \von another 
seat from National although both parties ' vote increased by 
almost exactly the same amount . Here the situation in the 
Class 1 and 2 seats was reversed; Labour increased its rep-
resentation without increasing its share of the vote more than 
National . Labour's hold on the Class 5 seats remained almost 
complete in 1938. 
but only two seats. 
National won 32 . 88 per cent of the vote, 
One of these, Christchurch North, was 
held by the future leader of the party with a slender major ity 
of 492. The other was Remuera, where Endean 's majority of 
2861 made it one of National ' s safest seats. 
In 1938 Labour could still claim to have good support 
in all sections of the community . The National vote showed 
a clear pattern of decline as the content of urban population 
increased, and the party was unable even to win any country 
town seats (the Class 3 electorates). National seemed to be 
becoming more and more a "farmers' party", but without even 
the consolation of a firm hold on the rural seats. Even a 
casual glance at Table VII will show that 1938 and not 1935 
was Labour's high point. Although it lost seats it registered 
substantial increases in votes in all types of electorates, and 
polled a major ity of the votes in four of the five classes. 
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Against this background, the relative importance of 
developments in 1943 is clear. National consolidated rather 
than extended its position in the rural seats (Classes 1 and 
2), Labour's hold on the Class 3 seats was broken, and National 
made the small beginnings of a recovery in urban areas. The 
improvement, however, was not universal. 
actually declined in some city seats. 
National ' s vote 
It was in the Class 1 electorates that the National gain 
in votes most nearly equalled the Labour loss; that is, third 
party candidates in purely rural seats did very little damage 
to Nat ional . The drop in Labour's vote did not mean that it 
lost many seats, but that its rejection in those it lost in 
1938 was confirmed . The hopes encouraged in 1935 that Labour 
might achieve substantial representation in rural seats were 
finally dashed in 1943, and National members elected in 1938 
all had their majorities decisively increased. National had 
already won the Bay of Plenty seat from Labour in the 1941 
by-election. In 1943 it won Bay of Islands and Egmont, where 
the .Independent L. R. Wilkinson had retired. The only seats 
in Class 1 retained by Labour were Motueka , Otaki and Raglan, 
the latter remaining in the party 's hands only because of the 
mining vote. 
Labour ' s loss in the Class 2 seats was not so serious, for 
the small gains by National shovrs that much of it was due to 
third party intervention. Nevertheless , Labour did not obtain 
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majorities in many of the farming areas in the Class 2 seats 
it held. Buller was an exception, having a large mining pop-
ulation, and in Waimarino Langstone 1 s vote was swelled by the 
sawmilling population and by substantial majorities in the 
towns of Taihape and Taumarunui. Marlborough was the only 
Class 2 electorate in which Labour polled well outside the 
towns, but even so Meachen would not have held the seat had 
it not been for his comfortable majorities in the small towns 
of Blenheim and Kaikoura . The results in Otahuhu and Wairar-
apa showed up Labour's unpopularity in rural areas even more . 
In Otahuhu Petrie had majorities at only six out of 24 polling 
places, and these six were all in the suburbs of Auckland -
Otahuhu, Mount Wellington and Westfield, the latter the site 
of a large freezing works. Roberts' position in Wairarapa 
was even stranger. He polled majorities at only ten out of 
61 polling places, and of these ten only four were in the 
Wairarapa itself. These were in the small towns of Carterton, 
Featherston and Greytown, and in the railway settlement at 
Cross Creek. Roberts rarely polled more than a third of the 
vote at polling booths in rural areas, his small majority of 
151 being entirely due to his support in the borough of Upper 
Hutt across the Rimutaka Range. 
The crumbling of Labour ' s position in the Class 3 seats 
is perhaps the most interesting , as it showed the first signs 
of a swing to National outside the purely rural electorates of 
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Classes 1 and 2 . Nat ional increased its vote by only 2 . 08 
per cent, but won two seats, Marsden and Masterton. This 
may appear a small gain, but it must be remembered that Lab-
our in 1935 and 1938 had held all of these seats except Nel -
son, which Atmore held with the party 's support. He nearly 
lost the seat in 1943, and Labour's hold on Oamaru and Kaia-
poi was shaky. It still had comfortable majorities in Auck-
land Suburbs, Thames and Westland, but its monopoly of the 
Class 3 seats was broken and National made the beginnings of 
a recovery which was to extend to more highly urbanised elec-
torates in 1946 and 1949. 
National appeared (see Table IX) to make its greatest 
gains in 1943 in the Class 4 electorates, but Table VIII shows 
that these were largely illusory. The increase in National ' s 
vote (0 . 64 per cent) was the smallest in any class, and this 
despite a decrease of 10 . 13 per cent in the Labour vote . 
Nat ional won three seats from Labour, but in every case this 
was due to the splitting of the Labour vote by Democratic Lab-
our candidates. In 1946 with straight fights in most elector-
ates, Labour won back Waitemata (or North Shore, as it became). 
In Hamilton and New Plymouth, however, there was a just suffi-
cient swing from Labour to prevent it regaining them, and Nat-
ional held them throughout its term of office and after its 
defeat in 1957. Democratic Labour 's part in the original loss 
of these seats accounts for much of the subsequent Labour bitter-
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ness towards Lee, who himself stood at the Hamilton by-election 
in 1945 and ensured another National victory by polling 1095 
votes. Nat ional also suffered from the depredations of minor 
party and Independent candidates in Class 4 electorates, and 
this accounts for the small increase in its vote. In Napier 
Barnard took some votes from National, and in Timaru and We ll-
ington Suburbs Democratic Labour candidates did the same, a 
very unusual result. (1) In some Class 4 electorates , of course, 
National increased its vote substantially, but the gain was not 
at all evenly spread. 
The Government was hit hardest in its strongholds, the 
city seats of Class 5, where overall its vote dropped by nearly 
11 per cent. Nat ional, however, won only one new seat here, 
bringing its total up to three, while Labour still held 23. 
The seat chang ing hands was Wellington West, which Labour had 
won from the Independent R. A. Wright in 1938. In terms of 
~otes, too, Nat ional's position in Class 5 improved very little. 
Its vote decreased in six electorates (Auc kland Central, Dunedin 
North , Grey Lynn, Hutt , Remuera and Wanganui) and there were 
only five in which it increased by more than three per cent. 
The greatest damage inflicted on Labour in the cities was by 
Democratic Labour, not Nat ional. Table V gives some idea of 
the amount of damage Labour was able to absorb without any fun-
damental weakening of its position in the city electorates. 
The swing to National in Class 5 (2.51 per cent) was better 
(1) cr. p. 287. 
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than in any other except Class 1, but was negligible in rela-
tion to the amount of ground to be made up before the party 
started winning seats from Labour. 
The details of the voting in all five classes are shown 
on page 304. The major parties' share of the vote has already 
been given in Table VII, but this analysis includes the votes 
for small parties and for Independent candidates. These, the 
"others 11 , require some explanation. In Class 1 they were 
distributed between five candidates, but in Class 2 they were 
mostly accounted for by the 2137 votes cast for E.W. Nicolaus 
in Buller, where t here was no National candidate. The only 
Class 3 Independents were At more, with 6051 votes, and J.I.F. 
Williams, in Auckland Suburbs, with 196. In Class 4 Barnard 
polled 2784 votes, and the Class 5 the total included the high 
votes for Hogan (3563) Mansford (7134) and Scrimgeour (2253). 
It will be seen that the votes for the small parties were 
spread fairly evenly between the classes. Of course, these 
aggregate figures give no real indication of how much support 
a new party had in the different clas ses, for none of them had 
a full 11 slate 11 of candidates in any class. Democratic Labour 
had only five candidates in Class 1, nine in Class 2, five in 
Class 3, eight in Class 4 and 24 (nearly one in every elector-
ate) in Class 5 . The Independent Group and the R.D . M. did 
not approach this representation; both had only one candidate 
in Class 4, and two in Class 1. Average votes for candidates 
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Details of Results in Five Classes of Electorates 























56 191 39 .1 3% 
80987 56 . 40% 
2068 -1 1 . 44;o 
519 .36%** 
554 .39%** 
3273 2 . 281o 
143592 
Class III 
39752 43 . 88% 
39666 43 . 79/~ 
2988 3 . 30% 
1058 1.17% 
885 . 97%** 
6237 6 . 89fo** 
90586 
Class V 
205172 52 . 51% 
139050 35.59% 
23467 6 . 017b 
3881 • 99% 
2968 .73% 
16279 4 .17% 
390747 
Class II 
67726 43 . 01% 
80092 50 . 86% 







1 . 82% 
Class rl 







42 . 59% 
5 . 96% 
.16%* 
.15%* 
3 . 02% 
* One candidate only 
** Two candidates 
in each class, given in Table A, are the clearest way of repres-
enting party strengths. 
The inadequate representation of the Independent Group and 
the eal Democracy l ovement in Classes 1 and 4 makes it um·T ise 
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to generalise about their support. In fact, differences 
between the classes of the strengths of these two parties do 
not seem to be significant. The R.D . M.'s relatively high 
average in Class 3 cannot even be taken as a sign of heavier 
Social Credit support in small towns, for only two electorates, 
one of which was Auckland Suburbs, wa~ concerned. 
TABLE X 
Average Votes of Minor Party Candidates in Classes 1-5 
Class 
1 2 3 4 5 
D.L.P. 413 457 597 955 977 * 
One candidate 
I . G. 259** 360 211 204* 352 
** 
R.D . M. 277** 284 442* 193* 329 Two candidates 
It is, however, clear that Democratic Labour's strength 
grew as the content of urban population increased, following 
the pattern of Labour voting in 1943. The Democratic Labour 
average rose from Class 2 to Class 3 and rose steeply to Class 
4 . Thus its support was found in the same areas, and in 
roughly the same proportion, as was Labour's. Democratic Lab-
our's policies of cheap money and a higher guaranteed price 
did not win it much support in rural areas, and Lee ' s hopes 
that his party would displace Labour in some farming seats 
were shown to be the result of wishful thinking . Apart from 
this, Democratic Labour's stand as a radical challenger to the 
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Labour Party was not likely to appeal to rural voters who 
had in by-elections already shown that they were returning 
to the National Party. A party claiming to be to the left 




Labour support was a political tradition, and in these Labour j 
was, as has been shown, not harmed by split voting . 
The election results were basically an endorsement of 
the two-party system, and as such were of importance to the 
future development of the National and Labour parties only. 
The classification of electorates used in this chapter shows 
that the election produced a closer approximation to an urban-
rural split between the parties in Parliament than ever before. 
Although Labour won about 40 per cent of the Class 1 and 2 votes) 
it was left with only eight seats to National 1 s 25 in these two 
c~asses. Labour had lost most of its seats in purely farming l 
areas . In the cities, the situation was reversed; Labour 
held 28 seats, and National seven in Classes 4 and 5 combined. ) 
This urban-rural division was already developing in 1938, when 
Labour suffered a severe loss in Class 2 seats. It was accen-
tuated in 1943 when Labour lost more rural seats (two in Class 
1 and one in Class 2) while National failed to make comparable 
gains in the cities. 
After 1943, it was clear that were National to win an elec-
tion it would have to break Labour 1 s hold on the city seats. 
307 
This was made more urgent after the abolition of the country 
quota and the consequent reduction in the number of purely 
rural seats in 1945. A smal l beginning had been made in 
1943, when there was a swing of 2.51 per cent to National in 
Class 5 electorates. In 1946, the party won two secondary 
cities, Nelson and Invercargill, the new Wellington seat of 
Mount Victoria, and the Auckland seats of Eden and Parnell. 
At the next election, which National won, a decisive advance 
was made in New Zealand 1 s largest city. The party won four 
more Auckland seats - North Shore, Otahuhu, Roskill and Tamaki -
as well as Palmerston North and Has tings. Labour still held 
the vast maj ority of city seats but its losses in Auckland were 
sufficient to tip the balance in favour of National. The 
latter•s recovery in the cities after 1938 was slow and unspec-
tacular, but the 1943 election made it clear that until it occ-
urred National could go little further on the road back to power. 
The surmounting of this obstacle was in many ways the party ' s 
greatest achievement in the years between 1943 and 1949. 
The 1943 election marked an intermediate stage in the swing 
from Labour to National between 1938 and 1949. It was a point 
at which Labour lost votes heavily, but at which National was 
prevented from making commensurate gains by the intervention of 
third party and Independent candidates. In fact, National alone 
could not have caused anything like such a large loss of votes 
by Labour as actually occurred. Nevertheless, the election 
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disposed of the new parties , and a return to the two-party 
system brought a swing to National of 1. 04 per cent in 1946 
and a decisive 3 . 91 per cent in 1949. In 1943, however, 
Labour had lost a large section of its support before National 
was ready to take advantage of the fact and increase its own 
vote substantially . 
CHAPrER 8 
CONCLUSION AND EPILOGUE 
The most important immediate effect of the election was 
to lay to rest the vexed question of political unity. 
Holland interpreted the results as favouring a Nat ional gov-
ernment(1)and he was supported in this by most of the daily 
press. (2 ) However , it was difficult to see how the election 
result had shown much desire for this, or how the campaign 
had helped to bring it any nearer. Any possible re-opening 
of the question was forestalled by the Prime Minister in his 
post -election statement. 
We do not propose to be handicapped or trammelled 
in any way by sharing the authority for the carry-
ing out of our policy, and the legislative or 
administrative plans for its realisation, with 
any person or party which has opposed us and our 
programme and has been rejected by the people ••• 
The National Party and its leader smashed ••• 
political unity in the most deliberate and irres-
ponsible manner ••• 
After such an experience any further efforts in 
the same direction would be futile. Indeed, it 
would be a surrender of the people 's mandate ••• 
The Government can ca~ry on very successfully. 
We intend to do so.\3 J 
The National Party made no overtures for a coalition after 
the election and for the rest of the war there was very little 
pressure for one from any quarter . This was not surprising. 
A national government would have been likely only if the elec-
tion result had been a close one , or if the balance of power 
in Parliament had been held by M. P.s outside the main parties . 
However , Labour, with 45 seats to National 's 34 had a decisive 
(1) Star-Sun, 27 September 1943. (2) See N. Z. Herald, Star, Evening Post, Star -Sun, Et c. 28 ~~¥~: 
(3) Standard, 30 September 1943. 
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majority and, as Fraser claimed, a mandate to carry on. The 
election brought order out of potential chaos by eliminating 
the new parties . Democratic Labour lost its two seats in the 
House and was finished as an important factor in New Zealand 
politics . TIE People's Movement and the Real Democracy Movement 
• 
were snuffed out and neither was heard of again . The Social 
Credit Movement, battered in spirit and finances by its exper-
iment with the R. D •• , retired from the political scene until 
1954 when, in different circumstances, the Social Credit Polit-
ical League emerged as a significant political force. Thus , in 
its drastic but effective way , the electoral system had once 
again ended an incipient diversification of parties that had 
looked so threatening to Labour and National alike in 1940 . 
None of the new parties had made sufficient headway to give any 
promise of winning seats or to force either of the main parties 
to come to terms with them, and their extinction was inevitable. 
The election marked a break with the past for both Labour 
and National . For Labour it was the beginning of an electoral 
decline that ended in defeat in 1949 . The party ' s campaign in 
1943 showed that it considered its main work done, and it fought 
the election largely on its record . At such a difficult time 
this was dangerous to do . Although National had not yet taken 
the initiative on policy matters , Labour was certainly open to 
attack as far as its record and administration were concerned . 
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Time and again, on manpower, on taxation, on marketing, it 
was forced into defensive positions by its critics. Labour, 
instead of being able to pr@mise further advances as in 1938, 
was forced to defend its record, and in such a debate the terms 
were inevitably set by the critics, not by the Government. 
The radical overtones of Labour policy were no longer evi-
dent in 1943. Although the Government promised to carry on its 
social security and welfare policies, it did not mention any 
fresh fields of State activity. As "Freedom", the National 
Party newspaper, said after the election, 
In spite of Mr. Fraser's claim that the Government 
has received a mandate to carry on, it cannot be 
said that there has been a vote in favour of fur-
ther experiments in Socialism. Rather , the elec-
torate has said, in unmistakablE; terms, "Thus far 
you have gone; go no further! 11 U) 
Actually , it was the Government itself which had declared 
that it had gone far enough. It had certainly not sought "a 
vote in favour of further experiments in Socialism" . In one 
crucial sphere - the monetary system - it had openly opposed 
further State control in the face of demands from Democratic 
Labour and from the left wing of its own party . 
With this loss of radical initiative came an equally obv-
ious, but less definable, decrease in the party's vitality. 
Many of Labour's leaders were old men well before 1943. After 
the election there was no doubt about which side of the House 
(1) Freedom , 8 October 1943. 
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the "old gang 11 were on; all the new faces were in the Oppos-
ition, and Labour was the ageing party. The Government had, 
particularly during the war years, shown itself to be impatient 
and at times contemptuous of criticism. This had been partie-
ularly evident in its dealings with the farmers. The Govern-
ment seemed blissfully unaware of the extent to which rural 
feeling was running against it, and of the damage its attitude 
over such matters as wool prices and the Servicemen ' s Settlement 
and Land Sales Act had done . Vain and dictatorial actions by 
Labour leaders -for instance Semple's dismissal from a public 
works job of a man who had disagreed with him at a meeting( 1)- -
were widely noticed and commented on . Of course, many Ministers 
were handicapped as far as public opinion was concerned by their 
activities in World War I, and at times they seemed to be trying 
rather too hard to live them down . Perhaps, in another sense, 
Labour's divorce from its past was symbolised by the Savage 
Memorial at Auckland, an incongruous monument to a man whose 
personal life had been unusually simple and unostentatious. 
With the defeat of Democratic Labour the worst of the int-
ernal strife in the Labour Party was over . In many ways, Lab-
our radicalism had been dealt a crippling blow by Lee's activi-
ties after 1940 . Labour leaders drove home to their supporters 
the fact that Democratic Labour was a "scab" party organised to 
damage Labour, and that such a party had to be fought no matter 
(1) Dominion, 17 April 1940. 
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how much Labour supporters might sympathise with Lee 's ideals 
and criticisms. Fighting for radical ideas outside the party 
was a different matter from fighting for them inside it. This 
was why, twenty years after the event, one of the founders of 
the Democratic Labour Party summed it up as "a mistake", (1)for 
in the end it only weakened the position of the remaining left-
wingers in the Labour Party. The only polit ical success they 
had after 1940 was the forcing of the national i sation of the 
Bank of New Zealand on Cabinet in 1946. Otherwise, the left 
was in steady retreat ending in the party's acceptance of peace-
time conscription in 1949. 
The 1943 election was also the end of a stage in the Nat -
ional Party's development. This was not because of its incr-
eased representation, but because of its largely ne\v personnel . 
Many of the older National M. P.s had retired, and after the 
election only eight who had been in Parliament before 1935 
remained. There were 17 new members , most of them young men 
who formed the main body of the party in Parliament throughout 
its term of office from 1949 to 1957. The great majority now 
shared Holland ' s outlook and policies , and the previous sniping 
at his leadership by some of the older members ceased. 
Nat i onal ' s expected eLectoral advance did not occur, and 
four of its six new seats \vere vTOn because of the split Labour 
(1) H. E. Herring, letter to the author. 
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vote. The election was rather a chance for the party to 
consolidate gains already made . The increase in its rural 
vote meant that the farming seats won from Labour in 1938 
could now be looked on as "safe" and National was not seriously 
challenged in any rural seat until the emergence of the Social 
Credit Political League in 1954. In the cities, National laid 
the foundation of future advances by increasing its vote slightly 
in the face of threats of vote-splitting by candidates of all 
types. 
It is significant that after 1943 National was no longer 
troubled by right -wing splinter groups . Part of the explana-
ti6n was the complete failure of the Independent Group and the 
right-wing Inde pendents at the election, but the main reason lay 
in the National Party itself. Under Holland it moved to the 
left rather than the right, but it became a much more effective 
Opposition . The new right-wing organisations such as the Free-
dom Association and the People ' s Movement which grew up after 
1938 were really an effort to goad National into becoming a more 
effective anti -Labour force. With the revitalisation of the 
party under Holland the main raison d'etre for these groups 
disappeared. Those members of the People 's Movement who joined 
the Nat ional Party in 1940 probably realised this. Those who 
had been dissatisfied with the amount of control exercised by 
the leadership in the National Party were impressed by Holland's 
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guarantee of "freedom" of voting for Nat ional M.Ps. Many 
of the younger Nat ional candidates in 1943 mentioned this as 
one of their main reasons for joining the party. This "free-
dom" was largely illusory and very rarely exercised in subse-
quent years, but Holland ' s declaration had considerable propa-
ganda value at a time when there was some dissatisfaction with 
party politics . 
Nevertheless, National did not have a great deal to feel 
optimistic about after t he election. The reason for this was 
put with surprising frankness by Gordon, the party's President, 
at a Dominion Council meeting soon after the election. 
An analysis of the 1943 total vote recorded would 
seem to indicate that many electors who formerly 
voted Labour were disillusioned, but did not have 
sufficient confidence in the National Party to 
vote in our favour. That would appear to be the 
reason why such a large number abstained from vot-
ing, and why a proportion of the anti-government 
votes went to other parties in the field . If, 
as may conceivably happen , we have a straight-out 
two-party contest at the next electiQn 1 that pos-ition will have to be rectified •••• ~1J 
Gordon had hit on the most important feature of the elec-
tion - what may be called an "arrested swing" from Labour to 
National. This marks the 1943 election apart from others bet-
ween 1938 and 1951; at none of these was there a significant 
difference between the number of votes lost by the Government 
and those gained by the Opposition . In 1943, however , the 
Labour vote dropped by nearly ten per cent, but National ' s rose 
(1) National Party . Dominion Council Minutes, 21 October 1943, 
quoted in Robinson , op. cit., p.161. 
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by less than one per cent . 
An "arrested swing" such as this occurs only when the 
party in power h~s lost considerable support but the main 
opposition party has not developed or won public confidence 
sufficiently to win over the dissatisfied groups . The only 
other ways for them to protest are to abstain from voting 
(and widespread abstention has always been rare in New Zealand) 
or to vote for a new party or Inde pendent candidates. New 
parties have in fact arisen regularly in New Zealand to fill 
vacuums of opposition in such circumstances. The Country 
Party had some success in rural areas,where Labour was highly 
suspect, in the nineteen-twenties, but the first new party to 
take action on a national scale was the United Party in 1928 . 
United does not perhaps fit exactly into this discussion as a 
"new" party, for it was a revival , with fundamental changes, 
of the almost defunct Liberal Party. Nevertheless, the revival 
was carefully calculated to take place at a time when the wide-
spread dissatisfaction with Reform was not yet ready to be con-
verted into increased support for Labour, and with a venerated 
Leader and its traditional position as a centre party opposed to 
conservative and socialist extremes, United won enough seats to 
become the Government . 
The Democrat Party, created in 1934, appealed mainly to 
disgruntled right-wing supporters of National . However, its 
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programme was strikingly similar to Labour 1 s on some points 
and had a superficially progressive flavour so that it is 
possible that it took some votes that would otherwise have 
gone to Labour. The Democrats polled 65,000-odd votes 
without winning any seats. The Social Credit Political 
League, which achieved a rather unexpectedly high vote in 
1954, was in a different category . The League certainly 
gained some votes through its criticism of the National 
Government 1 s ncredit squeeze 11 and itw general criticisms of 
orthodox finance. It is equally certain that only a small 
number of the League 1 s voters were convinced Social Crediters. 
What probably carried far more weight were the League 1 s attacks 
on party politics at a time when there was singularly little 
difference in out look and policies between the t\vo main parties. 
The League was loud in its denunciations of party politics (as 
the Real Democracy Movement had been in 1943) and concentrated 
hard on the line that there was ttno difference betvTeen the 
parties 11 • Voting for Social Credit candidates seems at the 
time of writing (1961) to be directed not against one party , 
but against both for their failure to produce alternative pol-
icies. That such a group should have polled a large vote -
essentially an ant i-party vote - at three consecutive elections 
is a sign of widespread malaise among electors, and a potential 
threat to both parties . The 1960 election results, however , 
showed increasing Social Credit support in certain dairy-farming 
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electorates and in North Auckland - the areas where the 
Country Party was most successful in the ninetBen-twenties 
and thirties. It is possible that the League may be chang-
ing from a vehicle for protest votes against both major parties 
into a party with definite sectional support. 
Voting for the small parties in 1943 was the product of 
two distinct factors - dissatisfaction with one or other of 
the existing parties, and disapproval of the pursuit of party 
politics in wartime . The "arrested swing" was the result of 
t he first of these in that National had not won sufficient 
public confidence to absorb all those dissatisfied with the 
Government . It had, though, done as much as possible to min-
imise the drift to the new parties by working to overhaul its 
image. The party fully accepted Labour's social welfare leg-
islation, and ostentatiously set about removing members of the 
"old gang" from positions of power . However, these measures 
were taken too late to pay large dividends in 1943. The ext-
ent to which confidence in the party was lacking can be seen 
in the passage in its election manifesto reading "The National 
Party pledges itself not to cut wages or pensions . 11 That any 
such declaration was necessary shows that National 's image as 
a "depression party 11 was by no means dead . In fact,_ Labour 
still concentrated heavily on this. One candidate said, for 
instance, that "Social Security and working conditions v.rere at 
present in the melting pot and the election was to decide 
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whether or not they were to be continued", (1) and Fraser, in 
his final pre -election message stressed that National waa 
still a "depression party" despite its new appearance . (2) 
The small increase in the National vote showed that such 
arguments were still effective. 
The small parties catered for a wide variety of political 
opinion . Democratic Labour appealed for support from Labour 
radicals , and no doubt they formed the core of its adherents. 
It must not be forgotten, however , that on some points , notably 
in its attitudes to industry and to trade unionism, Democratic 
Labour stood to the right of the Labour Party , and its critic-
isms of Government manpower policy were echoed by the National 
Party. For many of its supporters (as for two of its candid-
ates)(3)Democratic Labour was a half -way house between support 
for Labour and subsequent adherance to the National Party . 
The Independent Group vlas clearly a right -wing reaction 
from the National Party as far as its policy was concerned, and 
it is doubtful if it attracted any votes from Labour. · The 
R. D. M. is harder to place . Many Social Crediters , to whom it 
chiefly appealed , had been members of the Labour Party but had 
become disillusioned with it . However , its policy was conser-
vative and its attacks on high taxation could have taken the 
edge off National ' s appeal in some electorates. The complica-
ting factor in determining the orientation of these two new 
(1) Domin~on, 7 September 1943. 
(2)Ibid.~ 24 September 1943. (3) See a oove, p. 14-5. 
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parties was their opposition to party politics , whi ch both 
stressed above all else . Op position to party politics in 
wartime was fairly widespread , and it was increased by the 
amount of political controversy carried on over relatively 
minor matters at critical stages in the war , and by the 
failure to form a national government . It was obvious that 
the Independent Group and the Real Democracy Movement , as 
well as many of the Independents,. had a powerful weapon in 
their opposition to the party system , as well as in their 
criticisms of the policies of the individual parties . 
Why , then, were the votes for the new parties and the 
Independents not larger? The answer lies in the natural 
preoccupation with governmental stability in wartime . Rela-
tively fe1.; voters were prepared to risk political instability 
by voting for a party with no chance of forming a government, 
and few Labour supporters, no matter how much they might have 
sympathised with Lee, were prep~red to risk a Labour defeat 
by voting for the Democratic Labour Party . The Government's 
warnings against "splitting the Labour vote" vrere in the end 
successful. A post-election comment by L. Frame , the Demo-
cratic Labour candidate for Wellington Suburbs, was illuminat-
ing on this point . 
The amazing spectacle of the Government candidates 
being heckled, and in some cases even ridiculed at 
their poorly attended meetings, and then being 
voted for so cqn~istently is a new one in New Zea-
land politics . l1J . 
(1) John A. Lee ' s Weekly, 3 November 1943 . 
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Lee and his party ' s candidates had clearly underestimated 
the power of argument against vote-splitting and "changing 
horses in mid-stream11 during the war . Despite the reservoirs 
of ill-will against the Government it was unreasonable to 
expect many voters .to seek new political horizons in wartime . 
A. E. Davy, commenting on the failure of his Independent Group, 
fully realised this . 
I do not think the results of the election will 
come as any great surprise . Although we were 
encouraged to believe that the people had had 
enough of party politics, the election was dec -
ided upon strictly party lines . It is evident 
that the people are too preoccupied with the war 
to give much consideration to anything new in 
our political life •••• People were preoccupied 
with the war and simply made up their minds to 
vote for or against the government on strict 
party lines . It is for this reason that the 
outstanding qqalities of many candidates went 
unrecognised . l1) 
No - one pretended in 1943 that the Labour victory was the 
result of the same enthusiasm that had attended those of 1935 
and 1938 . Nevertheless , both Labour and National had much to 
be thankful for . Both had faced challenges from new political 
groups, and criticism of party politics from Independents like 
Barnard was something to which neither had any answer , since 
botp had come out badly from the half-hearted attempts at 
political unity during the war . However , the political slate 
was wiped clean of the new parties, and none was able to pose 
a real threat to either of the established ones . In an elec-
( 1 ) Evening Post, 27 September 1943 . 
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tion which showed little enthusiasm for either party , it was 
nevertheless the two-party system itself which won . 
------ ---
A P P E N D I C E S 
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APPENDIX A 
BY - ELECTIONS 1938-1943 
Christchurch South 
R.M. McFarlane (Lab) 
M.E. LYons (Nat) 
Auckland West 
H.P. Carr (Lab) 
W.H. Fortune (Nat) 
C.G. Watson (Com) 
L. Pickles (Ind) 
J. B'. Kennedy ( Ind) ~c 




































Bay of Plenty 
w. Sullivan (Nat) 
c. Mills (Lab) 
Mid-Canterbury 









A.S. Sutherland (Kat) 3805 
H.T. Head (Ind) 1082 
Temuka 7/2/42 
H.J.D. Acland (Nat) 4375 
D.C. Davie ("Ind. Monetary 
Reformer") 1616 
Christchurch East 6/2/43 
Miss M.B. Howard (Lab) 
H.E. Herrin~ (D.L.P.) 
M.E. Lyons {Kat) 
L.A. W. Efford (Ind) 










Labour National D.L.P. 
21-30 1 4 
31-40 5 8 14 
41-50 15 17 8 
51-60 18 27 3 
61-70 16 5 1 
71- 1 1 
No information 17 13 21 
Note : Information for this table has been gathered from 
various editions of "Who's Wb.o in New Zealand", newspaper 
advertisements and candidates' campaign material. Insufficient 






















Party official 1 
Skilled worker 5 
Unskilled worker 2 
Member of Parl't. 
Retired 1 


























































Note on occupations 
Some occupations listed in this table are 
of formal interest only. A number of M.P. ' s of long standing 
had of course not followed their old occupations for many 
_ years,although these have been listed where possible. Fraser 
and Semple , for instance, are included among the Labour 
candidates as "trade union officials". They could perhaps be 
better classified as "Members of Parliament",, but this has 
been retained only as a last resort. Its one occupant, John 
A. Lee, described himself as such in the electoral rolls and 
does not seem to have had any one clearly definable b66upation 
before his first election in 1922 or until his defeat in 1943. 
"Small businesses" are taken as those run by the 
candidate himself or employing up to two or.tb.ree others. 
owners of larger concerns are included in 11 business 11 • 11Exec-
utives" are those in managerial positions in private business-
es. Many candidates weee, of course, in the forces at ~ the 
~ime of the election, but in this list the category includes 
only those who had stayed on as instructors after their term 
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of service was over or those who had entered the forces as 
virtually their first employment. "Public servants 11 include 
one local body official. 
This list is a general guide only. Occupational classif-
ication cannot be accurate when there is not standardised 
information available. Some candidates appear, also, to have 
given rather optimistic apprai sals of themselves ana their 
attainments. One, for ins tance- ~ 1 , was aescri b~a as a "small 
businessman" in his party's press releases, but appears in 
the elec.,oral roll as a "draper's assistant". The electoral 
rolls have been accepted as providing the more candid 
descri ption in such cases. 
(c) New party and Independent candidates. 
There was some 
confusion among newspapers as to the affiliation of some 
candidates outside the Labour ana National parties. A careful 
check on advertisements and election campaign material has 
cleared up these discrepancies. The exact labels of the 
Independents have also been given~ although many of these are 
of esoteric interest only. These lists form the basis of the 
figures quoted in Chapter VII. 
DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY 
A. E. .Allen Hamilton H. E. Herring Wellingt on 
T.K. .Ansley Waitemata North 
G. Barclay Oamuru s. Hindrnarsh Palmers ton 
R?J. Barnett Otaki North 
R.H. Bates .Pi id-Canterbury Mrs. c. Jowsey Btahuhu 
R.R. Beauchamp Rmccarton L.A. Jury N f!§ Plymouth 
D.C. Beloe Hauraki J • .A. Lee Gr~y Lynn 
W. G. Bishop Wellington East D.Pf Lloyd Franklin 
G. G. Burke Waikato T. Lyon Gisborne 
D. H. Butcher Hawkes Bay s. McDougall Wellington 
G. H. Claridge Dunedin South West 
P. Connors Hutt L.P McMahon Remuera 
R.E. Crawford Wairarapa A. E. Marwick Stratford 
D.R. Creswell Timaru C. M. Moss Dunedin Nth. 
P. T. Curran Auckland West J.C. Nesfiela Waitomo 
B. Dawson Thames T.M. Nixon Eden 
A.T. Dillon Raglan F. M. Nottage Lyttelton ., 
N. V. Douglas Onehunga J.H. Parry Christchurch 
L. S. Dromgoole Auckland East North 
s. Duffy Wanganui R. Pearson Christchurch 
E. A. Ellis Pahiatua South 
L. Frame Wellington Subs. J. A. Peat Dunedin Cen. 
M. W. Grace Marlborough s. s. Pennefather Auckland Suba 
L.P.. Earbora Invercargill A. E. Petty Marsden 
K. W. Hay Roskill Te A.Pitama Southern Maori 
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M. Rangitaura Western Maori 
H.T. Schou Christchurch 
East 
c. s. Teece ~ellington 
South 
D. A. Thompson Masterton 
INDEPENDENT GROUP 
H.M. Bagnall Aucl:land West 
H. Bliss Kaiapoi 
R. Clayton::: Patea 
w. ;;. Crawford otaki 
R.J. Culver Auckland East 
G.P Cuttriss Oamuru 
R. Day Thames 
J.T. Donovan Auckland Subs . 
C. D. Drurmnond Wellington West 
H. W. Glynn Roskill 
H.T. Head Hauraki 
w.c. Hewitt Wai~emata 
REAL DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT 
F. Allen 
H. J. Angus 
C.P. Belton 
Mrs.G. BDooks 
T. G. Burnham 
s. Burton 



















W.H. Tong Rotorua 
n. v• Upton Avon 
L.A. Wheatley Auckland Central 
c.w. Young BEV of Islands 
P. Witehira Northern aori 
F. A. Keane Dunedin North 
R. Malcolm Wellington North 
J.H.Penniket Waikato 
D. E. Parret V'/aimarino 
G. E. Plane Grey Lynn 
J.N. Power Masterton 
L.E. Read Onehunga 
E. C. Russell Wellington 
W.F. Smithson Wairarapa 
E. W. Sinton Remuera 
L.R. Wilkinson Tauranga 
D. H • Wilson Eden 
• 
E. Moss Franklin 
T.E. Somerville Onehunga 
O.A. Thelding Kaiapoi 
W. R. Thompson Hamilton 
East 
F. Whiley Christchurch Eaat 
R.G. Young Hauraki 
(~; C.P. Belton and J.A. 
Govan were also endorsed by 
the New Zealand Fighting 
Forces' League (Political) ) 
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INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES 
Candidates marked with an asterisk(*) were endorsed by 
the People ' s Movement , although not members of the Independent 
Group. Independents in the Maori electorates are not included 






L.A. W. Efford 








H. S. S. Kyle =~ ;;~* 
D.M. McClure 
H.V. McCready* 
A. D. McKenzie 
A. McKinnon 
Miss M. McLean 
P.J. McMullan 
T.O. Maddison 
A.E . Mansford 
A.G. Newland 
E. w. Nicolaus 
C. G. Scrimgeour 

















Complete Democracy Christchurch North 
Social Democrat Roskill 
Independent Hutt 
Independent Liberal Christchurch South 
Independent Hurunui 
" Auckland East 
" Wellington Central 
N.Z. Fighting Forces' 
League (Political) Remuera 
Independent Riccarton 
" Auckland Central 
" New Plymouth 




11 Wellington South 
11 Palmerston North 
11 Central Otago 
11 Buller 
" Wellington Central 
11 Kaipara 
11 Christchurch North 
Savage Labour Auckland Suburbs 
Indepenoent New 
Order Hawkes Bay 
332 
APPENDIX 0 
THE FORCES' VOTES 
The controversy over votes cast by servicemen overseas 
began immediately the election results were known and continudd 
long afterwards. It centred around thr~e points; the higher 
proportion of Labour votes cast by the forces than by civilians, 
the poor distribution of election to the forces, and the burn-
ing of the ballot papers in the Middle East. The last, in part-
icular, seems to have become part of New Zealand's political 
folklore. 
Arrangements for forwarding party policy statements and i 
lists of candidates to the forces were made late and in some 
cases sketchily. The Government's attitude seems to have been 
expressed in Fraser's remark early in -the year that "I do not 
think that men in Egypt think about politics at all 11 } 1)and it 
was not until early September that the parties' contributions 
to the special election issues of the forces' newspapers were 
invited. The allocations of space were, however, made quite 
fairly. In "New Zealand News", publishedin London, Labour was 
allocated 49 column inches, National 45, Democratic Labour 29, 
the Independent Group 23 and the Real Democracy Movement six. 
The three sitting Independents, Atmore, Barnard and Kyle, were 
each allowed a 100-word message.The same policy statments were 
printed in all the forces' newspapers, but with variations in 
layout. In "N.z.E.F. Times" (published in the Middle East) all 
(1) N.Z.P.D., vol.262, P•35e 
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the statements began on the front page, but in "Kiwi News" 
(published in New Caledonia for the Pacific tropps) Labour 
definitely took the lion's share of the space by using a 
typographDcal disply without telling any of the other parties 
that they were also entitled to this.( 1) However, if the 
allocation of space was admitted to be fairly salisfactory, 
the distribution of the ma terial was not, although the sit-
uation was origina~}y t hought to have been worse thanit actuallY 
was. 
It was immediately apparent on election night that voting 
for Labour in the forces was heavier ~hen among civilians.This 
was r brought home foreefully by the appearance, when only the 
civilian results were known, that the Government had come very 
near to defeat. National led in six seats which the Government 
later held with forces' votes .. These e.eats were Eden, Nelson, 
Palmerston North, Oamuru, Otaki and Wairarapa. Had National 
held these the House would have been evenly split between the 
two parties with forty seats each. However, it soon became 
clear when the forces and absentee vobes were counted that the 
Government had a safe lead. There was uncertainty about the 
result in Oamuru for some days, and on 27 September most news-
papers went to press with a photograph of T.R. Beatty, the 
National candidate, as the new Member. Although it was clear 
by Monday that the Government had held most o# the closely 
fought seats, it must have spent some anxious hours on Saturday 
night. 
(1) N.Z.P.D.,vol.267, p.639. 
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The National Party was still muttering about the torces' 
votes when it was announced early in 1944 that the used ballot 
papers in the Middle East had been destrmyed after the election 
in stead of returned to New Zealand as required by law. The 
whole question immediately flared up again, and threatened to 
become a major political issue •. National now felt certain that 
there had been some irregularity in the voting overseas, and 
were determined not to let the matter drop. The Government 
realised the seriousness of its admission, and at the beginning 
of the 1944 session of Parliament a Select Committee of the 
House was set up "to inquire into and report upon the organiz-
ation set up and the methods employed for recording and 
dealing with the votes of servicemen in the recent general 
election". This Cornmi ttee, the Servicemen's Votes ( 1943) 
Committee, sat throughout the session and did not present its 
report until 6 December. 
The arrangements and procedures for voting in the forces 
were set out in detail in the reports of the Special Return-
in g0fficers( 1) and there is no point in recapitulating them 
here. They seem to have worked satisfactorily on the whole. 
the one important exception of the upset over arrangements for 
personnel in India being due to Post Office staff in the Middle 
East sending the material by surface instead of air mail.( 2) 
Interest in the Committee's report, therefore, cenjred around 
(1) A.J.H.R.,H33C, 1944. 
(2) Ibid.,p.14. 
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its findinas regarding the availability of propaganda and the 
disposal of the Middle East ballot papers. 
The report itself was a shopt document of four pages. It 
stated, without giving any reasons, that propaganda for the 
Middle East had been late in arriving and that 6000 men had 
voted without seeing any of it. Regarding the burnt ballot 
papers, the comrrdttee pointed out that under the Electoral 
(Members of Forces) Regulations of 1941 these were not available 
for a recount, the Returning Officer's statement being accepted 
as final. The committee decided that Major Bryan, the Middle 
East Special Returning Officer, had committed"an ,~error of 
judgement"in burning the papers, but it was clear that the 
episode was not in the least sinister. Bryan had been sent to 
the Middle East mnly three weeks before the polling date and 
had done a remarkable job with, as his report( 1)made clear,a 
minimum of helpful assisantce and preparation by the Government. 
When the count had been completed Bryan had approached Brigadier 
Wier to have the papers returned to New Zealand , but had been 
told that no shipping space was available. Had the enemy been 
able to capture the material , however, the strength of the New 
Zealand force in the ~~~i£!1!ould have been accurately known 
and its security endangered. It was therefore decided to burn 
all the election material, including the used ballot papers~ 2) 
(1)Ibid.,pp.5-14. 
(2)Servicemen's Votes (1943) Committee (Report of the), 
A.J. H. R. ,I18,1945, p.3. 
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The National Party were not to let the matter rest at 
that, ana it was thoroughly fought over in the debate which 
followed the presentation of the rpeort. It wa,s, however, quite 
clear that B~an had acted in good faith in ordering the papers 
to be burnt, and it was understandable that, after a month's 
frenzied work under trying conditions, he was not very concerned 
about what happennea to <"· them. The minutes of evidence taken 
by the committee were bot widely circulated, only one copy being 
laid on the table of the House. The National members of the 
committee contended that the report was a 11whitewash" ana aid not 
accurately reflect the burden of the evidence. Portions of this 
which were read out in the debate in the House( 1)certainly 
indicated that this was the case on some points. Although most 
National speakers were led astray by the rea herring of the 
burnt pallots, it was clear that they had real grounds for 
complaint about the transmission of election material to the 
forces. The picture that emerged was of the commanding officers 
in the Middle East urging the Government to make sure that the 
Parties' policy statements reached the proops in plenty of time, 
and the Government itself refusing to make any arrangements 
until the last mement. One would have expected that the reverse 
might have been the case, for the officers in the field could 
certainly have been excused for regarding the election as a 
nusiance. However, as early as 16 March 1943 Brigadier Stevens, 
the Officer in Charge of Administration for 2N.Z.E.F., asked 
that party policy statements be ready for distribution three 
(1) N.Z. P.D.,vol.267.pp.633-696. 
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weeks before the election. On 24 July Stevens again cabled to ~ 
New Zealand asking why he had Areceived no reply to his earlier 
message. This failed to elicit any reply, and on 21 August 
Freyberg himself cabled the Government urging that all election 
material be ready for distribution by 9 September. In response 
to this L.C. mrwin, the Chief Electoral Officer, set 4 September 
1g the final date for all election material for the forces to be 
in his hands, and 2 N. Z.E.F. arranged to keep 12 September free 
from manoeuvres so that voting could be carried out. It will be 
noted that even this would have allowed only a few days, insteAd 
of three weeks, for perusal of the material. National Party 
propaganda was handed in on 4 September, forwarded to the censor 
for clearance, and returned to Irwin on the 6th. The Labour 
Party's material, however, was not banded in until the 10th, 
six days after the deadline and only two days before voting was 
to bake place.( 1) Although the Postand Telegraph Department's 
Cable Section worked all day on the 12th to despatch the material, 
there was no hope of it reaching the troops in time. On 11 
September Freyberg and his administrative officers decided to 
stop the voting,until the material arrived, but before all uni*s 
bad received this order some 6000 men had voted without seeing 
any material whatsoever.( 2)It was necessary for the Division to 
(1) Ibid.,pp.63S:9. 
(2) A.J.H. R.JM H33C, 1944, p.8. 
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move to a new training area on the 13th,and voting was accord-
ingly postponed until the19th. The material finally arrived on 
the 13th, "N.Z.E.F. Times" "rushed into publication", as Bryan 
put it, and was distributed to all units ob 15 September. Thus 
the men, many of whom had been in the Middle East for three 
years, had to try to acquaint themselves with the changed New 
Zealand political scene in only four days, and at a time when 
the Division was carrying out a complete change of location. 
The bungle was clearly the fault of the Government, both for 
failing to make earlier arrangements for forces' propaganda, 
and for neglecting even to make sure that Labour propaganda 
was ready in time. 
The Opposition speakers in the debate also revealed, from 
the evidence presented to the committee, the unfortunate after-
math of the burning of the ballot papers. The final count was 
completed in the Middle East on 24 October, and, following 
eir's advice that no shipping space was avail able for their 
return, the papers were burnt on 1 November. Two days later 
Bryan received a cable from Irwin demanding their return, to 
which he replied on the .5th advising that they had been destroyed~ 1 
The Prime Minister was not, however, told of this until the 
following January, although Irwin had drafted a letter to the 
New Zealand Alliance promising a recount of the licencing votes 
on 20 December 1945, and had obtained Nash ' s signature to it.( 2) 
(1) N. Z. P. D. ,vol.267, p.639. 
(2) Ibid., ~.650. 
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Table XI makes clear the Gi.fferences between the 
civilian and forces's voting. 
TABLE___g 
Civilian and Forces' voting 
Civilian % Forces % 
Partl 
Labour 383,599 46.73 48276 53.37 
National 363,300 44.26 31285 34.58 
D.L.P. 34,262 4.17 6162 6. 81 
J.G. 6,383 .78 820 • 91 
R. D.M. 5.;321 .65 416 .46 
Others 28,043 . 3.q.1 3503 3.87 
Totals 820,908 1 oo.oo 90462 100.00 
Invalid votes 7,475 .90 2482 2.67 
The Labour vote was much higher among servicemen, and this 
was so in practically every electorate. However, National 
obtained a majority of the forces' votes in 19 electorates. 
All but two sitting Nationalists had comfortable leads• 
although Labour sometimes led in safe National seats where 
the National vandidate was anewcomer. This seems to indicate 
that, despite a general preference for Labour, soldiers also 
tended to vote for the sitting member. Barnard, for instance, 
obtained 531 soldiers' votes to the Labour candidate's 534 in 
Napier, and in Grey Lynn Lee polled 646 to Hackett 's 755, 
leaving the National candidate with only 182.This trend was 
probably due to a desire to keep things as they were 'and 
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avoid dra~tic political changes during the war. Democratic 
Labou~s relative success among servicemen was due to several 
factors. Lee was himself a disabled veteran of Vorld War I,and 
a holder of the D.C.M. He had xtaken pains to give Democratic 
Labour a returned services flavour in choosing its candidates 
and by inserting the word "Soldier" into its name just before 
the election. In addition, Lee had always sought higher was 
. veterans ' and disablement pensions, and his party ' s message to 
the forces coneentrated very effectively ob this and other 
points affecting servicemen. 
Estimates of the proportion of servicemen who vo t ed , 
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These percentages compared very favourably with tbe 
figure in New Zealand, wich was 82.8 per cent. Informal voting 
in the forces was , however, higher than in New Zealand . This 
was probably due to lack of knowledge of the candidates, and 
there was apparently some informal voting as a protest against 
the paucity and late arrival of the election material. The 
Special Returning Officer for the Middle East, Major Bryan, 
reported that "many persons cast blank ballot-papers~' ( 2) and 
2 N.Z . E.F. tradition has it that there were a large number 
(1) Loc.cit.,p.1 . 
(2) A.J.H.R.,H33C,1944,p . 14. 
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of "write-in" votes for a certain well-known Middle Eastern 
monarch. 
These factors aside, however, there were several reasons 
why servicemen should have recorded a Pdgher percentage of 
Labour votes. First , many of the had been out of touch with New 
Zealand conditions for some time , and it ·must be remembered that 
the Government had been much more popular at the be ginning of 
1940 than it was in 1943. The only source of news for service-
men, apart from letters, was "N.Z.E.F. Times" , which did not 
attempt to follow the progress of party politics in New Zealand 
and confined its political news to factual reports of legislatbon 
and Government decisions on important matters. Several Cabinet 
Ministers 
had also made trips to the Middle East and had spoken to the 
troops there. 
It should not be forgotten that the average serviceman 
was more likely to be a Labour jhan a National supporter. He 
would have been young - under forty unless he was a commissioned 
officer who had volunteered early in the war - probably 
unmarried, and not so likely to have the skills that might have 
caused him to be retained in New Zealand - at high rates of pay-
asxessential manpower. In addition, the Government , through 
visiting Ministers and in its election material, had fully 
described its rehabilitation plans and had drawn attention to 
recent increases in veterans'a nd disablement pensions. Finally, 
the inauguration of the furlough scheme in July 1943 had of ~ 
cpurse been enthusiastically welcomed by the forces, and came 
just at the crucial time before the election. 
B I B L I 0 G R A P H Y 
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